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Abstract
ORIGINS OF SQUATTING AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
IN NAIROBI
by
Samuel M. Kobiah
-Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 23, 1978,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
City Planning
Squatting poses one of the most nagging problems to the cities of
underdeveloped countries. Whereas numerous theories and methods of re-
solving the problem have been used, it is evident that the problem still
persists. This study is an attempt to understand the squatting problem
and how it is being resolved in Kenya.
It is <the contention of the study that squatting cannot be under-
stood as merely a "natural" and incidental byproduct of urbanization and
"modernization". Nor can it be seen as simply a logical outcome of rural-
urban migration. To understand squatting in Kenya, this thesis traces
squatting to its roots.
In our view, squatting in Kenya rose directly out of the process of
laying down the material foundation of capitalism in Kenya. During the
primitive accumulation of capital, the state power was used to alienate
massive tracts of land from African control. In order to ensure the need-
ed cheap labor for development of capitalist agriculture, the process of
proletarianization of the African peasantry took place. Squatting be-
came the form of labor seen as best fulfilling the needs of agricultural
development in the European settlement areas.
With development of the city (especially Nairobi, the primate city
of Kenya) as another enclave in the country, there arose the need to meet
the industrial, commercial and menial demands for cheap labor. This pre-
cipitated t'he influx of Africans into the burgeoning urban centers. Like
in othef capitalist situations, there was no adequate provision of neces-
sary services for the labor force and the alternative was to squat.
Naving established the socio-economic structures which breed social
ailments like squatting, the problem continued to reproduce. The present
Kenyan government inherited and continues to nurture the same structures
and so, inevitably, continues to be nagged by the same, if more complex,
problem of squatting.
In spite of the governmental action in the form of persuasion, regu-
latory measures, and demolition of squatter settlements, the problem has
ii
not only been preserved, but has grown in proportion. Community Organi-
zation (CO) as a way of attempting to ease the social and economic prob-
lems of the squatters has been used by the squatters themselves and by
voluntary organizations like the National Christian Council of Kenya.
Though it has had some measure of success, CO, too, will be shown to be
ineffective in addressing the real causes of squatting.
Thesis Supervisor: Lisa R. Peattie
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
Kenya is developing in a classic capitalist pattern, a pattern
characterized by unequal development, in which a surplus is extracted
from the workers at the bottom and funnelled up to those at the top, in
part even to metropolitan centers elsewhere. The national planning stra-
tegy gives spatial expression to this kind of development. The economic
pattern in the White Highlands was a rural version of the pattern in
which Africans, having been colonized and deprived of ownership of the
means of production (land), become cheap workers for the white settler.
In Nairobi, the same pattern is repeated in the role of the "informal
sector" and squatters in the urban economy. This is the situation which
community organizing should have some relevance to.
Scope of the Study
The overall goal of this study is to understand the squatting prob-
lem in Kenya and how it has, and is being, resolved. To achieve that goal
it will be necessary to do the following:
(1) To analyze the role of the squatters in the socio-historical
process that led to the current urban socio-economic structures in Kenya.
In particular, we shall trace the different stages of development of capi-
talist agricultural economy, paying close attention to the production re-
lationships between the workers (squatters and wage-laborers) and the
owners (white settlers) of the means of production (land).
(2) To analyze the various methods that have been and are used in
dealing with the social and economic problems posed by the squatting
phenomenon. A primary concern will be to look at the role of the state
in this socio-historical process. We intend to show that all through
2there has been the use of the power of the state to foster development
of capitalism. This was the case during the stage of primitive accumula-
tion of capital and it continues to be the case today. If nothing else,
the state guarantees the conditions and the social relations of capital-
ism and protects the ever more unequal distribution of property which
this system brings about. By so doing, the state uses its power to en-
rich the capitalist class, and create favorable conditions under which
certain groups and individuals enrich themselves.
(3) Since the methods used by the state through its agencies, like
the local governments, do not serve the interests of the squatters, it
is our purpose to analyze a different method used in trying to improve
the social and economic conditions of the squatters. This method is
community organization. We are cognizant of the fact that even the most
"effective" type of community organization in Nairobi is at best reformist.
In that case, the only reason for looking at community organization is
because it is, at the moment, the method that seems to have some positive
impact on the living conditions of the squatters.
In an attempt to achieve those purposes, it is the intention of
this study to explain the root causes of squatting (and also migration)
in Kenya.
Squatting and its Implication for Planning
The physical form of the city is, to a large extent, a time-linked
crystallization of the total social order of the city; it represents the
interactions and interests of different social classes. Looking at the
physical city plans, on a planner's drawing board, the physical city
3looks intelligible and even admirable. However, the real city will look
unintelligible and undesirable without understanding the class formation
process and the struggles, on the part of the urban poor especially, to
survive the pressures of urbanization and its concomitant socio-economic
problems. "Generally, and certainly in capitalist societies if not more
widely, proletarian process and action are either disregarded altogether,
thought of with respect to specific characteristics, such as squatter
settlements, as aberrations, or thought of only piecemeal, as with re-
spect to favelas but not other types of housing." There are a number
of other scholars2 who agree with Anthony Leeds on this point. They
show that planners and the governments treat squatters as marginal with
respect to the rest of the metropolitan system.
"In consequence," Anthony Leeds observes, "planners, who virtually
without exception are recruited from the elites, see the physical city
in only a partial way. As elite personnel, they see the city as elite
process. They see the future city for which planning is to be done in
terms of the extrapolated future of the upper class or, more likely,
those of the subsequents more closely linked with the professions and
with governments. Since most of them see the city only partially, they
necessarily plan partially."3  If there is partial planning, and we do
agree with Leeds that there is, then it means that planning is ostensibly
in favor of the interests of some social classes in the city and against
others. But the social order of the city is such that even those that
are not planned for -- squatters in this respect -- are social realities
in the city. Such a situation will inherently involve interaction be-
*
References can be found at the end of each chapter.
4tween the planned for and the parts not planned for. Inevitably, the
situation will lead to direct conflictual contradiction between the two
parts, and consequently, to social struggles.
In concrete terms, what we refer to as social struggles are charac-
terized by authorities' demolition of squatter settlements, on the one
hand, and the squatters' resistance, on the other. Such incidences are
a common occurrence in the majority of cities of developing countries.
In general, then, any urban planning which does not take account
of the entire social order of the city is bound to fail. Regardless of
what scholars believe to be the sources (migration, natural growth, or
overmechanization) of urbanization or hyper-urbanization, the phenomenon
of squatters and slum dwellers presents planners, and the systems they
plan for, with a great challenge.
The failure of such plans will be of even greater magnitude if the
plans, made as we have observed by only members of one class -- the elite,
will continue to disregard the interests and opinions, not to talk of
participation, of other social classes like squatters and slum dwellers.
A plan foresees only a range of possibilities in the future development
and then only for a limited span of time. Once a plan is implemented,
it literally concretizes the ideological position of the planners at the
time of planning. In this respect, planning could be viewed as a social
process. Since the entire habitat of a city are necessarily involved in
the social process, it is advocated by some scholars that all members of
various urban communities should participate in the urban planning pro-
cess.
5In my view, the fundamental problem with advocacy of the integra-
tion or participation of the members of a politically and ideologically
dominated class into the planning process is that the "integrated plan-
ning syndrome" is done within the existing structures. At any rate, the
poor will be in a disadvantaged position "when it comes to dealing with
those who speak the language of maps, diagrams, and statistical tables."4
It is, therefore, most unlikely that social and economic conditions will
ever change simply because of integrating the poor class into the city
planning process. Even when integrated, they will certainly be manipu-
lated by those with higher conceptions in the game of planning because,
to quote Professor Lisa Peattie, "the power to conceptualize is the power
to manipulate." 5
Theoretical Positions and Their Policy Implications on Squatting
There are at least three theoretical positions with regard to squat-
ting:
(1) Squatters as a pathological agglomeration.
This view sees squatter settlement as the hideout of unemployed
loafers, orphans, abandoned wives, thieves, drunks and prostitutes.
Squatters are seen as rebels who have run away from the rural life.
Hence, they are "marginal elements" in the city. Such views favor the
policy of squatter eradication and repatriation of the squatters back to
the rural areas.
(2) The second view is a direct opposite of the first one. It
portrays Squatters as communities striving for elevation.
This view describes the squatter settlement as "a community inhabi-
6ted by dynamic, honest, capable people who could develop their neighbor-
hoods on their own initiative if given the chance.6 Among the proponents
of this view are John Seely, Marc Fried,8 and the International Labor
Office.9 Such favor the policy of legalizing squatting and improving
their conditions of work. ILO made such recommendations to the Kenyan
10
government.
(3) Squatting as inevitable blight.
This views squatting as unfortunate yet an inevitable consequence
of rapid urbanization. Squatters are regarded as economically under-
productive, politically naive and socially a rather unnecessary burden.
"The proponents of this attitude," argues Perlman, "take the paternalis-
tic view that squatters are like children."1 1 Many of the church groups
and philanthropic organizations who work with squatters belong to this
school of thought. Hence, they tend to favor the policy of giving chari-
table services (providing food, old clothes and organizing some health
services) and that of improving squatter shelters. But they do not favor
structural changes.
Most of the community organization done in the squatter settlements
is done by groups with either the second or the third view. The current
work in squatter areas in Nairobi is supported by organizations whose
viewpoint is a mixture of the second and the third theories.
My theoretical approach is different from those outlined above.
In stating my position, I shall also state the main propositions of this
study.
(1) In Kenya, squatting has been and remains a necessary product
7of the structural social formation and social order which characterizes
the formation and initial stage of the underdeveloped capitalist economy.
Such an economy has its distinctive form of social classes, each of which
has a specific role in the society. In the case of the urban squatters,
their labor is regarded as not economically "required" by the economic
system and, consequently, they become a "marginalized sector" with re-
spect to the dominant modes of production.
(2) Squatters are not politically and economically marginal, but
are instead a repressed, oppressed and exploited class of people.
Why Increased Concern Over Community Organization
During the post-Second World War period, there has been increased
concern over self-determination and self-governing of the colonized and
the opressed. Whereas this applies mainly to the countries in the Third
World, there is its counterpart in the industrialized world. In the
United States of America, especially, there have been "demands by groups
that have traditionally had little power -- most visibly, affluent stu-
dents and low-income blacks [and women] -- for enhanced roles in shaping
of policies that vitally affect their lives...."12 Similar demands are
made by people in the cities of developing countries, as well. Not a
long time ago, such demands were hailed and condemned as unprecedented;
but now, they are accorded international attention and can no longer be
ignored.
One of the international organizations that strongly advocates for
community participation in urban affairs is the United Nations Organiza-
tion. The UNO concerns were articulated at the Habitat Conference at
8Vancouver in June, 1976. Among other priority areas in human settle-
ments, the "Vancouver Symposium" emphasized the following:
". Citizens must be permitted to participate [their emphasis]
in decisions that mould their communities before directions
are fixed and policies set;
. All international agencies, public and private, active in
the area of human settlements, must as a first priority
work with local citizen bodies, academic institutions and
research groups [their emphasis] in order to ensure that
the wealth and variety of values, cultures and traditions 13
in human society are preserved in the world's settlements."
The above expressed concerns did not end at the conference discus-
sion level. They were incorporated in the UNO "General Principles" and
in the "Guidelines for Action" which were adopted in Vancouver, June,
1976. As a general principle, the conference stated that "all persons
have the right and the duty to participate, individually and collective-
ly in the elaboration and implementation of policies and programmes of
their human settlements." Two of the twenty-four Guidelines for Action
were:
(i) "Adequate shelter and services are a basic human right
which places an obligation on governments to ensure their
attainment by all people, beginning with direct assis-
tance to the least advantaged through guided programmes
of self-help and community action. Governments should
endeavour to remove all impediments hindering attain-
ments of these goals...."
(ii) "Basic dignity is the right of all people, individually
and collectively, to participate directly in shaping the
policies and programmes affecting their lives. The pro-
cess of choosing and carrying out a given course of ac-
tion for human settlement improvement should be designed
expressly to fulfill that right." 15
Another international organization that has equally advocated for
and supported community organization at the grassroots level is the
9
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World Council of Churches (WCC). We are concerned with the WCC's posi-
tion on grassroots participation, because it supports financially and
technically many community organization groups in cities of developing
countries. A good part of community development work in squatter set-
tlements of Nairobi get financial aid from the WCC. On top of its list
of priority areas in its work, the Urban and Industrial Mission of the
WCC states, "give highest priority to work supporting the involvement
of churches with people in their efforts to organize themselves to gain
power necessary to influence the conditions under which they live and
work." 16
The above concerns can be translated into workable programs in at
least one of the following ways: (1) initiative from the top; (2) ini-
tiative from the bottom to exert pressure for social change.
(1) Initiative from the top: governments can, in their own inter-
est, have public policies that will allow the poor and oppressed to ac-
tively and meaningfully participate in the decision-making process.
That means developing of mechanisms through which the people can partici-
pate at various stages of city and regional planning. But it is highly
unlikely that the majority of governments in both developed and develop-
ing countries will, of their own accord, grant such "privileges" to the
poor people.
Empirical studies show that in Kenya, if anything, the African
elite government has grown more hostile towards the poor. This hostility
*
Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the World Council of Chur-
ches is a council of all the major protestant denominations as well as
protestant-based organizations in the world.
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is characterized by the constant demolition of the squatter houses in
Nairobi. Referred to as "clean-up campaigns", demolitions are usually
conducted with neither prior notice to the owners of the houses nor al-
lowance of time to pick up their properties. According to Frederick
Temple, "the following excerpt is typical of newspaper accounts of demo-
lition exercises:
'Smoke billowed along Nairobi River yesterday as city
askaris [police] swooped on shanty dwellers at about 9
A.M. and set alight their flimsy 'homes'. Families using
the shanties, however, were later found to be busy put-
ting the remains together while constructions of new 'huts'
went on.'" 17
[quoted from Daily Nation, Nairobi, November 24, 1971]
As incidences of demolition have increased over the years, so has the
ruthlessness with which the authorities have carried on the operations.
Evidence of this is found in the following report from the Standard news-
paper:
"A pregnant woman gave birth in the cold in Nairobi and
spent the whole night with her newborn baby outside their
demolished house, it was learned yesterday.... The woman
said she was in labour when the askaris [police] demolished
the houses... .A man who was asleep when the askaris swooped
claimed he was dragged behind a lorry for about 10 yards." 18
According to the newspaper, the above was the fourth time the shanty
town has been demolished.
Usually, when a particular concerted "clean-up campaign" is conduc-
ted by the City Council, it is subjected to considerable public criticism.
However, Temple points out that it was revealed the decision to launch
some of the campaigns are sanctioned by the President of the Nation and
his Cabinet.1 9
The above attitude towards the poor has an inverse relationship
11
between the people and the government. In his empirical study of grass-
roots politics in Nairobi, Marc Ross shows that "increasingly people are
more uncertain of the leaders they once supported unhesitantly. The gap
between leaders and followers increases as political officials are
charged with having forgotten about the people who first elected them."2 0
The behavior of the authorities towards the masses, and the socio-poli-
tical status quo in general, symbolizes an increase in social distance
between the people, particularly the very poor people, and the govern-
ment.21 The Ross study also shows that over time the people have taken
an essentially deterministic view of their social and political environ-
ment and believe that there is relatively little that the single indivi--
dual can do to produce changes. This kind of attitude reveals the feel-
ings of the people's sense of political powerlessness. In Nairobi,
"feelings of powerlessness are most commonly found among individuals
occupying positions of relative deprivation in the social structure.
Thus, individuals with the smallest available resources for altering
the social situation are those who most commonly believe that there is
little that individuals can do to effect change."2 2
From the above evidence we conclude that the government in Nairobi
does not provide a platform through which the masses can participate in
decisions that mould their lives and their communities. Social changes
will hardly be initiated from the top.
(2) The second alternative is community organization, or attempts
to initiate social change from the bottom. In this study, we assume
that community organization is a good indicator in trying to better the
12
living conditions of the squatters. However, we are aware of the fact
that whereas in many occasions community organizations have been por-
trayed as very radical movements, they have not managed to bring about
much social change. The experiences of community organizations in the
United States is a case in point. The orthodox community organizations
have been co-opted by the establishment and no longer serve the inter-
ests of the people. The community organizations of the 1960s have had
their effect on urban policies in America. Dominated by excitement,
sense of moral outrage, and grand optimism of the 1960s, the black
movements, the youth and student revolt, the women's movements and other
community-based organizations helped to redefine and revive left-wing
revolt in the United States. However, now faced with the changed envi-
ronment of the 1970s, these social movements have either subsided, or
are on the defensive.23 The 1970s have been rather silent, but Janice
Perlman suggests the "silent seventies" are not so silent after all. 2 4
Perlman suggests that "although they would for the most part not recog-
nize their own roles as such, [the grassroots] groups are part of the
class struggle in America today."25 The grassroots groups that have
emerged in the 1970s are a result of a growing anticorporatism, not
only in the United States, but in the world in general. "The new fer-
ment involves constituencies scarsely touched by the revolts of the
sixties -- for example, blue-collar workers, old people, housewives,
and middle-aged homeowners."26 These "citizen movements" focus on spe-
cific issues and are basically result-oriented. However, these groups
do not envision rapid, nor far-reaching, social change in the foresee-
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able future. In aggregate, the citizens' action movement amounts to a
growing organizing effort "analogous to the defensive campaigns waged
by unions in the workplace: an effort to organize the public in order
to 'bargain' over and 'defend' the terrain of social life." 2 7
Community organization in other Western countries is very much
similar to that of the United States. - In our attempt to advocate for
community organization as a way of bettering the conditions of the squat-
ters in Nairobi, therefore, we need' to envision a community organization
along different lines than those outlined above. If community organiza-
tion is expected to deal with -the causes rather than symptoms of squat-
ting, it will have to be more progressive than the current community
organizations in squatter settlements of Nairobi. This is because the
types of community organization in Nairobi are either of the reformist
nature, or organized by opportunist "former" squatters whose objective
is nothing but profit maximization, or a poor caricature of community
organization in the United States in the 1960s.
Outline of the Study
This study is in two parts. The first part analyzes the social,
political and economic factors which explain the nature and extent of the
squatting problem, first in the former White Highlands and in Nairobi
today. The second part is a case study of community organization in Ma-
thare Valley, Nairobi.
There are seven chapters besides this Introduction. Chapter 1 is
basically an explanation of urban development in Kenya. It "sets the
stage" of the study by introducing Nairobi to the reader. A major thrust
14
of this chapter is to show the role of the city, with relation to the
country, in a capitalist economy. It will also discuss the strategies
that are being implemented to deal with the uneven growth, in spatial
and economic terms, that is characteristic of the underdeveloped capital-
ist economy. One consequence of this uneven growth is rural-urban mi-
gration.
Chapter 2: there are many theories concerning the causes of mi-
gration and subsequent urban or rural squatting, as the case may be.
This chapter will review some of those theories. It will show that quite
a few of them, especially those used to explain the causes of migration
and squatting in Africa, are not valid explanations.
Chapter 3.will give an historical analysis of the roots of migra-
tion and squatting in Kenya. It will show how the colonial government
used political, economic and even "military" power to force Africans to
migrate into the settler plantations to provide the necessary cheap labor.
The main purpose of the chapter is to show that migration and squatting
in Kenya started as a function of labor organization.
Having explained the roots of migration and squatting, Chapters 4
and 5 will deal with the nature and extent of squatting in the "White
Highlands" and Nairobi, respectively.
Chapter 6 is the case study of community organization in Mathare
Valley, Nairobi. It will analyze three types of community organization.
It will give a more detailed analysis of the type of community organiza-
tion practiced by the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK).
Chapter 7 will be recommendations, to the NCCK, on how its commun-
ity organization could be improved.
15
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Chapter 1
Urban Development in Kenya
Introduction
Africa remains an overwhelmingly rural continent. Where urbanization
has taken place - especially in eastern, central and southern Africa -
it has been relatively recent. Nonetheless, even though African cities
are on the whole young and small by world standards, they are growing
more rapidly than cities in Latin America or Asia. For example, the
average growth rate of African cities is 5.52% compared to 4.25% and
4.45% for Latin American and Asian cities respectively (see Appendix
1:1).
Certainly this rapid urbanization has been an integral part of the
socio-economic development in Africa. But the other side to this
development is, of course, the under-development of the rural areas.
To that extent, it is indeed accurate to say that urban growth - both
economic and demographic - continues at the expense of rural develop-
ment. In its wake, moreover, urbanization has brought about large-scale
rural-urban migration and created a severe problem of squatting in
the urban centers.
Why has uneven growth been the case and what has been done to
alleviate or resolve problems like squatting? These are the questions
to be addressed in this chapter- by reference to the case of Kenya.
In doing that, we will view urbanization as a historical process that
is part of the development of capitalism in Kenya. Our object is also
to assess the role that urban centers have played in that capitalist
18
development. As such we will discuss in detail the origins of Nairobi
and its growth into a primate city, and show that its role has been to'
channel part of the economic surplus of Kenya to the world metropoles.
Finally we include an analysis of the urban strategies that have been
implemented in Kenya. It is our contention that these strategies have
largely failed, particularly as ways to resolve the problems of uneven
growth and squatting.
Urban Development in Kenya: Policies and Strategy
During the time of the first national population census in 1948,. there
were 17 towns with a population of 2,000 and more, providing an urban
population of 276,240 or 5.1 percent of the total national population.1
By 1969 there was an urban population of about 1,000,000 distributed over
48 towns.
Table 1:1
Number of Towns and Urban Population, 1948-76
No. of towns by size 1948 1962 1969 1976
1,000,000+ 1 2 2 2
20,000-99,999 1 2 2 3
10,000-19,999 2 3 7 7
5,000-9,999 3 11 11 13
2,000-4,999 10 16 26 32
Total 17 34 48 57
Total Urban Population 276 671 1,082 1,650
Percentage of Total Population 5.1 7.8 9.9 13.06
Source: Government of Kenya, Development Plan, 1974-78, p.1 1 5.
The table shows that during the period from 1962-69 the average rate
of population growth of the country as a whole amounted to 3.3% per year.
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During the same period about 240,000 or 11.2 percent of the whole of the
increase in rural population migrated to the towns.
Until 1967 urban development planning was carried out on the basis
of land use plans prepared by and for each town. Little consideration,
and in some cases no consideration at all, was given to the question of
the size and function of towns relative to the overall national and
regional requirements or to the establishment of a suitable network of
service centers (towns) at different levels to serve the rural popula-
tion. The Development Plan of 1974-78 articulates the consequences of
the above phenomena:
"As a result, some centers and services were developed in a scattered,
uncoordinated and sporadic manner and the needs of much of the rural
population were met inadequately or were provided on an uneconomic
basis. Also, the development of towns proceeded in accordance with
short term requirements, since no basis existed for long term
planning. 
"2
It was with a view to correcting the situation created by the above
form of urban planning that in 1967 the Government of Kenya established
Physical Planning Department (PPD) within the Ministry of Lands and
Settlement. The Ministry provides offices and administrative services,
but all other government ministries are represented in PPD.
Since the time PPD was established it has followed the design of
the physical planning framework with the preparation and publication of
comprehensive physical planning studies for all regions. It has also
prepared over 150 detailed long term and short term development plans
for individual service centers or towns. In addition, the department
has published special studies on urbanization, tourism and housing, and
extended its organization into several of the regional centers.
The input that PPD has brought to metropolitan planning is reflected
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in the task that this special team was charged with. It was supposed to
define population levels and target satisfactory spatial distribution
within the social and economic realities of Nairobi, and to formulate
proposals for implementation which were related to resource capacity.
The current plan adds that "the final output will provide a series of
coordinated urbanization projects appropriate for international finan-
cing and providing a sound basis for Nairobi development."
In order to make feasible plans for metropolitan development, the
PPD has made studies and projections of population growth in the whole
country in general and urban areas in particular. At present, the
population of Kenya is about 13 million people. Studies by PPD show
that by the turn of the century the population is expected to reach
between 28 and 34 million. Even by 1980 the total population will amount
to 16 million and, if the urban population continues to grow at the
present rate of 7.2% per annum, facilities for metropolitan population of
2.2 million - 15.1% of the total population - must be planned for that
year. Of these 2.2 million, 82.5% will be living in the 11 largest towns.
And it is planning for these 11 central places that the PPD is mainly
concerned with. The table below shows the areas in question (see also
Figure 1:1).
To achieve the set goals, the PPD formulated urbanization policy and
a strategy which give the guidelines for the 1974-78 Development Plan.
The objectives of the policy and the strategy are: (a) to achieve the
maximum development of the rural areas so as to slow down the rate of
migration from rural to urban areas: (b) to establish a more even geo-
graphical spread of urban physical infrastructure in order to promote
more balanced economic growth throughout the nation and a more equitable
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standard of social services between regions; (c) to encourage the expan-
sion of several large towns in addition to Nairobi and Mombasa, thereby
providing more alternatives for the absorption of the migrant population
and avoiding the problems arising from excessive concentration in these
two towns; (d) to continue to develop a network of communications, so as
to link centers of economic and social development; and (e) to adopt
standards for urban infrastructure which are closely related to what can
be afforded by the country as a whole. The PPD recognizes that to achieve
Table 1:2
Projected Population of 11 Largest Towns, 1980
Population ('000s)
1980
Town 1948 1962 1969 Urban Rural Total
Nairobi 119 347 509 1,098 --- 1,098
Mombasa 75 180 247 447 -- 447
Nakuru 18 38 47 79 4 83
Kisumu 11 24 33 124 66 190
Thika 4 14 18 50 --- 50
Eldoret 8 20 18 42 10 52
Kitale 6 9 12 23 2 25
Nyeri 3 8 10 26 15 41
Kakamega 5 4 6 17 14 31
Embu 1 5 4 14 5 19
Meru 2 3 5 12 68 80
Total 252 652 907 1,932 184 2,116
Source: 1974-78 Development Plan, p.ll 8.
the set goals the strategy for urban development must aim at producing
the necessary infrastructure at more than 20 times the speed achieved in
the past. The major strategy to be followed is that of Growth Centers,
hoping that
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"concentrating urban development in selected centers will promote the
formation of small towns in rural areas. As these towns grow, they
will form a level of urbanization which is large enough to be econo-
mically served with public water supply, sewerage, disposal, electri-
city, postal and banking facilities, etc."
Thus the policies to change the urban balance in Kenya presupposes
growth center strategy. The Kenyan authorities believe that the strategy
will help to contain rural-urban migration and eradicate major urban
problems like squatting in Nairobi.in particular and in other big cities
in general. But the question we pose here is, to what extent will adop-
tion of central place strategy be able to alter the fundamental socio-
economic structures that create the problems of excess rural-urban
migration and squatting. To answer this question we need to analyze
the version of central place strategy Kenya is pursuing a little more
profoundly.
Theoretical Framework of the "New" Urban Development Strategy
The central place strategy adopted by Kenya seems to be modeled especially
after Walter Christaller's and August Losch's5 versions of central place
theory. The 1974-78 Development Plan outlines and locates hierarchical
order of service centers. The plan considers the agglomeration of human
community (village, market place, or town) to be a good indicator of
the "crystallization of mass around a nucleus" (to use Christaller's
terminology) and this is seen as a necessary and elementary form of order.
It is in such a "nucleus" or central place, therefore, that certain
economic activities will be located. Since the central places differ
in size, provision of goods and services, etc., they are classified
accordingly; hence the hierarchical order of central places. The overall
objective adopted in planning the network of central places is to eventu-
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ally provide one Local Center for every 5,000 rural population, a Market
Center for every 40,000 and an Urban Center for every 12,000.6 Totalling
over 1,681 centers, their distribution in the provinces is shown in Table
1:3.
Table 1:3
Distribution of Selected Urban Service Centers
Prin-
cipal
Province towns Urban Rural Market Local Total
Central* 2* 17 23 86 185 313
Coast 1 9 9 38 90 147
Eastern 2 17 29 93 173 314
North-Eastern - 3 6 13 35 57
Nyanza 1 12 25 72 171 281
Rift Valley 3 18 37 74 263 395
Western 1 10 21 44 98 174
Total 10: 86 150 420 1,015 1,681
Source: Development Plan, 1974-78, p.1 2 0 .
*excluding Nairobi
It is important to note that while each central place needs to have
a threshold size, the importance of the central place is not so much
measured by its size as by the functions, goods and services produced
by the central place. Hence the nature of the central place is determined
by either of the following principles:
Market principle - there is hierarchical arrangement over landscape
to minimize the distribution of various types of goods with the least
number of places, e.g. Meru, which gets priority because it serves a
large concentrated population isolated to some degree from any other
7
towns; or
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Traffic principle -- which maximizes the movements of goods at minimum
cost. Examples Of the traffic principle are Nyeri, Kakamega and Embu
municipalities which get priority because, although they are provincial
headquarters they are comparatively small in size with low industrial
potential and a level of infrastructure below other municipalities. 8
Hence the consumption of central place goods is more important than
their production and consequently it is the trading function rather than
the production function of a place that will determine its centrality.
Since it is likely that the consumption of those goods will be scattered
over regions, each central place is tied to a complementary region that
it serves or, indeed, dominates. The relationship between the central
place and the complementary region will be determined by the consumption
behavior of the people in the region. Hence the plan states that
"the successful creation of service centers at all levels depends on the
concentration within the center of all urban infrastructures required by
the particular area served by the center." 9
Limitations of the Central Place Strategy
There are at least three levels of limitations or problems that the "new"
strategy will be faced with. The first level of problems arises from the
current socio-economic system in Kenya. One major assumption that the
government seems to make is that cityward migration is caused largely
by lack of various amenities and services in the countryside. Whereas
these are variables that might contribute towards rural-to-city migration,
they do not constitute major problems. (This is a point we shall deal
with in more detail later in this study.) The government plan overlooks
the fact that it is structural poverty which is the root cause of the
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problems which planners are addressing. Consequences of structural
poverty like income differentials, squatting, lack of adequate low-income
housing, etc. are treated in the plan as if they are themselves the
causes of poverty and inequalities. By and large, therefore, the plan
works out a strategy within the present socio-economic structures that
are generating the problems in the first place.
Secondly, the plan - like the central place theory in general -
places the success of the strategy on the main assumptions of the neo-
classic model of perfect competition, i.e. free entry, minimal profits,
etc. The plan states very clearly that "once a central place has its
basic infrastructural facilities, it will tend to attract commercial
and industrial development which will enrich the lives of the people of
the rural areas and provide employment opportunities." Assuming such
an assumption is plausible, the fact remains tha t even if commercial and
industrial activities are attracted, the socio-economic status quo is
such that they will enrich not the currently poor peasants, but the
already rich people who straddle* the urban as well as the rural economy.
Related to the above limitations is a point which has to do with the
degree to which Kenya is committed to its plans. With regard to central
place planning, Clay Wescott points out that "the Kenyan Government is
committed to a policy giving priority to the development of other princi-
pal towns besides Nairobi and Mombasa. Yet the government projects that
by 1980, 88% of the urban population of the 11 largest urban centers will
live in one of the two primary cities."-
* On the concept of "straddling" and for an in-depth analysis of its pro-
cess, see M. Cowen and Kabiru Kinyanjui, Some Problems of Class Formation
in Kenya, IDS Working Paper, Nairobi 1977.
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A look at how Kenyan government has remained faithful to its former
plans on inequality makes us question how the central places will be made
to perform miracles. Observing planning in Kenya, Helleiner shows that it
is precisely because the basic interest is not to deal with inequality
that any references to it in the plans must remain vague: "The 1970-74
Kenyan Plan emphasizes that a fundamental objective of the government is
to secure a just distribution of the national income, both between dif-
ferent sectors of areas of the country and between individuals."12 But
the distributional references are not linked with the rest of the plan.
What seems to have moved the government to show concern of dealing with
the question of inequality is mostly the overt urban employment which
seems to be such a big threat that the Kenyan regime suddenly proclaims
unemployment as a major concern of the Second Development Plan,. But iem-
ployment "is clearly only a small part of the much larger (and more contro-
versial) issue of distribution.... in this sense, the emergence of urban
unemployment, when eventually seen in historical perspective, may be
regarded as an inducement mechanism, without which the distributional
issues would have continued to be glossed over for several decades more." 1 3
The second level of problems is in the theory and its implications.
Kenya is adopting central place theory as a development strategy when this
strategy is being rejected by some developing countries which have tried
it before. In Latin America for instance, Chile, Colombia and Bolivia,
"which had developed detailed national plans for growth-center-based
concentrated decentralization, have now abandoned them and turned to
alternative bases for regional planning."14
The problems of central-place-based development in less developed
countries are many. The value-bases believed to be implicit in the theory
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(as advanced by Perroux) and the implications of growth center strategies
for overall long-run national development must be questioned seriously.
Coraggio argues that it is impossible to "separate the reasoning behind
internal polarized growth and that same reasoning applied at the inter-
national level."1 5
Coraggio shows further that strict interpretation of the theory
implies:
(1) aligning one's national economy with a world pattern of dominant
and subdominant poles of development (which in the contemporary
world means submission to the dominance of the economies of the
United States, Japan and Western Europe);
(2) artificially inducing internal growth consistent with the world
system of dominant poles (as distinct from regional organization
consistent with presumably more beneficial autonomous national
growth); and
(3) encouraging further foreign investment as the only feasible means
of obtaining the requisite large-scale, dynamic, oligarchic,
high- technology, "propulsive industries which Perroiix has 16
described as the core of any polarized scheme of development."
Some of the implications mentioned above have already begun to be
manifested in Kenya's application of the growth-center strategy. It has
been reported recently that
"Kenya's efforts to take industries to rural areas is fast gathering
momentum with more and more large scale industries coming in selected
Rural Industrial Development Centers (RIDCs) throughout the republic.
One such industry is the proposed Ksh 40 million new Bata* shoe
factory to be built at Voi in Taita-Taveta District."1 7
Voi is one of the many growth centers listed in the 1974-78 Development
Plan. According to the Weekly Review, "The Voi factory will bring to a
total of 102 Bata shoe factories in 89 countries all over the world." 1 8
The paper also revealed, although no confirmation was available from
* Bata Shoe Company is one of the largest Multinational Corporations
operating in Kenya. Owned by a Canadian citizen (Thomas Bata), Bata
monopolizes production of footwear in Kenya.
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Bata, that it is understood that the Voi factory had originally been
planned for a neighboring country, but the decision had been reversed in
preference to Kenya where there is "healthy atmosphere for (foreign)
investment."
We note further that besides the Bata Shoe Company, other multi-
national financiers have begun stepping up huge loans for the promotion
of light industries in numerous growth centers in Kenya. Recently, "the
government has obtained from the World Bank" a loan of Ksh 800 million
(US$100 million). "Part of the World Bank money will also be used to
support about 200 workshops for light industrial undertakings in different
parts of the country."19
Hence, one tends to agree with the view that "the focus of 'concen-
trated decentral ization' to which growth center strategy logically leads
is a solution dictated by an apparently unchangeable private concentration
of economic activity in mammoth corporations and by the absence of
government policy instruments to effect anything other than the location
of these increasingly concentrated units."20 The "new" strategy in Kenya
therefore is in effect a new form - albeit more reformed - of persuading
the less-developed countries of the capitalist world to open the doors
and establish a satisfactory climate for the implantation of multinational
corporations and their local branches.
It is also pertinent to raise the question concerning the transfera-
bility of the theory from the highly industrialized developed countries,
where it was originally conceptualized, to the less developed areas which
possess substantially different patterns of organization.
There is a third level of limitations that beset the new strategy.
An important issue to raise with relation to whether or not the central
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place strategy will eradicate inequality is the role of the city in an
underveloped country like Kenya. As A.G. Frank points out:
"In each underdeveloped country it is today its national metropolis
which had and has the greatest contact with the world metropoles.
Simultaneously and consequently, these national metropoles maintain
an exploitative relationship with their respective provincial peri-
pheries which is an extension of the relationship the world capitalist
matropoles maintain with them. On the regional and sectoral levels
as well, the provisional commerdial centers which are in the economi-
cally disadvantageous position of a periphery with respect to the
national and international metropoles, are for their own part in
turn an exploiting metropolitan center to their respective rural
hinterlands."
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This exploitative relationship between various levels of urban centers
will persist right to the local level, thus preventing the capitalist
system in Kenya from arresting the rural underdevelopment. A look at
how the centers came into being will reveal that they were either pro-
vincial, district or divisional colonial outposts whose primary purpose
was to facilitate the colonial machinery. From the local to national
levels each center was and is intimately tied to and dependent on the
metropoles of other levels. Just as they have some economic power with
relation to their hinterlands, the "central places" also have political
and cultural power from which they derive the aurhority to maintain their
exploitative relationship. It was the design of the colonial system,
and the subsequent inheritance and maintenance of the same system by the
neo-colonial Kenya, that each center sucks resources out of the periphery
and uses its sanctioned power to maintain the economic, political, social
and cultural structure of the periphery and its peripheral metropoles.
Nairobi, being the dominant "growth center", maintains the relation-
ship with the international capitalist system whose interests contribute
greatly to mold its (Nairobi's) urban form. This pattern of relationship
shows that "the essential internal contradiction of the capitalist system
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as a whole, while permitting the relative development of some, thus pro-
duces and maintains the underdevelopment of others on the international,
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national, regional, sectoral and local levels."
Nairobi: The Origin and Growth of a Primate City
The concept of the "primate" city seems to have been formulated into a
"law" by Mark Jefferson.23 To Jefferson, the law refers mainly to the
relationship in size and function between the largest city in a country
and other cities in the same country.24 More specifically, it refers to
the presence of one city that is clearly dominant in relation to the next
largest city. Using worldwide data, Arnold Linsky found that "high urban
primacy occurs most frequently in countries with small areal extent of
dense popul-ation, low per capita income, export-oriented and agricultural
economies, a colonial history and rapid rates of population growth. 25
Nairobi clearly meets those conditions, as shown in the above analysis.
Since its inception, Nairobi has grown at quite a remarkable rate.
Before 1899 Nairobi was used as a trading center by the Masai, Agikuyu,
Akamba and Andorobo. The parties exchanged such goods as grains, live-
stock, vegetables and game trophies. Blacksmith products from iron,
such as spearheads, arrows and axes, were also part of the lucrative
business. In 1885 a visitor by the name of Joseph Thomson tells of "a
flourishing trade in grain, flour, vegetables and fruit from the Kikuyu
side in exchange for sheep, skins and hides from the Maasai." 6 Whereas
there is no written record of permanent settlement in the locale where
Nairobi now is, there is evidence to show that there must have been a
settlement especially by the Maasai who used to water their livestock
in Nairobi. (Nairobi is a Maasai name for cold stream.) Andrew Hake
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shows that "the point where caravans (traders from the East African
coast) touched the southmost tip of the Kikuyu homeland in the Ngong-
Kikuyu-Nairobi River area became the scene of a large-scale trade in
27 
Ccommodities." He goes on to give the account of Thomson's description
of trade in "enormous quantities of sweet potatoes, yams, cassava, sugar
cane, indian corn, millet, etc... .and extremely fat sheep and goats." 28
In 1899 the railway headquarters were moved from Machakos to Nairobi.
In 1905 the headquarters of the government of the Kenya Protectorate were
moved from Mombasa to Nairobi. Soon after, the railway station yard and
Indian and European bazaars established themselves in distinct areas of
the central town. As early as 1903 definite land use zones and nuclei
of future residential patterns had emerged in Nairobi, as the map on the
following page demonstrates.
"Europeans began to build comfortable residences on large plots in
the Nairobi Hill area to the west and northeast and in Parklands to the
north. The Asians were concentrated more densely in the city center and
on its northern and northeastern perimeter."29 The Africans who came to
work in Nairobi during the early stages of its development "may be char-
acterized as a non-industrial class of workers, many of whom were casual
laborers on short term contracts. In the early part of the twenties, they
worked mainly in the service sector as domestic help, rickshaw drivers
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and manual laborers for various government departments." Since Nairobi
was an administrative center it needed literate Africans to fill various
posts in the lower echelons of the colonial bureaucracy.
During this time, racial segregation in Nairobi "was reinforced by a
color bar that was partly legalized by more than 100 ordinances and was
partly social (denial of access to hotels, restaurants and other private
33
Figure 1: 2 Early Nairobi c. 1903
Source: Andrew Hake, 1977 p. 2 5
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establishments, inequality of educational opportunities, pay differentials,
etc.)."3 1 Africans, Asians and Europeans lived in strictly defined
residential areas. Africans lived in native locations and were expected
to provide their own housing and whatever amenities they cared to have.
This made it necessary to begin, as early as the 1920's, the first squatter
settlements* in Nairobi. It was the only way the Africans could afford to
live in Nairobi, both because there were no houses provided for them and
their wages were below the subsistence level. Within the city boundaries,
African villages such as Pumwani (a place to rest) and Maskini (place for
poor people) provided shelter, while "outside Nairobi, peri-urban settle-
ments like Kilel-eshwa provided homes for workers and petty traders who
commuted into town." 3 2
Until the mid 1930's the African workforce was directed mainly to the
White Highlands0 and the Public Works Department. It was only after the
labor supply in the Highlands became stabilized and light industries were
established in Nairobi that there began a great influx of Africans from
rural areas to Nairobi. After 1945 in particular, Nairobi's economic
role within Kenya and East Africa began to change very rapidly. Roger and
Zwanenberg have characterized this growth in the following way:
"The City of Nairobi has grown considerably faster than any other
part of the society. There has been a tendency towards the centrali-
zation of developnenTt in East Africa in Nairobi. Whatever indices
one takes, it can be shown that Nairobi has drawn in the people from
the countryside, foreign capital and personnel, and light industry
from abroad. There seems to have been a strong tendency for Nairobi
to suck in a high proportion of development resources from outside.
* The socio-historical process and patterns of squatting will be dealt
with in detail in the subsequent chapters.
* Agricultural enclave alienated for European farming.
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In a sense, therefore, just as Europe functions as the center of the
economic system of which East African [sic] is on the periphery, so
Nairobi acts as the center of the East African economic system and the
other towns and cities function on the periphery." 3 3
The following table summarizes Nairobi's expansion from 1901 to 1969.
It shows expansion both in terms of population and space.
Table 1:4
Nairobi's Growth, 1901-1969
Europenans
Population
Asians Africans Total
Land Area
(Sq. Miles)
7.0
559
(4.9%)
2,665
(8.9%)
5,600
(11.3%)
10,400
(9.6%)
21,476
(8.0%)
28,765
(8.3%)
Year
1901
1906
1919
1926
1936
1944
1948
1962
1962
1963
1969
3,582
(31.1%)
9,199
(30.8%)
16,000
(32.3%)
34, 300
(31.5%)
86,454
(32.4%)
86,922
(25.0%)
67,189
(13.2%)
7,371
(64.0%)
18,000
(60.3%)
28,000
(26.5%)
64,200
(59.0%)
158,865
(59.5%)
231,744
(66.7%)
422,912
(83.0%)
11,512
(100.0%)
29,864
(100. 0%)
49,600
(100.1%)
108,900
(100.1%)
266,794
(99.9%)
347,431
(100.0%)
509,286
(.00.0%)
32.4
35.0
266.0
266.0
Source: Temple, p.3 2.
In spite of the fact that various methods to check African inflow
into Nairobi were employed, the African population continued to grow even
19,185
(3.8%)
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during the pre-independence period. Africans' numerical preponderance did
not, however, stop Europeans and Asians from regarding Nairobi as an area
not suitable for African residence. The African was needed only insofar
as he was providing labor. The foreigners' attitude towards Africans has
been expressed very clearly by a District Officer in 1933:
"It seems only right that it should be understood that the town is
a non-native area in which there is no place for the redundant native,
who neither works nor serves his or her people, but forms the class
from which professional agitators, the slum landlords, the liquor
sellers, and other undesirable classes spring. The exclusion of
these redundant natives is in the interest of natives and non-natives
alike."
Because of those kinds of attitudes, the African laborers were paid
starvation wages and continued to live in inhuman conditions. Temple
notes that "the goals of the municipal authorities with regard to Africans
were, however, mutually contradictory. They wanted cheap labor, segregated
residential areas and protection against public health threats - all while
keeping expenditure on Africans to a minimum."35 During the period from
1932 to 1947 the Council devoted 1-2% of its net revenue to African
services.36 It was not until the mid 1950's that the necessity to provide
reasonable housing to create a stable African working force was accepted.
Until the time Kenya got independencein 1963, enormous inequalities
along racial lines prevailed, associated with the differential access to
jobs and facilities typified by the wage and salary structure. As late as
1961, as the following table shows, the average earnings of 22,000
Europeans in wage-earning employment were over . 1,350, compared with
those of the Asians (just over g 500) and the 350,000 Africans (about
- 75). As the ILO mission observed, "The inequalities were enormous but
the sense of immediate injustice aroused by their obvious racial dimensions
may have obscured their deeper implications for the long run." 3 7
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Table 1:5
Number of enumerated* employees, average earnings
and total wage bill by racial groups, 1961 and 1970
Items Africans Asians Europeans Total*
1961:
Number of persons employed (000's) 530 38 22 590
Average earnings ( ) 76 511 1,365 152
Total wage bill ( million) 40 19 30 90
1970:
Number of persons employes (000's) 601 30 14 645
Average earnings ( ) 182 960 2,207 261
Total wage bill ( million) 110 29 30 169
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1977, tables 200 and 209.
* In 1970 some self-employment was included but little, if any, in
the informal sector.
*Totals may not add up exactly owing to rounding.
The inequalities molded the Nairobi economy in particular, and the
nation's economy in general, in several ways:
1. The inequality in incomes led to a pattern of demand which in turn
established a structure of supply to meet them. The supply of
goods from local production and imports was sharply divided
between supplies to meet the high-income luxury market and those
for the low-income market.
2. The development of Nairobi was heavily influenced by the Europeans,
so that building standards and the urban form in general were
regulated primarily in the interests of the expatriates.
3. Multi-national firms had a natural advantage both in local
manufacturing and importing manufactured goods.
4. Over time 1, 2 and 3 above molded the attitudes and aspirations
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of the emerging national elite so much so that when the
national independence was granted, the political aim of
taking over the economy became merged almost imperceptibly
with individual aspirations to take over the jobs, positions,
businesses and lifestyles which the capitalist economy made
possible.
Conclusion
One major problem that is caused in part by the pattern of urban
development in Kenya is uneven growth. It has been shown that the Ken-
yan government has decided to pursue central place strategy, for regional
spatial and economic development, as a means of eradicating inequality.
This decision, however, has been made more as a response to the politi-
cal implications of problems like excess unemployment and uncontrolled
migration than a serious concern for resolving regional inequalities.
In any case, this chapter has pointed out the severe limitations that
make it impossible for the central place stragety to eradicate problems
of inequality or to achieve balanced growth.
The growth and role of Nairobi as a primate city were also discus-
sed. It was shown that Nairobi is a metropolis whose major role is not
only to exploit its periphery, the rest of Kenya, but also to channel
part of the country's wealth to the international metropoles.
As a primate city, Nairobi is a center that the majority of Ken-
yans tend to want to end up in. Why is this the case? Why do the peas-
ants, young and old, educated and uneducated, men and women, find it
necessary to leave their rural homes and migrate to Nairobi, where chan-
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ces are, they will end up squatting? We shall attempt to answer that
question in the next several chapters. But first, Chapter 2 will review
critically some theories that have tried to give reasons for rural-urban
migration and squatting.
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Chapter 2
Some Theories on Migration: A Critique
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we discussed the uneven development that
is caused partly, but not wholly, by the rural-urban migration. There
is a growing body of literature that tries to explain the causes of rural-
urban migration and one of its subsequent consequences, squatting. In
this chapter, we shall review some of those theories with a view to de-
termining whether and which of them are applicable to situations like
Kenya.
In particular, we shall discuss the "push-pull" theory which has,
for a long time, been relied upon as offering adequate explanation of
rural-to-urban migration. A second theory to be considered is that of
"two-sector internal trade-model with employment" formulated by John
Harris and Michael Todaro. We shall argue that those theories do not
offer adequate explanation for the causes of migration. By and large,
such theories are inadequate explanations because they do not go deep
enough to unearth the fundamental structural factors that create rural-
urban, or in some cases, rural to rural-enclave, e.g., large-scale farm-
ing, as an integral part of the economy. In my view, migration and
squatting are features of organization of labor in an underdeveloped
capitalist economy.
Secondly, there will be a discussion of some theoretical posi-
tions on squatting. Shortage of housing is seen by many scholars as the
major cause of squatting. Champions of this view, who do not bother to
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explain why there is shortage of housing for a certain class of people
in the first place, include Charles Abrams, Charles Maar and William
Mangin. John Turner bends towards this theory, but he champions more
in offering the solutions, themselves ineffective, to the squatting prob-
lem. Another view to be discussed is the one which sees squatting as
primarily a legal problem.
In our view, the above theories offer neither valid explanations
nor effective solutions to the migration and squatting problems.
One of the factors that many studies consider to be an important
cause of squatting is migration from rural areas to the cities. Migra-
tion studies frequently rely upon either a "push" or a "pull" theory as
the main explanation for the movement of the people from the backward
and poor rural areas to the advanced and rich urban areas. The city
"pulls" while the rural area "pushes". The city attracts because the
employment opportunities (especially in the industrial sector), social
services, and other amenities have, over time, become concentrated in
the largest cities. Secondly, the minimum wages in the industrial sec-
tor, however low they may be in absolute terms, tend to be comparatively
higher than those in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, rapid
population growth, the mechanization of commercial agriculture and the
acute shortage of new cultivatable land have put extreme pressures on
rural employment opportunities, argues Martinez Rios.2  Octavio Ianni
is of the same opinion. He sees cityward migration as related to the
"changes in the technical and social conditions of production in several
of the agricultural regions... .Little by little capitalistic technology
in the rural areas expanded, producing unemployment and the expulsion of
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a portion of the labor force. 3
As to the question of who migrates, the students of modernization
have this to say: "rural dwellers who choose to avail themselves of this
opportunity for socio-economic mobility tend to be younger, better educa-
ted, and more skilled occupationally than the average economically active
. t4
resident in their community of origin." Kemper adds that the migrants
tend to be positively selective as compared to other residents of their
community of origin, in terms of such traits as innovativeness and
5
achievement orientation.
John Harris and Michael Todaro6 have formulated a rather sophis-
ticated migration model which has influenced migration studies. They,
however, regard their model as "extremely simple". As they suggest, the
model could be described as "a two-sector internal trade model with un-
employment." The two sectors are urban and rural. The central assump-
tion in this model is that cityward migration will always occur as long
as "the expected urban real income at the margin exceeds real agricul-
tural product -- i.e., prospective rural migrants behave as maximizers
of expected utility.8 Hence, the term induced migration. That means
"the greater the urban-rural wage differential, the more responsive ex-
pectations to increased probabilities of finding a job."19 Similarly,
if the economy is less sensitive to prices and marginal products in the
agricultural sector, the result will be greater migration induced by
creation of an additional job in the urban sector.
Analyzed critically, however, this model only builds upon what we
have discussed in the preceding pages. All that has been introduced into
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the variables -- the gap in income between the city and countryside and
the possibility of being employed in the city -- is an abundance of eco-
nomic jargon. There are at least three major problems with the model.
The first two are limitations admitted by the authors. These limitations
are: the model is "gained only through compromises with reality,"1U and
secondly, the model's analysis is extremely static in character. Above
those two limitations, we argue that the most critical problem with the
formulation and, therefore, also with the general push-pull hypothesis,
is that the approach is descriptive rather than explanatory. Whereas the
proponents deal with some variables (like income differentials and lack
of social amenities) that might lead to migration, they do not show dia-
lectically the causes for the need to migrate cityward. The situation
does not just spring from nowhere. They do not tell us why the town al-
ready is in actual fact the concentration of the population, of the in-
struments of production, of capital, of pleasures, of needs, while the
country demonstrates just the opposite fact: their isolation and separ-
ation. Why is it necessary to have the division of labor between the
urban and country? Without dealing with such fundamental questions, I
do not see how adequate explanation of migration can be given.
In our view, the spatial regional distribution of various factors
is primarily a result of a pattern of development which, as in the case
of Kenya and many other countries, especially Latin America, Africa and
Asia, has been characterized by capitalist penetration within the poli-
tical framework of colonialism and neo-colonialism (this is a point we
shall discuss more fully later in this study).
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There are empirical studies that have discredited the importance
of push-pull factors in migration. Germani found no correlation between
the degree of rural poverty and the tendency to migrate. He believes in-
stead that "objective factors are filtered through the attitudes and de-
cisions of the individuals... .Therefore, rural-urban migration is not
merely a symptom, a demographic fact, and a response to a certain econo-
mic pressure, but also the expression of a mental change."12 In his
study of Brazilian rural areas of varying degrees of poverty and economic-
climate depression, Werner Baer found no greater migration was evident
from areas where push factors should have been strongest.13 In her em-
pirical study of Brazil, Perlman found the following to be the case. 1
Reason for Migrating
Economic concern
Family or health reasons
(to join a relative or spouse, escape
from a difficult situation, find a
husband or wife, or get medical treat-
ment)
Push factors
(e.g., natural disaster, climatic or
soil conditions, or "acts of God")
Pull factors
(attraction of the city)
Military service or other
TOTAL:
Percentage
46
46
2
5
100
The tabulation demonstrates that the "push" and "pull" factors ac-
count for only 7 percent of the reasons for rural-urban migration in Bra-
zil.
McGee, too, has examined the conventional theories concerning the
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nature of migration and squatting. His conclusions are that the theories
are inapplicable to the situation that now prevails in South and South-
east Asia. He questions very strongly the assumption that decisions to
migrate are made with full knowledge of the variables of income and poten-
tial employment. In the largest cities, McGee argues, the rates of growth
are double that of the national population, unemployment is high and pov-
erty and squalor are a major part of the city life.15 The question that
McGee poses is what sense it makes for a peasant, who has full knowledge
of the hostile conditions in the cities, to migrate. Or, in other words,
could a squatter have done otherwise under the prevailing rural condi-
tions? Even before he migrates, the peasant is already part of a system
which causes him to make the decisions the way he does. Without a clear
understanding of the roots of that system, it will be difficult to under-
stand why rural people migrate, and eventually become squatters.
The popular approaches to the study of squatting consider squatting
as basically a consequence of urbanization and industrialization; hence,
the proliferation of squatter settlements is seen to be a function of
variables such as inadequate housing, cityward migration and high rates
of unemployment. Charles Abrams regards the squatter's shack to be a
mark of industrialization in the developing countries, just like the ur-
16ban slum was the mark of industrialization in Europe and later in America.
"Squatting", argues Abrams, "is triggered by many factors -- enforced
migration of refugees because of fear, hunger, or rural depression, the
quest for subsistence in the burgeoning urban areas, and simple opportun-
ism. Usually, it is the byproduct of urban landlessness and housing fam-
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ine."17 There are other scholars who, like Abrams, treat squatting as
primarily a housing problem. Charles Maar, Marcia N. Koth, and William
Mangin consider housing as the most spectacular among many other problems
associated with rapid urbanization.18 David Collier, in his study of
squatters in Lima, Peru, argues that "their [squatters] appearance was
unquestionably accelerated and facilitated by the Peruvian government." 1 9
However, he hastens to contend that "it should be emphasized that squat-
ter settlements would have unquestionably played an important role in the
growth of Lima without government intervention."20
To the above school of thought a legal dimension is added by schol-
ars such as Mary Hollinsteiner. She sees the legal status of land and
the unwillingness of the planners to work with people in solving their
housing needs as the major impediment to successful amelioration of the
squatters' housing needs in Manila.2 1
John Turner has two major points concerning the squatter problem.
First is in the psychological sphere. He argues that one finds satis-
faction in owning or possessing something that he can say is his. Hence,
he advocates for self-help housing and lower-standard housing that will
eventually lead to squatters' "legal" ownership of their shelters. He
and Don Terner start from the hypothesis that
"When dwellers control the major decisions and are free
to make their own contributions in the design, construc-
tion, or management of their housing, both this process
and the environment produced stimulate individual and
social well-being..." 22
Second, John Turner argues that the governments charge the poor people for
what they do not consume. In this respect, we agree with him except that
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he does not see the problem from a structural point of view, but as sim-
ple corruption.
All the above theoretical positions point to the same policy impli-
cations as far as the squatting problem is concerned. They advocate
squatters' participation in the market systems that operate within the
same socio-economic structures that produced the problems in the first
place. At best, they advocate transfer payments to ensure minimal ade-
quate standards of housing. As we shall contend in this study, implemen-
tation of such policies will not solve the squatters' problems. Whereas
we respect and admire the organization and ingenuity of the squatters in
planning land invasions, negotiating with governments for basic services,
etc., we agree with Diego Rivas that in the final analysis, "the inter-
ests of the elite are better served by this hidden subsidy from the labor
and scarce capital than are the interests of the poor themselves who
really need jobs and a fairer distribution of income." 2 3
Conclusion
We have reviewed two views, migration and housing, that are fre-
quently used to explain squatting. As far as migration is concerned, we
discussed the "push-pull" theory and the Harris-Todaro Model. The posi-
tions of some others that see housing as the major cause of squatting
were also discussed. It was argued that as explanations the theories
are not adequate. Even a more serious shortcoming is the policy impli-
cations of the theories. The authors do not put the migration and squat-
ting phenomena into a structural context. They assume that the capital-
ist system can be turned around and solve the problem. As we have stated
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earlier, this assumption is wrong.
There is an obvious contradiction of the capitalist system as far
as migration-squatting-employment is concerned. The government encourages,
sometimes by use of force and in other cases even finances, migration be-
cause the system thrives under cheap labor. But simultaneously, the gov-
ernment demolishes those people's houses. It is, therefore, only by
understanding the varying needs and demands of the capitalist system that
we can adequately explain migration and squatting. That is exactly what
the next chapter will do.
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Chapter 3
The Roots of Squatting in Kenya: An Historical Overview
"From about the year 1902 increasing numbers of white men
arrived, and portions of our land began to be given out to
them for farms, until large areas in Kyambu, Limoru, Kikuyu,
Mbagathi, about Nairobi, and at Ruiru and beyond, had been
disposed of this way. These lands were not bought from
their Kikuyu owners, and any compensation they received (for
land actually under cultivation only, and at an extremely
small rate per acre] was quite inadequate. The natives on
them had either to become squatters [on what had been their
own land] or else move off. Many of them to-day are squat-
ters on up-country European estates and many have become
wanderers, moving from one estate to another."
-- Extract from a memorandum presented
to the Parliamentary Commission (of
the United Kingdom) in November, 1924,
by the Kikuyu (Native) Association.
Introduction
As we traced the growth of Nairobi into a primate city, we noted
briefly some discriminatory practices used by the colonial government to
actively discourage African dwelling in the city. An immediate response
to that discrimination was the rise of the first squatter settlememts
around Nairobi. But even though the discrimination may indicate the form
that squatting took or where it was located, it cannot adequately account
for the material conditions that spawned squatting in the first place.
That is to say, it hardly explains the social origins of squatting as a
phenomenon that arose in a particular period of Kenya's history.
Similarly, however, squatting cannot be any better understood as a
"natural" and incidental byproduct of "modernization"; nor should it be
posed simply as the logical outcome of African peasants leaving a subsis-
tence sector in which their "marginal productivity" was zero, as some
theorists would have us believe. On the contrary, we believe, squatting
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in Kenya arose directly out of the capitalist development the British
imposed on Kenya. It is, therefore, for more than mere historical inter-
est that we will trace squatting in Kenya to its roots; for it is only
by analyzing squatting at the moment of its inception that we can really
grasp the social forces and circumstances that interacted to give rise
to it.
Several things are outstanding in this regard. To begin with, the
British alienated massive tracts of land from African control by politi-
cal means. Second, the colonial government also utilized various meas-
ures to "supply" labor to the settler plantations that grew up. It was
as a direct consequence of these that the increasing proletarianization
of the African peasantry took place. By that, we refer to "the increas-
ingly 'necessary' character of African participation in the labor market,
and hence the closing off over time of available alternative means of
getting a livelihood."' This entails an entire process of social trans-
formation through which Africans increasingly took up waged employment
or had to spend a sizeable part of their time seeking such employment
either in the agricultural economy or in the urban center. We will show
in this chapter and the next one that this process engendered first rural
squatting, and then urban squatting. This chapter will include detailed
discussions of the process mentioned, analyzing the various measures
used by the British to deliberately develop the European sector, and
underdevelop the African sector.
Theoretically, our framework borrows from Giovanni Arrighi's work
*
on the African peasantry in Rhodesia. At the same time, we provide a
See Chapter 5 in G. Arrighi and John Saul, Essays on the Political
Economy of Africa, MR Press, New York (1973). Chapter 5 is on "Labor Sup-
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critique of the theoretical viewpoint of W. Lewis, and the analyses that
have been influenced by his work. It will become clear that what amounts
to abstract theorizing (on the part of Lewis), uninformed by deeper in-
sights into African society, cannot accurately explain the issues that
concern us here.
Colonialism and the Land Issue
To begin with, we shall try to define colonialism. Colonialism is
a system of rule which assumes the right of one people to impose their
will upon another (Brett, 1973). This inevitably leads to a situation
of dominance and dependency which will systematically subordinate those
governed by it to the imported culture in social, economic, and political
life. To get the maximum out of Kenya, the British colonial power had
to destroy the traditional social structures which were not conducive to
the type of economy they wished to introduce. And this is the point in
history at which the story of colonialism in Kenya begins. The story of
colonialism is essentially a description of the beginning of underdevelop-
ment of one people (Africans), on the one hand, and on the other, the
development of capitalism for the benefit of the British Empire, and at
the local level, of white settlers and European industrialists. What was
African undevelopment was turned into the underdevelopment of Kenya (Rod-
ney, 1972).
The first steps in alienating the African land from the Africans
were taken in the last decade of the nineteenth century. In 1.895, the
British government took over the British East Africa, hereafter referred
plies in Historical Context: A Study of Proletarianization of the African
Peasantry in Rhodesia."
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to as Kenya, from the Imperial British East Africa Company. In 1897, the
Foreign Office of the British government issued a new set of Regulations
with regard to land ownership in Kenya. The Regulations empowered the
Commissioner
to grant to any person a certificate authorizing him to
hold land and occupy the land described in it for a term
not exceeding twenty-one years and at the end of which
the permission would be renewed. 2
When he got to know Kenya better, Sir Harry Johnson sent a report to the
British government in 1900, wherein he remarked that in the eastern part
of Uganda there was "a country almost without parallel in tropical Af-
rica." He described this country as "admirably well watered, with fer-
tile soil, cool and perfectly healthy climate and covered with noble for-
ests." He concluded that the country is "as healthy for European set-
tlers as the United Kingdom, British Columbia, or temperate South Africa.
... I am able to say decidedly that here we have a territory admirably
suited for a white man's country." (Ross)
In response to that report, the British government authorized the
Commissioner "to grant to any person, if he thinks fit, a certificate
authorizing him to hold and occupy the portion of land described in the
certificate for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years." However, this
Regulation stated further that "no certificate would be granted in re-
spect of any land which was lawfully held and occupied by any person,
whether a native or not a native, who held such land under a documentary
title which Her Majesty's Commissioner was prepared to recognize." (Ross)
It is important to note here that not a single African in Kenya then had
any such documentary title. That left all the land in the country at the
disposal of the Commissioner to parcel out as he thought "fit".
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When Sir Charles Eliot became the Governor in Kenya, his concep-
tion of the future of the country was very clear; the railway was meant
to open up the interior and that heralded the creation of a white man's
country. With this notion as his central theme, "he made suggestions
for improving administration and investigating the commercial possibili-
ties of the country."4
Around 1900, the British colonial government in Kenya, in collabor-
ation with its mother government in London, was considering a policy of
using Indians for economic development in Kenya. In 1901, Commissioner
Eliot, reacting to mounting pressure for concrete steps toward economic
development, approved the immigration of Indian agricultural settlers
(Wolff, 1974). In 1902, Crown Lands Ordinance was enacted. It enabled
Commissioner Eliot and his successors to dispense land "on such terms
and conditions as he may think fit...." During the same year, Eliot sup-
ported land, grants, free seed distribution, and agricultural loans to
Indian settlers in the highlands of Kenya. However, efforts in recruit-
ing Indian settlers failed and were totally abandoned in 1905 in favor of
mounting interests of Europeans who wanted to come to settle in Kenya.
Tracts of land at very little or no cost were alienated from African
peasants. Where a little cost was involved, it was paid not to the Af-
rican landowner, but to the colonial government. As the table below in-
dicates, by 1906 there were as many as 4,756 Europeans (a good many of
them from South Africa) who had come and settled in Kenya.
To increase the influx of Europeans into Kenya, the colonial gov-
ernment did everything possible to make the conditions for the European
extremely favorable. In a kind of advertisement fashion, the government
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declared in 1906 that "white people can live and will live here [in
Kenya], not as colonists performing manual labor, as in Canada or New
Zealand, but as planters, etc., overseeing natives doing the work of
development. "5
TABLE 3:1. European Population in Kenya
Year Number of Europeans
1902 506
1903 596
1904 886
1905 954
1906 1,814
Source: Wolff, R.D., The Economics of Colonialism: Britain
and Kenya, 1870-1930, p. 53.
In 1905, the government formulated a policy that granted exclusive
rights to Europeans in the Highlands -- henceforth known as the White
Highlands (Norman Leys, 1925). Some Indians were permitted, by the same
policy, to enter and remain as retail traders or as laborers and to set-
tle in lands deemed unsuitable for and unwanted by Europeans (Wolff, p.
55).
The land given to the European settlers is situated in the region
of Kenya generally most favorable to agricultural production. As Figures
3:1 and 3:2 indicate, the areas thus alienated were among those with the
highest and most advantageous levels of precipitation. The area totaled
35,000 square miles and about 90 percent of it is over 4,500 feet above
sea level. By 1914, as much as 3,138,745 acres of the best land in the
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country was alienated for the Europeans' settlement.
TABLE 3:2. Land Alienated to Europeans in Selected Years
Year Number of Acreage Allocated
Holdings
Allocated Agriculture Pastoral Fibers Other Total
1903 89 3,991 1,000 0 0 4,991
1905 263 14,520 193,645 96,000 6,400 368,165
1907 208 26,126 329,219 214,400 1,623 571,368
1909 222 18,394 350,988 3,362 826 373,670
1911 382 7,370 601,382 0 0 608,752
1913 447 14,052 494,276 63,831 0 572,159
1915 312 9,635 630,005 0 0 639,640
Source: Wolff, p. 57.
World War I interrupted the inf low of settlers and the alienation
of land to Europeans, but the end of it offered new opportunities to
stimulate white immigration. In 1919, the government formulated a policy
which was given enthusiastic support by the settlers already established
in the White Highlands. This policy paved the way for the preparation
of the soldiers' scheme. As a result, a further 2.5 million acres were
given out as free farms. By 1920 the government had alienated more land
for Europeans than they were able to utilize. Table 3:3 shows the Euro-
pean land uses as compared to land available to them.
The major consequence which the overall land policies from 1900 to
1930 had was the discriminative spatial population distribution by race.
The policies favored the white settlers against the Africans. In 1915,
the Crown Lands Ordinance provided for the conversion of 99-year to 999-
Figure 3:2. Patterns of European Farming
Figure 3:1. Patterns of Rainfall in Kenya
.
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Settlement in Kenya in the 1920s
Source: R.D. Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya,
1870-1930, PP. 58 and b9.
N
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year leases for the land owned by the white settlers. It reduced the
rents and the minimum values of the required improvements.
TABLE 3:3. European Land Uses
A. Land Development, 1920-1930 1920 1930
Land occupied (acres) 3,157,440 5,111,161
Land cultivated (acres) 176,290 643,644
Proportion under cultivation 5.6% 12.3%
Land used for livestock (acres) 1,137,354 2,054,001
Number of European occupiers 1,183 2,097
B. Land Use in 1930
Land available to Land not used by
Europeans (acres) Europeans (acres)
Land alienated 6,766,080 Land alienated 1,654,900
Surveyed land avail- Land occupied 2,413,500
able for alienation 892,800 Land available 892,800
Total 7,658,880 Total 4,961,400
Land not used, in proportion to land available 64.8%
Source: A. Holm, "Memorandum: A Decade of Agricultural Progress
in Kenya," in GB CP CO, Kenya Land Commission, "Evidence
and Memoranda," 3: 3057-59
The land given to the Europeans had to be withdrawn from the owner-
ship of Africans. Since in the process Africans were deprived of enough
land on which they lived, the next thing to be done was to make policies
concerning the African habitat. In 1905 a policy designating areas as
"native reserves" was formulated. It is important to note here that
"fixed reserve boundaries were not simply measures to keep people within
defined areas but a policy which greatly reduced most people's opportuni-
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ties for:
"a) developing their flocks and herds for the market;
b) continuing their traditional intertribal marketplace
economy; and
c) adjusting to natural conditions by migration. The
Reserve boundaries significantly altered the ecolo-
gical balance between man, animals, and land." 6
In response to the Africans' bitter protests that ensued, the govern-
ment ruled that "regardless of native land tenure systems, all land --
even that which was 'reserved for natives' -- remained Crown land. All
natives remained tenants-at-will of the British Crown."7
To begin with, the policy established specific "native reserves"
for the tribes whose land had been taken away. But, gradually, this
pattern was extended to other areas and tribes. Corollarily, the same
move served "to establish firmly an administrative policy of setting
precise limits on European 'areas'" (Wolff) into which it was illegal
for an African to go without permission. This was as true of areas in
the countryside as it was of urban areas. Because of a lack of good
land, Africans crowded around the outskirts of the towns that had begun
to emerge. But the growing European and Indian populations sought to
expand outwards from the town centers. This made the government once
again take away the lands Africans had occupied. Especially in Nairobi,
Nakuru, and Eldoret, which were located close to European-settled areas,
the Africans were removed to specified "locations" further removed from
the urban center.
What we have tried to show in that section is the process through
which the British colonial government in Kenya rearranged the geographic
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distribution of black, brown (Indian) and white populations. The govern-
ment policies that were adopted shifted control of land resources much
as they moved populations, all with the purpose of creating conditions
under which one group of people will benefit over another.
European Agriculture and African Labor
In a fully developed capitalist system, it is not entirely neces-
sary for the state power to be applied in directing labor; once capital
is monopolized by the minority the corresponding inability of the major-
ity to produce independently ties them to the owners of capital. The
situation ensures that the majority poor will always be available at a
price which the owners of capital are willing to pay. In a capitalist
system during the period of primitive accumulation, however, it is neces-
sary for the government power to be used for direction of labor. Kenya
was in this stage during the period immediately preceding World War I.
In the 1910s and the early 1920s, the European settlers found it diffi-
cult to recruit labor from among the peasants. The difficulty emanated
from two factors. First, the African peasant was not interested in work-
ing as a wage earner for the white settlers. Second, around this time
the colonial government was using a considerable amount of African labor
in building the railway and roads. The white settlers, therefore, had to
compete for labor with both the peasant agriculture and the Public Works
Department. Under these circumstances, the settlers inevitably "turned
to the state, committed already to provide them with many of their re-
quirements, to put its coercive capacity more directly at their disposal
and force labor out of the (African) reserves and on to the farms."8 To
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this end the white farmers mounted a campaign with two objectives in
mind -- to ensure the maximum flow of labor out of the reserves, and
to keep wages in the public sector as low as possible.
The theory of the supply and demand of labor within an underde-
veloped capitalist economy in Africa has been greatly influenced by the
work of W.A. Lewis. * Lewis proposed a two-sector model of labor real-
location from a low productivity "subsistence sector" to a high produc-
tivity "capitalist sector" (Arrighi, 1973). Lewis argues that the
peasant marginal productivity is zero. That means that there is, in
the subsistence farming, a surplus labor (or disguised unemployment)
because "a part of the labor force could be withdrawn without causing a
reduction in total output, or at least without causing a reduction
greater than the amount of means of subsistence customarily allocated
to them."9 In this kind of a situation, a good part of the labor force
will be prepared to leave the subsistence farming to seek employment in
the capitalist sector, where wages are expected to be much higher than
the value of production in the former sector. Therefore, because of in-
exhaustible supply of cheap labor, the capitalist sector will expand in-
definitely without an increase in wages becoming necessary to attract
the growing amounts of labor. This position bears striking semblance
with the "push-pull" hypothesis in the migration studies; the subsistence
sector is predominantly in the rural areas (although it also has its
counterpart in the "urban subsistence" sector, otherwise known as the in-
formal sector) and the capitalist sector is like the city that attracts
Lewis' theory was first published in Sviluppo Economic e Soura-
structure in Africa, Milan (1969). It first appeared in Eng1ish in the
Journal of Development Studies, No. 3 (April, 1970).
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and pulls labor from the countryside.
Another central assumption in the Lewis theory is that "the entire
surplus is always reinvested in a way that increases the demand for
labor." As the system matures, the "surplus of labor" in the subsis-
tence sector will finally disappear. If in the unlikely event the
wages rise before the system matures, the capitalist accumulation will
be slowed down. This event may occur if the average productivity in
the subsistence sector increases. Such increases would occur if any
of the following reasons prevail:
(a) the expansion of the capitalist sector is rapid enough to re-
duce the absolute population in the subsistence sector;
(b) there is substantial technological increase in the subsistence
sector; and
(c) the terms of trade turn against the capitalist sector.11
Besides the Lewis theory being apolitical, its basic assumption with re-
gard to Africa is highly questionable. This assumption is that the de-
velopment of capitalism in Africa was exclusively a function of market
forces.
Let us take different facets of Lewis' theory and weigh them, using
the experiences from Kenya. First, I shall deal with the notion that the
peasants' marginal productivity is zero. This notion has its origin in
the colonialists' attitude towards the African peasant. By asserting
that Africans were lazy, the colonialists merely sought to justify first
the taking away of the Africans' land, and next, forcing the natives to
work for the settlers. The Europeans claimed that in Kenya, males, espe-
cially the young and able-bodied, were idle and that they would benefit
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from working in the European plantations.
A more serious observation on the African life pattern will show
that their so-called marginal productivity is nowhere near zero, let
alone zero. (We shall show later that there was a high probability
that the peasant's participation in wage labor resulted in negative
productivity for him and his family.) To show that the Africans were
not idle, Chief Wambugu observed that:
.in the shambas [cultivated land] all helped. The
men cut the grass and dug up the soil, the women and
men weeded, the women planted and harvested and the
men did the grain-store construction. Men plant yams.
Each section had its work. 12
I can support Wambugu's observation with my personal experiences in
peasantry farming. If one did not know the African people well and
came to the villages during a given season, one might think that a whole
lot of Africans never worked. If one came during the beans' harvesting
season, for instance, one may conclude that it is only women who worked.
One may not at all realize that the men had done their part in digging
up the ground. Or, if one found women plastering the grain-store or a
house, and men resting under the shadow of a tree, it would be easy to
conclude that only women work at all in the society. A casual observer
may not know that it was the men who cut and carried the building poles
and did the building. The peasant economy is such that the work done by
members of one sex or one age-group is complementary to that done by the
others.
J. Van Velson, too, has challenged the "fallacies" in the notion
of "leisure" or idleness of Africans. He argues:
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"Those who hold this notion seem to think that unless
people are working manually they are not using their
time gainfully....If a similar view were adopted for an
industrialized European society all judges listening to
cases in court, all those bankers or business managers
concluding important contracts.. .and all those not ac-
tually using muscle power or even pushing a pen would be
considered to be enjoying "leisure" instead of working
for livelihood. This would of course be wholly unreal-
istic. It is equally unrealistic to think that people
in tribal societies are indulging in unprofitable leisure
unless they are handling a hoe or an axe or are doing
other physical labor. When men and women are sitting
together chances are that they are not just wasting their
time in idle talk but are in fact settling a dispute
over, say, garden boundaries or are discussing the desir-
ability of moving a village to a better site or, again,
are arguing about the merits of some new farming tech-
niques... .These are activities which vitally affect the
welfare of individuals or the community as a whole." 13
Various economic and financial analyses have been used to suggest
that in countries where there is a low degree of industrialization,
there are periods when no alternative agricultural employment exists,
and, therefore, a seasonal "surplus labor" is observed. "During those
seasons, the opportunity cost of family labor can be considered as
zero."14 The arguments these scholars put forward are rational but
only to a limited degree. We maintain that whereas it is easy to ration-
alize that the opportunity cost to peasant labor is zero or close to
zero, the withdrawal of one portion of the population from subsistence
economy puts a big burden on those left in the subsistence, while at the
same time the peasants hardly ever benefit from participation in the
wage labor. This was the case in Kenya during the period under consider-
ation, as we shall show below.
Let us accept, for the purpose of argument, that the marginal produc-
tivity of a peasant is zero and, therefore, the opportunity cost to a
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peasant's availability for wage labor is also zero or close to it.
Mkulima,* who is the head of a peasant household, gives up his subsis-
tence farming in favor of employment in wage labor in the capitalist
sector. His withdrawal from the peasant farming does not reduce the
total output. Let us further make the assumption that the subsistence
level in the part of the country where Mkulima works is Shs. 220 per
month. But Mkulima is employed at Shs. 180 per month. What does this
mean to Mkulima and his family? It means that he either leads a life
which is below the poverty datum line or he must be subsidized by his
wife from the peasantry farming. Mkulima's withdrawal from peasantry
farming, therefore, will have a high cost to his family who by subsi-
dizing him will have to live less well while they have to work harder.
Mkulima is employed in wage labor, and yet he has ended up becoming a
"parasite" on his family.
The idea of the laborer being subsidized by his family is not a
farfetched one. David Leonard, quoting Mahmoud Mamdani, points out
that:
"...wage employment for Africans was generally insufficent
to support the laborer's family and often himself. The
worker was therefore dependent upon the agricultural farm-
ing of his wife, tying him integrally to the peasant sec-
tor...the very act of employing Africans involved an ex-
traction of value from the peasantry, for the employee had
to be subsidized by his family." 15
A deeper analysis of our argument will show that the cost was not
only paid in quantifiable economic terms. The nonquantifiable costs,
such as the psychological consequences of the head of the family staying
Swahili word for a peasant.
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away for months on end are also great. The social relations between
the husband/father and his wife/children will be negatively affected
by the fact that he has been away for so long, and in the end brings
nothing home. From my own observations, men who were faced with such
a situation would rather end up squatting in the city than return to
bear the inevitable shame. In the final analysis, therefore, the
peasant's participation in that kind of economy has a negative produc-
tivity to his family.
What the above case shows us is that a casual observation of the
peasant's life pattern may make economic analysts conclude that the
peasant's marginal productivity is zero. In hypothetical terms, that
may make some sense. Still, the analysis is incomplete, and certainly
misleading, without a proper consideration of the type of economy the
peasant actually participates in. Under wage labor in a capitalist
economy, the worker depends solely on his real income since he does
not benefit from the profits of his productivity.
The other aspect of Lewis' theory to be considered here is the
market mechanism and its relation to peasant labor. Lewis posits that
since wages in the capitalist sector are high, the peasants will be at-
tracted to it and the wages will determine whether or not the laborers
will stay in wage labor. My position is that it is political mechanisms
rather than market forces that "cause" African peasants to participate
in the capitalist sector in Kenya. Barber, who applied Lewis' theory,
argues that the labor shortages during the preliminary years "were due
to a 'delay' in African response to market opportunities for increasing
their incomes and that extra-economic factors played the role of leading
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the African peoples on to the path of rational behavior."16 Our analy-
sis will show that after many years of savoring the "market opportuni-
ties", Africans realized their real incomes did not increase, and the
only rational decision they could make was to quit wage labor -- a
decision that would have been carried out were it not for certain
"extra-economic factors".
After a sizeable number of Europeans had settled in Kenya, "the
African population was regarded simply and solely as a labor-force for
the planters and farmers."17 That was a view as much cherished by the
government as it was by the planters and settlers. In its first Labour
Circular in October, 1919, the government showed concern over the fact
that:
"...there appears to be still considerable shortage of
labor in certain areas due to reluctance of the tribes-
men to come out into the labor field; as it is the wish
of the government that they should do so, His Excellency
desires once again to bring the matter to the notice of
Provincial and District Commissioners, and at the same
time to state that he sincerely hopes that by an insis-
tent advocacy of the government's wishes in this connec-
tion that an increasing supply of labor will result." 18
The same circular, which McGregor Ross considered to be the evidence of
the "high-water mark of exploitation by a British Government in our
times," continues to stress that the larger and more continuous the flow
of labor is from the peasantry sector, the more satisfactory will be the
relations between the native people and the settlers, and between the
latter and the government. Through the circular, the government offi-
cials were reminded that it was their duty to ensure a constant and suf-
ficient level of labor in the plantations. This they had to do by exer-
cising "every possible lawful influence to induce able-bodied male
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natives to go into the labor field."' 9  And where firms were situated
in the vicinity of a native area, women and children should be encour-
aged to go out for such labor as they can perform (Brett, 1973). In
response to the circular, the District Commissioner of Kiambu, one of
the main labor-supplying areas, issued his own circular directed
mainly to the settlers. He informed them that as he understood from
the Labour Circular No. 1, a considerable amount of additional labor
was required to get in the coffee crop, and "as I intend to arrange
for a temporary supply of child labor from the Reserves, I shall be
glad if any coffee grower who may like to employ these children will
write his name hereon, stating the number required, the time. for which
they may be most needed." 2 0
The Resident Natives Ordinance, as the Labour Circular was called,
was used to recruit 2,208 laborers between February and December,
1920.21 However, direct forced labor was in operation for just a
short time. It was abandoned because it was severely criticized from
two circles: the liberals and humanitarians in the United Kingdom; and
the Church circles in Kenya. In the latter case, though, only the
Bishop of Zanzibar condemned forced labor outright, while other Church
leaders were more ambiguous; they accepted the need for some compulsion
in the interests of "economic development", while expressing concern
that the methods laid down were subject to abuse by labor recruiters
(Brett).
In view of the opposition mounted against direct forced labor, the
government switched onto more subtle policies which worked just as ef
fectively. These policies were taxation and prevention of Africans
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from engaging in alternative economic activities other than wage labor.
Taxation and Services
Brett has observed that "the State's ability to create an economic
infrastructure depends upon its capacity to extract a surplus from the
population, and the way it invests that surplus determines the economic
life-chances of the various actual or potential groups engaged in pro-
duction. It is therefore necessary to ask questions about the extrac-
tive and investment stages of the cycle, in simple terms to ask who
pays and who receives, how much and for what purposes."22 During the
early periods of building a settler community in Kenya, the situation
was such that the Africans paid and the Europeans received. This is
because the settler sector required a very costly level of services in
order to meet the expectations created by the government which had in-
vited them in the first place. But the settler sector did not have the
means to pay for such services. Hence, the government turned to the
only other productive element in the economy, the African peasant sec-
tor, to pay for the services required by the European sector. This was
done through taxation. The other equally important function to be ful-
filled through taxation was to create in the peasant sector an urgent
need for a cash income.
When Africans were required to pay tax for the first time, in 1901,
it was left open to them to pay in cash or in kind. In some areas, a
sheep or a goat was accepted in lieu of two rupees; in others, farm pro-
duce was accepted in lieu of cash or livestock. In 1903 the 1Hut Tax
Ordinance was introduced. This demanded that a male had to pay tax on
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every hut -- that meant for every wife -- he had. In 1903, the Afri-
cans were required to pay the Hut and Poll Tax. The tax was raised
from 2 to 3 rupees, which was still payable in cash or in kind. How-
ever, when in 1919 the demand for labor became high, a piece of legis-
lation was enacted that required the tax to be paid only in cash.
That was shortly after the direct forced labor was abandoned. In 1922,
a Dispatch was sent out which pointed out to the local authorities
that while "... no actual force can be employed to compel a man to go
out to work, he can, however, be made to pay his tax."23 Three months
later, the Hut and Poll Tax was raised from 10 s. to 16 s. (Brett,
Wolff).
The Governor in Kenya then threw more light on the function of the
Hut and Poll Tax: "...we consider that taxation is.. .compe lling the
native to leave his Reserve for the purpose of seeking work."2 4 Nor
was taxation introduced as a means for raising the incomes of the Afri-
cans. This idea is supported by an opinion from a government official
who confided to another concerning this matter. According to a senior
district official in Nyanza Province then, "...taxation has been imposed
upon natives more with the intention of producing cheap manual labor than
of conferring benefits on them" (Brett). On the other hand, Europeans
did not pay tax because, according to the government then, "...taxation
on Europeans reduced their incentive to produce while that on Africans
forced them, to engage in modern economic pursuits which would not other-
wise have interested them."
From the above presentation it becomes clear that a taxation system
of that kind only increased poverty and dependence in the "native re-
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serves" by a net transfer of resources out of them. The system forced
a large percentage of the able-bodied men to get out to work in the
private sector and simultaneously, through low wages and high taxes,
supply the sector with the surplus used to build up its productive
capacity.
Where the need to raise cash to pay the Poll Tax benefited the
white settlers, the cash generated from the taxes was invaluable to the
government budgets. The table below shows the Hut and Poll Tax's share
of the overall tax revenue.
TABLE 3:4. Kenya: Receipts from Main Heads of Taxation
1920-1939 (C000s) (four-year averages)
1920- 1924- 1930- 1935-
1923 % 1929 % 1934 % 1939 %
Customs and
Excise 337 36 788 48 672 42 850
Native Hut and
Poll Tax 458 50 553 34 542 35 527
Other Taxation 128 14 285 18 358 23 433
47
29
24
TOTAL 923 - 100 1,626 100 1,572 100 1,810 100
Source: Brett, p. 192.
From the table, we find Africans must have contributed nearly 70 percent
in the first of the above periods, almost 50 percent in the second,
slightly more in the third, and probably just less than 40 pcrcent in the
fourth.
An important question to raise is how Africans benefited from the
government in terms of the services they received. The answer, very
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simply, is very little, if anything at all. In terms of infrastructure,
the African Reserves made do without roads, hospitals and certainly
recreational facilities. It has been argued by some historians that
Africans benefited from the schools that the colonial government intro-
duced. But a look at the government expenditure on education in the
1930s and even as late as the 1940s questions seriously the kind of
benefits the Africans obtained. "For every shilling spent by the Gov-
ernment on an African child at school in 1945, 150 were spent on a Euro-
pean counterpart. A comparison of expenditure per head on children of
school age shows that the Government spent 500 times as much on a Euro-
pean child as it spent on an African child." 2 5
TABLE 3:5. Government Expenditure on European and African
Education
European Education African Education
Govern- No. of Expenditure Govern- No. of Expenditure
ment Ex- Pupils per Head of ment Ex- Pupils per Head of
penditure in All Children penditure in All Children
Schools Schools
. E s. d. s. d.
1939 49,814 1,889 26 7 5 80,721 100,720 16 0
1945 151,215 2,000 75 6 0 110,268 218,568 10 1
Source: Aaronovitch, p. 139.
The same imbalance in the government's expenditure on different
races could be established for other services. In the late 1930s, the
Chief Native Commissioner himself admitted that "...from my experience of
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ten years, the very large bulk of the expenditure of taxation derived
from both native and other populations has been poured into the 6,000,
000 acres [European land] to the detriment of the remainder."26 A
commission that was set up later to look into the question of taxation
and services argued that "the natives had long paid an ample contribu-
tion towards revenue considering the services provided in return,
whereas the settlers enjoyed all amenities of civilization in return
for a relatively light scale of contribution."27
Conclusion
By way of concluding, let us review some of the points raised in
this chapter. British colonialism marked the beginning of a process of
capitalist penetration and consolidation in Kenya. This four-decade-
long process owed little to fortuitous circumstances. Anxious from the
outset that the colony was to profit the Empire, British officials de-
signed the expropriation of African land by political and military
measures. But if the expropriation of land was a necessIry material
condition for capitalist development, it was obviously not sufficient.
The alienation of land from African control both provided the basis
of an African labor force as well as created a need for it. "Freeing"
the African from his land also meant "freeing" him to work the settler
plantations if capitalist agriculture were to succeed. It was precisely
their astute understanding of this that led the British to implement Hut
and Poll Taxes, coerce labor, utilize female and child labor, etc., in
order to get capitalist develonpment going. We should derive a more
Five "punitive raids" against the Nandi in 1895, 1900, 1902, 1903,
and 1905 brought the British not only the bulk of Nandi territory, but
also their livestock (Wolff, p. 65).
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general point here: under capitalism, it is a mistake to distinguish
between the exploitation of natural resources and the exploitation of
labor.
Furthermore, the taxes and the extremely low wages paid to labor
performed another important function. The taxes directly subsidized
infrastructural development in the European sector. An indirect sub-
sidy came from paying less than subsistence wages: the difference be-
tween subsistence and the wage was "offset" by the family's contribu-
tion. In terms of various social services, therefore, not only was
the African sector neglected, it was underdeveloped in order to develop
the European sector. We might make an additional general point: under-
development and development went side-by-side. Landlessness, the under-
development of the African sector, and increasing proletarianization
thus formed the material basis of squatting.
It is unnecessary to repeat our critique of W.A. Lewis' theory here.
Suffice it to compare that whereas he believed the supply and demand of
labor obeyed economic laws, for instance, a more informed man, Charles
Eliot, thought quite differently:
"I think it well that in confidential correspondence at
least, we should face the undoubted issue -- viz., that
white mates black in a very few moves... .There can be no
doubt that the Masai and many other tribes must go under.
It is a prospect which I view with equanimity and a clear
conscience." 28 (emphasis added)
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Chapter 4
Squatting in White Highlands
Introduction
The process of laying down the material foundation of capitalism in
Kenya, as we have shown in the previous chapter, had two sides to it: on
the one hand, land for settler use, and on the other, landlessness among
Africans, which formed the basis of squatting in Kenya. But in Kenya, as
elsewhere in the colonies of Europe, once the settler plantations had been
set up, a supply of labor to them had to be ensured. Depending on the
specific social circumstances under which colonial rule was imposed, this
"supply" of labor took various forms: slavery in the Americas, corvee
labor in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and French Indochina, imported
Chinese and Indian labor into British Malaya, etc.
In other words, it becomes pertinent to ask in this chapter why the
required African labor force in Kenya was largely organized in two cate-
gories: wage labor, and squatters. Since our interest is focused on
squatting, it is necessary to explain what particular role squatters played
in the initial development of capitalism in Kenya. Put differently, what
were the needs of capitalism in colonial Kenya that squatting, and not some
other form of labor, could best fulfill?
Our attempt to answer these questions leads us to consider the chang-
ing needs of capitalism in Kenya from 1895 to 1945. We will specifically
discuss the role squatting played in primitive capital accumulation at a
time when the settlers did not possess sufficient capital to organize
labor into a waged form throughout. We will further show how squatting
became more restricted, even banned, when capitalism had "matured" to
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some extent, and its needs had correspondingly altered. It is by pur-
suing this theme that leads us to perceive the transition from rural
squatting to urban squatting -- the form of squatting that we are most
familiar with today.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, there were two
categories of laborers in the European plantations. First, there were
the wage-laborers, and secondly, there were the squatters. A wage-
laborer, as shown in the preceding chapter, was a peasant who still owned
a piece of land but had been forced, either directly or indirectly, to
leave his family to continue with peasantry farming while he worked in a
plantation. The squatter, on the other hand, was a landless peasant who,
together with his family, squatted on the settler's estate. For the pur-
pose of presentation, the discussion is divided into four historical
periods: 1895-1919, 1920-1930, 1930-1939, and 1939-1945.
1895-1919
As Frank Furedi has observed, "the system of squatting was an inevi-
table result of a general pattern whereby European settlers had large
holdings of land and insufficient labour force to develop it."1 During
this period the settler was undercapitalized and so had little cash for
paying wages. An easier way for him, therefore, was to offer cultivating
and grazing rights to the Africans in return for their labor. The Afri-
can, who in any case had been alienated from his land, found solace in
this kind of arrangement. The tenancy arrangements varied: "Africans
living on European farms paid rent in kind or provided labour services
and in a few instances paid a cash rent."2 However, the most generally
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accepted arrangement between the European settler and the Africans was
one of labor tenancy. This has led some scholars to suggest that "labor-
tenant" is the most appropriate term to describe a squatter during this
initial period.3 The result of this arrangement was the establishment
of quasi-feudal social and economic relations in the settler estate.
In such an arrangement, what was expected of the squatters was that
the settler expected a man and his wife should work for "five months in
the year between them: the man should be required to work for three
months a year at least."4 During this period, the squatters were able
to extract fairly favorable terms from European settlers. This was pos-
sible because of two main reasons: first, labor shortage was acute, des-
pite various labor-getting techniques being employed by the colonial
government. Secondly, the settler had an abundance of underutilized
land. Hence, "before 1918 there were literally no restrictions on the
amount of land that a squatter could cultivate or the number of animals
he could keep."5 There were instances where in one farm 400 acres were
cultivated by about sixty squatters. That gives an average of 6 to 7
acres per squatter family (Mbithi and Barnes). The chief crops grown by
squatters were maize, beans, and potatoes. Except for the three to five
months when the squatter's labor was demanded by the settler, the squatter
was free to work on his plot. "During the time that a squatter worked for
the European settler, he received a wage of around 4 shillings a month
and a ration of maize meal."6 Squatters could pasture sheep, goats and
cattle.
However, there were certain limitations to the squatters' economic
freedom. Whereas he had the above-mentioned freedoms, the squatter did
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not have complete freedom to dispose of his farm produce. Sometimes, he
was required to sell to his landlord at a fixed price. When the landlord
did not need the produce, the squatter was constrained by a system of
permits and leases which militated against the free movement of produce.
Hence, he was forced to sell to the Asian traders who, by this time, had
established themselves in all trading centres in this area. The Asian
trader was the middleman between the producer and the customer. That is
why there was not a direct trade between the squatters and the Africans
in the reserves.
In spite of the various constraints experienced by the squatters,
their lives were quite prosperous in comparison to that open to the other
Africans in the reserves (Furedi). Barnett and Njama are of the same
opinion. "Notwithstanding the tragic loss of his mother and three sisters
and the absence of any opportunity for formal education, Karari views his
childhood on the Boer farm as a relatively 'good time'." Karari Njama
gives an account of his family's life as follows:
"My father had a large herd of livestock at this time,
consisting of 600 head of sheep and goat plus a number of
cattle which were taken care of along with the European's
large herd. In addition, he had a large flock of Rhode
Island Reds from which we obtained a good many eggs....
When I returned home from the pasture in the evening, I
played with the Boer's many children. We often went swim-
ming in the dam or into the forest to shoot birds with our
slingshots or simply played in the fields." 8
The above account illustrates the fact that many squatters were able
to accumulate a considerable amount of property. Socially, the squatters
led a reasonably unregulated life. They followed the same life pattern
led by Africans in the reserves. Ceremonies such as marriage and various
initiations, like circumcision, were carried out according to custom.
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(Mbithi and Barnes).
By the year 1919, squatting had become a very important economic
*
phenomenon in the agricultural economy. For instance, Kaf fir Farming
was competing with the settlers' farming. Since the settlers were un-
able to use their land productively, African squatters emerged as a group
of independent producers. This is clearly demonstrated in a statement
made by the D.C. of Naivasha in 1917: "Agriculture has made little pro-
gress except at the hands of native squatters." 9
The squatters' contribution was not limited to agriculture only.
The colonial government admitted that the economic contribution made by
the squatters was vital to the Crown. As Furedi has highlighted it:
"The importance of squatters in the settler economy can be
illustrated by the fact that 'development' effected by
squatters was accepted by the Land Commissioner in 1918 as
improvements necessary to substitute the labor of their
squatters for capital investment in order to meet the
development requirements of the Crown." 10
The settlers were not happy with the "native competition". They
tried various devices to stop it. They formed a "Masters' Union", whose
major discussions were centered around "native competition" and how to
stop the squatters' emergence as independent producers. A typical expres-
sion of this fear was articulated by a Mr. Stimar at a meeting of the
Kenya Colonists Association in September, 1910:
"It was necessary for a farmer to get natives on his land
for purposes of labour. There must be some quid pro-quo
*
Kaffiz farming in Kenya was practiced by the most undercapitalized
sections of European settlers. This arrangement implied the exchange of
access to land in return for a rent in produce, livestock and sometimes in
cash. Kaffir farming was most prevalent among Boer farmers in the Uasin
Gishu District. These arrangements were rare in those districts (Nakuru,
Naivasha, Nyeri and Thomson's Falls) where Kikuyu squatters lived in great
numbers.
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for labour. But the farmer objected to introducing on
his farms a Swahili or other foreign native, who could
undersell him in the market with, say, potatoes. It was
ridiculous to sell potatoes at 75 cents per load when they
were worth a penny per pound." 11
During this period it was not easy for the settlers to accomplish
the objectives of the "Masters' Union" because they lacked enough capital
and, therefore, were unable to obtain an adequate supply of labor on
terms other than some form of tenancy arrangement. They also depended
on the rent obtained from the squatters.
1920-1930
The favorable conditions in the settler estates led to an influx of
squatters during the decade of 1920-1930. However, the influx was a
function of the following factors, which are a result of cumulative ef-
fect of the colonial economy on the African reserves:
(1) the growth of population in the African reserves, whose boundar-
ies'were fixed, resulted in considerable pressure on the land;
(2) soil erosion within the reserves reduced the return from re-
serve lands, and hence, their attractiveness could not match
that of the settler land -- usually virgin land -- offered as
part of a squatter contract;l2
(3) As African population density increased in the reserves, so did
that of their livestock. Increasingly scarce inside the re-
serves, available grazing land was an important attraction of
13
squatter status;
(4) An increase in European settlers due to the establishment of the
Soldiers Scheme. Since the settlers often preferred squatters
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to monthly contract workers, there was an increase in demand for
more squatters. The demand was met through "advertisements cir-
culating in the reserves [which] led Africans to believe that
life on the European farms would be a 'paradise' for them." 14
(5) The need to meet increasing cash requirements in the countryside.
Thus, in Nakuru district, for instance, in 1920 out of 9,116 Afri-
cans, 8,000 were squatters; only 215 Europeans lived in the district.
The increase rate of squatters in Laikipia district is a good indication
of the influx during the decade of the 1920s. In 1921, there were only
18 squatter families; 58 settlers owned land in the district. In 1923,
the number of squatter families had risen to 1,81 and that of settlers
to 166.15
In general, we can note that the growth rate of squatters surpassed
that of African population growth rate in the reserves. Wolff shows that
"during the decade 1921-1931, for example, while the overall Kikuyu popu-
lation increased at an average rate of 1.5 percent per year, the compar-
able figure for the Kikuyu squatter population was 6.2 percent."16 Sta-
tistics for the early 1930s indicate a total squatter population of about
110,000.17
During the same period, 1920-1930, European farming was established
on a more secure basis. There was a direct government intervention in
development of European agriculture. Up until the mid-1920s, maize was
the main crop both for settlers and peasant farming. But in the early
1920s, coffee and sisal were introduced as important cash crops. Only
European settlers were permitted to grow cash crops. In the arable land,
wheat was added to maize and both became the center of agricultural activ-
87
ity. As one scholar has shown:
"Maize emerged as an important export crop and was chiefly
grown in the TransNzoia, Uasin Gishu and Nakuru districts
on a monocultural basis; similarly, wheat was grown in higher
altitude farms in the Uasin Gishu and in Nakuru, once more
on a monocultural basis." 18
The table below shows the great expansion in European agriculture
during the period from 1920-1930.
TABLE 4:1. The Use of the Cultivated Area
1920-1930 ('00 acres)
in the Highlands,
Crop 1920 1930
Maize 315 1,996
Wheat 46 709
Barley 6 28
Oats 5 30
Total Cereals 372 2,763
Coffee 278 960
Sisal 290 1,169
Tea - 83
Wattle 116 113
Other Plantation Crops 22 31
Total Plantation Crops 706 2,356
Fruits and Vegetables - 28
Fodder Crops - 11
Other Crops - 106
Fallow - 762
Total Cultivated Land 1,634 6,026
Source: Odingo (1968), p. 268.
With the settler agriculture doing so well, the active and independent
role played by the squatters in the agrarian socio-economic structure in
the White Highlands became unacceptable both by the settlers and the
colonial government. In 1924, the government passed the Resident Native
Labor Ordinance. The ordinance granted the governor the power to waive
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the plantation owners' obligation to pay their squatters for the manda-
tory work. It further stipulated that, when a squatter's son reached the
age of sixteen, he would automatically become subject to the squatting
contract then binding upon his father. 1 9
The ordinance was meant to serve two main objectives: first, to
stabilize the supply of labor to the settler agriculture; and second, to
eliminate the status of the squatter as an independent producer. Other
measures taken to this end were:
(1) To reduce the amount of land cultivated by the squatter for his
own existence. As well, between 1925 and 1929, the settlers
started shooting animals owned by the squatters. Almost all
cattle belonging to the squatters were gone by 1929 (either shot
or hidden in neighboring areas).20
(2) The number of mandatory working days for a squatter was increased
from 90 to a minimum of 180 days.
(3) Transform the squatter into a laborer rather than a tenant.
1930-1939
The basis for taking the above measures was the awareness of the set-
tlers' relative weakness and the potential strength of the squatters. By
the late 1920s, the squatters' population had increased immensely and so
had the acreage of land under their cultivation. In one district, Nakuru,
for instance, there was in 1927 a total population of 31,396; 1,190 were
European settlers, while 29,316 were squatters.21 The squatters had under
their cultivation 60,456 acres and owned 42,032 goats, 30,981 sheep and
4,312 cattle. 22 The settlers feared that eventually Africans might claim
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ownership of part of the land they cultivated or grazed. Hence, the bit-
ter campaign that began in the mid-1920s.
The settler campaign against the squatters continued into the decade
of 1930-1940. The settlers wanted the government to sort out the ambigu-
ous status of the squatters. The government's response was to set up the
Kenya Land Commission, whose task was "to define the White Highlands and
thereby the rights of squatters in the settled areas."23 The Commission
satisfied the settlers, since the report explicitly rejected any notion
that Africans had any rights to land in the White Highlands. In con-
cluding its findings and recommendations, the Commission stated that:
"Squatters have no right to land.. .but they have temporary
right to use land while in employment. In our view, care
should be taken to ensure that the essence of the contract
is a labor contract." 24
The government accepted the Commission's recommendations. In 1937,
the Resident Labor Ordinance (1937) was enacted. It specifically defined
squatters as laborers and from then on squatters were legally forced to
relinquish their tenant status.
The effects that the changing situation had on the squatters is best
articulated by Karari Njama, himself a victim of it:
"...1 the owner of the farm planted wheat and kept large herds
of cattle. He at first used ploughs drawn by bullocks to
cultivate his fields; later, when these originally poor Boers
began to make a good profit from their crops, they replaced
their bullocks with tractors and bought harvester machines.
... Only later when African labor began to be replaced with
machines, and European farmers like Mr. Daniel became rich
men, that people like my father began to suffer. Government
passed a law to the effect that no African was to own cattle
in the White Highlands in 1936. My father had to herd his
cattle into Nyeri Reserve and sell them at a low price.
Shortly after he returned, he was faced with another govern-
ment order forbidding African laborers to keep more than 30
sheep or goats. The figure was reduced to 15 almost immedi-
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ately. Land, too, was reduced. Previously a man could culti-
vate as much land as he and his family could manage with their
labor; now each laborer was allowed one acre per wife. My
father, angered by the restrictive regulations, decided to
take his large herd of sheep and goats to Nyeri District. In
June, 1937, we packed all our belongings and loaded them onto
our donkeys." 25
Njama's family is one of the thousands that left the White Highlands
between 1930 and 1937. Furedi shows that the number of squatters in the
White Highlands fell from 113,176 in 1931 to 93,112 in 1936.26
But the decade did not augur very well for the settlers and the gov-
ernment. There came the Great Depression and with it the collapse of the
international prices of agricultural produce. This had a negative impact
on European farming, which had just begun to shape rather well for the
settlers. The drop in price of maize, more than anything else, contribu-
ted to the setback of settler agriculture. This led to a decrease of
land under European cultivation. The situation got worse, so much so
that in 193-7 the Commissioner of Land and Settlement reported:
"During the recent visit of the Advisory Land Board to the
Uasin Gishu and TransNzoia Districts, the Board was impressed
by the large areas of underdeveloped and unoccupied farms.
In some instances the farms appeared to have been partially
developed and abandoned; in others no sign of past develop-
ment could be discovered." 27
Because of the deteriorating economic conditions, the tenancy system
of squatting reasserted itself in the late 1930s. Regardless of the fact
that the system had been made illegal, the government decided to give the
settlers the benefit of the circumstances. As the Principal Inspector ad-
mitted:
"The question has not been that of getting labor at any cost
but of getting labor at under market rates and of getting
free or at nominal cost such squatter products as manure,
milk and actual stock. That is, of course, illegal but there
is a widespread conspiracy between [settlers] and squatters
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to circumvent the law in this respect and from the nature
of the case such a conspiracy is difficult to detect and
impossible to control." 28
Not only did the government allow the law to be circumvented, but it
went a long way towards giving the settlers whatever support they needed
to survive the difficult years of the Great Depression. The settlers de-
manded, and the state endorsed, that the squatters should sell their pro-
duce to them.29 On its part, the government took steps to control the
squatter produce trade. In 1936, the Native Produce and Marketing Ordi-
nance was applied in Nakuru District. A marketing and inspection organi-
zation was set up to control the 200,000 bags of maize which were sold
by squatters annually.30 In 1937, the inspection of African-grown pota-
toes was made compulsory.
Towards the end of the 1930s pyrethrum was introduced. As other
cash crops, only the Europeans were allowed to grow it. Pyrethrum is a
crop that requires a small initial capital investment, but demands a
high rate of labor. Hence, the tenancy system of squatting was ideally
suited to the growing of pyrethrum. The state waived the legislation
preventing the tenancy system so that:
"The infiltration of [African] squatters into the Nakuru
District continued unabated and was stimulated by the demand 1131
for the labor of the women and children as pyrethrum pickers...
1939-1945:
The zenith of settler farming and the end of the squatting system in the
White Highlands
The historical epoch we shall describe in this section has a striking
similarity with the one which prevailed one century before in England. As
Karl Marx observed:
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"...between 1849-59 a rise in wages took place in the
English agricultural districts... .this was the result of
unusual exodus of the agricultural surplus population
caused by demands of war, the vast extension of railroads,
factories, mines, etc....... 32
The way capitalists responded to the situation was by introducing
"...more machinery and in a moment the laborers were re-
dundant again in a proportion satisfactory even to the
farmers. There was not 'more capital' laid out in agri-
culture than before, and in a more productive form.
With this the demand for labor [in the agricultural sec-
tor] fell not only relatively but absolutely." 33
The Second World War years could be seen as a turning point in set-
tler farming in Kenya. The new wartime demand for agriculture produce
necessitated increased production and this led the government to actively
assist and direct large-scale farming. "Long- and medium-term credit
for European farmers was made available and through the 'Increased Pro-
duction of Crops Ordinance' (1942) subsidies facilitated the expansion
of agriculture."3 4
To correspond with the need for increased production in the White
Highlands, there was great demand for labor. The Resident Labor Ordi-
nance was suspended, as its implementation during this period was direct-
ly against the interests of both the settlers and the government. As a
high-ranking government official disclosed:
"Bearing these considerations in mind, and remembering how
very important it is at this time to retain the good will
of the native labor, I suggest that His Excellency might
consider suspending the operation of the ordinance insofar
as TransNzoia, Nakuru and Laikipia [districts] are con-
cerned." 35
But the demand for labor was so great that even the squatting sys-
tem and other conventional methods for labor-getting did not suffice.
European settlers demanded the introduction of compulsory labor, and the
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state met the demand when, "on March 2, 1942, compulsory labor for es-
sential agricultural production was introduced."3 6 Furedi shows that
this move by the state had the desired effect, as the supply of labor
was substantially increased by forced labor.37 By November, 1944, the
conscript labor contributed greatly to the large-scale farming, as the
table below indicates.
TABLE 4:2.
Type of Crop Conscript Labor as % of the Work Force
Pyrethrum and Mixed
Farming 7%
Sugar Estates 26%
Sisal Estates 50%
Source: Furedi, p. 6.
By the end of 1944, the supply of labor had become pretty stabil-
ized. A class of undercapitalized settlers had begun to succumb to a
strong class of capitalist large-scale farmers, no longer threatened by
competition with "Kaffir farming". This class of capitalist farmers
decided in 1944 that the time had come to enforce the R.L.O. The work-
ing conditions for the squatters deteriorated as their economic condi-
tions were severely curtailed. The squatters reacted by refusing to ac-
cept the new terms. "At the request of the Agricultural Production and
Settlement Board, the Government implemented a standstill order. This
order put a 'standstill' on the engagement of squatters and aimed to
force resident laborers to remain on the farms where they were." 3 8
With the end of World War II, we witness the systematic postwar
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policy of transforming the squatter from a labor tenant to an agricul-
tural laborer.
Conclusion
From the above description we have established and learned the
following:
(1) The squatters, together with the wage-laborers, played a vital
and indispensable role in the capital formation in the agricultural sec-
tor during the historical period dealt with in this chapter. But be-
cause of the production relationships between the producer (African
squatters and wage-laborers) and the owner (European settlers) of the
means of production, the Africans did not have a share in the fruits of
their labor. Whereas they were not marginal in producing, the squatters
cum wage-earners were denied a share in the profits which accrued from
the products. When their labor became less demanded by the capitalist
mode of production, they were kicked out of the plantations altogether.
What happened during this period cannot be any closer to Rosa Luxemburg's
view of the accumulation of capital and the workers' role in it. During
primitive accumulation of capital, she argues, "capital cannot accumu-
late without the aid of noncapitalist organizations nor, on the other
hand, can it tolerate their continued existence side-by-side with itself.
Only the continuous and progressive disintegrations of noncapitalist
organizations makes accumulation of capital possible."3 9
(2) During this period of primitive accumulation of capital, the
state power was used not only for direction of labor, but also for deter-
mining the production relationship between the African squatters and the
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European settlers. The status of the squatters, and how it changed
over time, was determined as much by the settlers as it was by the gov-
ernment. The ordinances and other legal devices enforced by the govern-
ment were used in favor of the settlers over and against the squatters
and wage-laborers. Without the use of the state power it appears as
if squatters could have emerged as a class of independent producers.
This could have been the case particularly during the decade of 1900-
1919 and in the mid-1930s, when squatter farming or the so-called "Kaf-
fir farming" became widespread and productive.
(3) After the agricultural capitalist accumulated some capital
and began to mechanize agriculture, he decided to turn loose many of
the squatters and wage-laborers as well. This was done (not without
the help of the state), first by transforming the squatter into a wage-
-laborer, and second by firing him. In consequence, the process led to
the creation of a surplus labor force, the majority of whom were the
landless squatters and the wage-laborers displaced by machines. In the
case of the latter, as we noted in the preceding chapter, most of the
men did not go back home because they had nothing, in the form of cash
or kind, to take home. It is, therefore, not surprising to learn that
shortly before and during the 1940s, armed with nothing but their labor
power:
"...bands of Africans were reported wandering the country
looking for work; a reserve army of the unemployed ready
and available for work in the settler sector." 40 (And,
obviously, in any other sector.)
The situation served the purpose of keeping wages in check so that
surplus value and accumulation "ay continue. This is "the characteristic
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and essential features of capitalist production.",1 So, even when out
of work, the squatters and other former wage-laborers, through their ac-
tive competition in the labor market, continue to exercise a constant
downward pressure on the wage level, thus being of vital "service" to
the capitalist production.
What alternatives did the squatters have? There were three alter-
natives:
(a) To squat on the forests and other government-owned land near
the plantations so as to remain within proximity in case job
opportunities arose;
(b) To return to the African reserves. But these were already
overcrowded and could absorb only a very small percentage of
the surplus laborers. Besides, in the reserves the opportuni-
ties for making a living were very remote; and
(c) The biggest percentage migrated to the urban centers where
chances for getting employment were high.
The third alternative was the most appealing, because around the
same time there began a rapid growth of secondary and tertiary industries
especially in Nairobi and Nakuru town. In particular, there were de-
veloping industries for processing agricultural products. Such indus-
tries were owned by the same class of capitalists who owned and control-
led large-scale farming. Once again, therefore, the system creates con-
ditions which force the laborers to go to participate in the capitalist
production; this time, in the urban industrial sector. So, the type of
rural-urban migration that ensued in the early 1940s should be conceived
of as reallocation of labor from agricultural production to capital for-
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mation in the industrial sector, thus sustaining the demand for African
labor.
Seen against that proposition, this chapter becomes very relevant
to this study. It has located the dialectical relationship between
squatting in the White Highlands and "modern" squatting in the Kenyan
cities, especially Nairobi. That relationship is not only seen in spa-
tial and demographic terms, but also in terms of class struggle between
the peasants/workers, on the one hand, and the capitalist class, on the
other.
The figure on page 102 in Chapter 5 articulates the process we
have discussed in this chapter and how it is linked with the current
rural-urban migration to, and squatting in, Nairobi.
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Chapter 5
Squatting in Nairobi
Introduction
The preceding chapters have brought us from discussions of rural
squatting to those of urban squatting. We have tried to capture the com-
plexities of squatting as a social phenomenon closely bound up with capi-
talist development in Kenya. It should be evident by now that we regard
it a mistake to perceive narrowly of squatting as an unfortunate product
of uncontrolled migration into cities unable to sustain rapid population
increases. That is to say, we also regard as inadequate any formulation
of squatting as merely "an urban problem" detached from broader considera-
tions of the overall organization of colonial and post-colonial Kenya to
fulfill the needs of capital accumulation. In the final analysis, such an
uninformed approach would be misleading precisely because it sees as the
disease itself what is after all only a symptom. It entirely loses sight
of the plight of underdevelopment that afflicts Kenya today.
Meanwhile, it is true, however, that squatting remains a "problem",
especially in Nairobi, since the immediate factors which precipitated this
particular form of squatting remain: high unemployment, uneven distribu-
tion of income, and inadequate housing (for the poor, we must add). And
insofar as squatting is regarded as "an urban problem", squatters will
continue to be talked of as "marginal" and treated as "undesirables".
Stereotypes of squatters (as "vagrants", "loafers", "criminals") abound,
but they amount to no more than justification for governmental action taken
against them, be it in the form of persuasion, regulation, or demolition.
Recent experience indicates that the last has certainly not been the least.
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In criticizing such absurd stereotypes in this chapter, we are not glamor-
izing the image of the squatters, either. Nonetheless, it is essential
to recognize that despite all obstacles, squatting has not only been pre-
served, it has even grown in proportion. Thus, in the face of such a per-
plexing situation, if we must consider squatting as "undesirable", it must
be because we consider it to be a symptom of an "undesirable" disease.
Figure 5:1 summarizes what has been discussed in Chapters 3 (The
Roots of Squatting in Kenya: An Historical Overview), 4 (Squatting in
White Highlands), and what will be discussed in this chapter. Large-scale
farming was mainly in the White Highlands, although it was practiced in
other districts like Nakuru, Laikipia and some parts of Meru. From the
early 1900s, the colonizers used political, economic and every military
means to force Africans to leave their activities in the so-called African
Reserves and seek employment in the settlers' agricultural sector. (A)
indicates that stream of African labor force.
In the mid 1930s, we witness for the first time a surplus labor,
which I also refer to as reserve army of labor force, in the large-scale
farming. During that period, as we have shown in the preceding chapter,
there were squatters (and wage-earners, too) who were forced to leave the
settler farms. A large number left the plantations (E) while the rest of
the surplus labor force (B) continued to squat on the available land near
the settlers' farms. When, in the early 1940s, the capitalist farming be-
gan to expand, some from the reserve army of workers (C) were rehired.
Towards the mid-1940s, however, the situation got worse for the laborers
and there was an exodus from the European farms (E) and the areas around
them (D). Some of those who left found their way back to the countryside
102
Figure 5:I
Migration and
squatting process
in Kenya
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A. New workers (wage-laborers, squatters)
B. Displaced (fired, especially squatters)
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D. Retiring from the agricultural surplus labor
E. Retiring from large scale farming ) especially in late 1930's
F. Some % of (E+D) to countryside and certainly in 1944
G. Other % of (E+D) to industrial and commercial (urban) sector
H. New workers from countryside
I. Unable to find jobs
J. Displaced workers
K. Rehired (mainly on temporary basis)
L. Retiring from labor pool (or giving up job-seeking)
M. Retiring
N. Some might go back to the countryside. Included are the so-called
circular migrants
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(F) and others (G) migrated to the city. Most of (F) were older people
who were wage-laborers and still owned a piece of land in the African re-
serves. Whereas there may be cases of (A) today, it is not very signifi-
cant in the current rural-urban migration pattern. Most of those who mi-
grate to Nairobi in stages transit mainly in the smaller towns.
(H) represents the stream of new job seekers from the rural areas.
Prior to the 1940s, many in (H) were doing menial jobs and others served
in the colonial administration and in the Indian shops. After World War
II, the influx increased tremendously. However, between 1952 and 1958,
when there was a State of Emergency as a result of Mau Mau,' the Kikuyu,
Embu and Meru people were restricted from going to Nairobi. It is impor-
tant to note that the Operation Anvil of 1954 was responsible for the re-
moval of over 24,000 Agikuyu, Aembu and Ameru from Nairobi. After the
Operation, passbooks were issued to Africans in the city, and African
housing was reorganized in the locations on an ethnic group basis. But
during the same period, there was a great influx into Nairobi of Africans
from other ethnic groups. It is not everybody in (H) and (G) who enters
directly into the industrial/commercial employment. Some, failing to find
employment (I), join immediately the ranks of the reserve army. (K) are
those rehired mainly to do casual jobs, especially in the construction
industry, but also to do other manual jobs like loading and unloading
within the "formal sector". Leaving industrial/commercial employment are,
first, the retiring workers who have finished their productive careers (M)
and, second, those who are displaced from their jobs (J) and hence, enter
*
The popular name for the War of Liberation in Kenya.
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the pool of the reserve army. (L) are those who, after fruitless efforts
at job-seeking, finally give up and join those retiring from employment.
Conventionally referred to as circular migrants, (N) is losing sig-
nificance in the migration pattern. This is because today it is neither
easy nor fruitful for the peasants, just fresh from the countrysid, to
obtain casual employment in big cities. With unemployment and underemploy-
ment being so acute in Nairobi, the reserve army of workers are forever
ready to swoop upon whatever casual jobs will be available. In any case,
it is becoming increasingly commonplace for "target" migrants to go back
home with empty hands and usually thinner than when they left the country-
side.
There are three interrelated variables that will determine whether
or not a migrant will become a squatter. These are employment opportuni-
ties, income level and supply of "legal" housing. I shall deal with one
at a time, with a view to showing their influence on a migrant's propen-
sity to squat.
Employment
In Nairobi, the expansion of employment in enumerated activities --
government service and private firms covered by annual enumerations of
employees -- has proved inadequate to provide urban opportunities for the
existing adult population, much less the annual increase of adult popula-
tion resulting from migration. Officially, the urban employment problem
is indicated by a rate of unemployed of 8 to 14 percent (or a weighted rate
of 11.5 percent). The ILO suggests that to the 11.5 percent must be added
"the urban working poor who, if defined as persons earning less than 200
shs. a month, would be more numerous than those openly unemployed."' The
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ILO concludes that, taken together, those who are not adequately remuner-
ated in the urban areas exceed 20 percent of the males in Nairobi, with a
much higher incidence among women. The situation is summarized in the
following table.
TABLE 5:1. Proportion of Unemployed Persons and of the Working
Poor in the Adult Population of Nairobi, by Sex and
Household Status, 1970 (Percentages)
Males Females
Heads of All Members Heads of All Members
Households of Households Households of Households
Unemployed1  4.9 10.0 10.8 22.8
Working Poor 13.8 13.6 40.7 31.8
Unemployed1 Persons
and Working Poor
Jointly 18.7 23.6 51.5 54.6
1 Unemployed persons are those with zero incomes who are seeking
work..
Source: ILO, p. 64.
With the unemployment problem being so acute, therefore, it is no
wonder that more of ten than not the migrants do not get the jobs they go
to look for in Nairobi.
According to the Metropolitan Growth Strategy, it is assumed that
Nairobi's employment will increase somewhat faster than the projected na-
tional rate of 3 percent per annum, but not all employment categories will
grow at the same rate. The categories referred to here are the "formal
sector" which will grow at slightly over 4 percent per annum and the "in-
formal sector" (IS) which will grow at roughly 3 percent. But if "infor-
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formal sector" includes all the industry and businesses outside the "mod-
ern sector", it is more than likely that it will grow at a faster rate
than the Nairobi Urban Study Group predicted. However, even if it does,
the Nairobi Study Group further predicts that it is extremely unlikely
that the informal sector would account for more than 100,000 jobs by the
year 2000. The Group adds:
"In any event, no matter what the techniques used, and ir-
respective of the exact assumptions used, the inescapable
conclusion is that much of the future population of metro-
politan Nairobi will be poor, by any standard, and that
the part of the population without visible means of support
will be very poor indeed." 2
1000-
800.
600-
$400
200-
0-
Informal
Sector
and
Not
Employed
Modern
Sector
Employees
1971 1979 1985 2000
Figure 5:2. Nairobi Labor Force and Employees
Source: Nairobi Urban Study Group, 1973.
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The figure shows that employment in the modern (formal) sector will
yield a figure of little under 650,000 in the year 2000. Even if this
figure is augmented by up to 100,000 of those in the other two categories,
it is clear that a substantial proportion of the labor force will be out-
side the range of gainful employment. It is possible that over 250,000
potential wage-earners will be unsuccessful in finding any kind of work
in Nairobi in the year 2000. On top of that, there are reasons to believe
that many of these will experience chronic unemployment, being subjected
to prolonged and unfruitful search for work.
Income Distribution
It is extremely difficult to get reliable data on incomes in Nai-
robi. Among others who have attempted to show the income distribution
in Nairobi are ILO and Temple. But they, too, used basic income figures
from the results of a household budget survey conducted in Nairobi in
1968-69 by.the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The results
of this survey must be treated very cautiously because of biases in the
sample. According to Temple, the major biases arose through: (i) omit-
ting most of the urban shanty areas from the sample frame; and (ii) ex-
cluding many African household servants (serving Europeans and Asians),
many of whom earn less than 200 shs. a month.3
The undersampling means that the data we shall use below under-
states the size of the poorest one-third in Nairobi. The poorest one-
third are those whose incomes are below the poverty datum line estimates
of Ksh 200 in 1969.
The data which were computed and in the long-run used by the ILO
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to plot the Lorenz curve for Nairobi is in the table on the following
page (Table 5:3).
Housing: Demand and Supply
The problem of housing is most acute for the poor people. In fact,
there is no shortage of housing for the rich class of people. According
to the government plan, "more high-cost housing units were constructed
(1970-1974) at the expense of low-cost housing. The housing shortage,
therefore, has seriously increased in the low-income brackets."4
The (1970-1974) Development Plan estimated that 5,880 new units
would be needed each year in Nairobi during the plan period to accommo-
date the expansion of households (i.e., ignoring replacement of old units
and without endeavoring to alleviate overcrowding).5 Nor is the demand
for housing by the unemployed included in the targetted new units. The
Urban Study Group estimated that by 1983, 7,700 new low-cost units would
be needed annually to meet population growth, reduce overcrowding and re-
place obsolescent units. 6
It is generally accepted that the public sector should assume the
responsibility for housing the poor in Nairobi. The two public agencies
that are charged with that responsibility are the Nairobi City Council
(NCC) and the National Housing Corporation (N HC). But since 1963, there
has been a marked decline in the ratio of City Council units to Nairobi's
population, as this table shows:
Year Population Rental Units Ratio
1963 342,764 14,203 1:24.1
1971 585,191 19,269 1:30-4
TABLE 5:3. Distribution and Average Composition of Household Incomes in Nairobi, by Income Group,
1968-1969 (Shillings per Month)
Item Income Groups (Shillings per Month)
0-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 500-699 700-999 1,000- 1,400- Over Whole
1,399 1,999 2,000 Sample
Cash from Regular
Employment
Cash from Casual
Employment
Net Business Profit
Sale of Own Produce
Transfer of Payments
Total Cash Income
Housing Subsidy
Other Income in Kind
Total Income (Cash
and Kind)
Average Household
Size (Persons)
Total Income per Head
Disposable Income
(After Income Taxes)
40 218
9 -
25 14
5 -
307 410 557 770 1,042 1,430 2,524 746
7
6 15
8 3 11
3 18
6
12 1
11
4 2
7 69 16
4 1
16 10 94 15
87 235 324 425 572 795 1,076 1,455 2,687 780
- 18 15 14 18 25 105 180 203 47
- - 4 4 1 13 - 24 - 4
87 253 342 444 592 833 1,181 1,659 2,890 832
3.47 3.38 3.57 4.26 4.46 4.75 5.14 6.14 6.28
25 75 96 104
86 245 330 326
133
571
175 230 270
4.45
460 189
794 1,126 1,591 2,698 801
Source: ILO, p. 348.
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The table shows that in 1963, Nairobi's population was 342,764 and
the City Council had 14,203 units of rental housing yielding a ratio of
one unit per 24.1 people. By 1971, the population had risen to 585,191,
while the Council's housing stock grew to 19,269; the ratio thus rose to
one unit per 30.4 people.8 During the eight-year period, the population
grew by 242,427 and the Council's housing stock by 5,066, representing an
increase of one unit for every 47.8 people in the population growth.
Therefore, we agree with Temple that the activities of the City Council
and other government agencies in the housing field have not been keeping
pace with Nairobi's rapid population growth.
The following table shows the percentage of dwelling units con-
structed by the NCC and NHC between 1968 and 1971 and the percentage of
African households who could afford them.
TABLE 5:4. Housing Demand by Nairobi African Households, 1971,
Compared to Public Sector Residential Construction,
1968-1971
Monthly Cost Category Percentage of Puble Percentage of African
Sector Units, 1968-71 Households Able Lo Afford
(Shillings per Month) This Housing
% Cumulative % Cumulative
Less than 54/- 0.0 5.4 5.4
54/- to 80/- 1.4 1.4 16.7 22.1
81/- to 107/- 1.4 13.1 35.2
108/- to 134/- 32.8 34.2 9.4 44.6
135/- to 188/- 11.3 45.5 14.5 59.1
189/- to 269/- 24.1 69.6 9.4 68.5
270/- to 377/- 14.6 84.2 10.4 78.9
378/- to 539/- 6.5 90.7 10.4 89.3
540/- and over 9.4 100.1 10.6 99.9
Source: Temple, p. 212.
111
The table reveals that between 1968 and 1971 nothing was built by
the public sector which fell within the means of the poorest one-third of
African population. Remembering that the data used to work out this table
were the data that undersampled the poorest Africans, it is evidently
clear that even the table understates the size of the population in the
bottom third. The table also assumes that even the urban poor are willing
to spend 20 percent of their income on house rent. This assumption is
challenged by the results of a survey which revealed that improved housing
standards were not regarded as a high priority by the urban poor. 1When
asked, Nairobi squatter families listed their priorities in the following
order:
Essential:
1. Food
2. Current standard of shelter on this location
3. School fees (for those with children of school age)
4. Clothes
Desirable:
5. Money to buy land
6. Money to contribute to extended family
7. Money to extend business
8. Money to build another room (possibly for rentals)
9. Money to rent or buy a better house or room to live in
10. Improved transport to job9
The study which was conducted by NCCK in 1971 shows that the squat--
ters who have regular jobs can only afford a monthly house rent of Shs. 38.
We can draw several conclusions from the above discussion. First,
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it is extremely difficult for migrants (except those whose standard of
education is higher than high school) to get employment within the "formal
sector". Second, the income of the working poor is too low to afford
house rent for available houses. Third, the public sector housing program
has catered much more to Nairobi's middle- and upper-income groups than to
the poorer inhabitants. Because of the above, the poorest 34 percent and
many others who have been labelled the "working poor" by the ILO have one
alternative to meet their most basic needs. That alternative is to squat.
Typology of Squatter Settlements
In 1971, it was estimated that one-third of Nairobi's population --
about 167,000 people -- were living in unauthorized housing. These set-
tlements are scattered in various parts of the city. There are at least
five different types of squatter settlements: the first is what we shall
call street-sleeping. To this type would be added the "twilight housing"
11
and mushroom shanties. These are for nocturnal use only. They are made
or erected in the evening and dismantled again in the morning. The other
four types are those described by David Etherton: semi-permanent rural
which, like traditional African houses, are round thatched huts, such as
those in Langata. Semi-permanent urban are the better-organized communi-
ties of squatters, like those in Mathare Valley and Dagoretti. Temporary
urban consists mainly of temporary houses constructed of scrap materials.
Semi-permanent and temporary infill, found especially in the Eastlands,
are built of scrap materials, but are attached to existing buildings or
*
Squatting for the unemployed does not mean sleeping shelter alone,
but also unauthorized business.
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their courtyards (see Illustration 5:1 for those settlement locations).
Of all the types, the semi-permanent urban and the semi-permanent
rural are the ones where there exists some form of organized communities.
Some of the inhabitants of those communities are registered squatters.
This, however, does not mean they are treated any better by the authori-
ties when it comes to squatter settlement clearance. Registration of
squatters was started immediately after attainment of national independence
in 1963 to identify the landless people in Nairobi. Originally, those
registered were promised a piece of land somewhere, sometime in the future,
but the exercise, having served its political purpose, has long since been
abandoned. The political purpose was to appease the squatters, most of
whom had fought in the War of Liberation, while the newly formed African
elite government consolidated its power.
Although the squatters have been under a hostile environment since
1901, the squatter settlements have always been growing at a remarkable
rate. In 1921, there were 12,088 squatters living in separate villages.12
In 1971, the 167,000 squatters were composed of 34,613 family units living
in 49 settlements in addition to Mathare Valley and Dagoretti. "Exam-
ples from all over the world," writes Etherton, "show that if the urban
economy is unable to provide the work and facilities sought by urban im-
migrants and the growing population, independent development will take
place and gradually overtake 'official' development policies."14 Andrew
Hake shows that in Nairobi, the "self-help city", as he calls the "unof-
ficial" side of Nairobi, "is now building more houses, creating more jobs,
absorbing more people and growing faster than the modern city." M1athare
Valley, for example, was reckoned in 1970 to be growing at 16 percent
Illustration 5:1. Characteristics of Uncontrolled Settlements*
Type Location Construction Occupation Public Utilities
1. Street Sleeping
Twilight Housing
Mushroom Shanties
2. Semi-permanent
Rural
3. Semi-permanent
Urban
4. Temporary Urban
Center of city
Along the Nairobi
River
Peripheral areas
of Nairobi
Peripheral areas
of Nairobi
(1 1/2 mile
radius of city
center)
Central city area
(within 3-mile
radius)
Along river
valleys
Blanket for cover
Sack for lying on
Cardboard or poly-
styrene
Traditional layout
of buildings
Informal village
layout
Mud and wattle with
some scrap mater-
ials
Entirely scrap ma-
terials
Begging
Hawking
Vending
Real food kiosks
Local markets
Subsistence farming
Some wage employment
outside settlements
Self-employed in
informal sector
Casual, wage, and
self-employment
Food/kiosks
none
Water from nearest
spring or perma-
nent house
(inadequate)
Pit latrines
(inadequate)
None
5. Temporary and Semi-
permanent Infill
Attached to or Scrap material Wage, casual and
within courtyards Sometimes corrugated self-employment
of existing hous- iron roofs Shops in surrounding
ing in specific areas
areas of Nairobi
Adapted, with modifications, from David Etherton, Mathare Valley (op. cit.), p. 4.
None
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ILLU'>TRATION 5:2
Ab4l TYPE AND EXTENT OF UNCONTROLLED SETTLEMENT: SCALE I : 500.000
NAIROBI
AbCl TYPE AND EXTENT OF UNCONTROLLED SETTLEMENT:
CENTRAL NAIROBI
AUTHORISED HOUSING UNAUTHOR
'Registered' villages in Central Province Each symb
are included in this category on both mea
c steel area 
em perm
Odustrial area emi-perm
bu ilt illegal
low-doensity housing se.perm
tsnder 20 people per acre squatters
med am density housing 0 emi-perm
between 20 and 100 ppa bui Illega
h igh density housing temporary
aee 100 Ppa squatters
,itet-and. service housan e perm
some squat
maan ro.,de ne .:nd ri
L lnatio -
SCALE I : 100.000
tISED HOUSING
I represents S00 people
ps
anent urban
anent urban,
lIV by landowner
anent rural:
anent rural
Ily by landowner
urban:
anent and temporary infill
ily by plot or houseowner
tere
II5
NAIROBI (EXCLUDING THE CENTRAL AREA)
SEMI PERMANENT RURAL
* I Dagoretti 10.000
* 2 Kibera 3,000
3 Garden Estate 100
4 Sisal Estate 2.000
5 Coffee Estate $o
6 Aintre Estate 3100
7 Kamiti Road
TOTAL 700
SEMI PERMANENT URBAN
1 Dagoretti 37.000
* 2 Reea000
* B Ruarska 2.000
9 Kariobansi South oo10 Koma Rock Road oo
* II Kahawa 1,000
* 12 Kasaran; 600
TOTAL 4729
TEMPORARY URBAN
13 Karura Forest 3100
JUB-TOTAL FOR NAIROB s.600.
CENTRAL NAIRORI
SEMI PERMANENT RURAL
14 Mathsre Valley 1,816
-I% Maishani 301
-16 Kambiu 409
* 17 Buru Ruru 1 906
SEMI PERMANENT URBAN
14 Mathre Valley 47,04118 Kari.bangi 1.026
19 Kandundu 2,412
20 Gitanuru 432
23 Nairobi River 1.200
TOTAL. SZ-111
TEMPORARY URBAN
-22 Kiranyaga 846
*-23 Kaburini 216
-24 Rox Estate 3152
-2S harana 103
*-26 Kitui Village 2,160
-27 Muthuri 409
-28 Carton City 1.912
-29 Kinyao 3,109
TOTAL 10507
TEMPORARY AND SEMI PERMANENT INFILL
-30 Eastiigh 6.100
33 Pangani 2.000
- Other I.00
SUB-TOTAL FOR CENTRAL NAIROBI 74.3
GRAND TOTAL 143.313
NOTES
Approximate population figures calculated at 4 persons per household.
0 The historical development of these areas is described in appenda.
A,pp 1-06
Recently demollihed areas .30
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yearly, which means its population will double in five years if the same
growth rate is maintained. "This 'other' urban revolution," he concludes,
"is thus taking the lead in many aspects of Nairobi's growth, with the
modern city following on behind."1 5
Demolition of Squatter Settlements and the Act of Blaming the Victim
As early as 1901, the Municipal Council of Nairobi passed a by-law
to "eliminate squatting"; to this day, neither the colonial government nor
the post-colonial one has managed to eliminate squatting. The government
and the Nairobi City Council have devised several ways of at least con-
trolling what they call uncontrolled settlements. We can identify three
devices:
(i) Regulatory measures
Examples of this are the Vagrancy Acts. The government passes
and tries to enforce the law, hoping that it will be obeyed.
To go with the law are always the promises of a "better place",
e.g., to a site-and-service scheme or resettlement on a piece
of land in the countryside. However, the promises are given
up almost as soon as the first "vagrants" are arrested. In
1962-1963, there were as many as 2,000 people arrested every
month under the Vagrancy Ordinance. Such persons were ordered
to be repatriated to rural areas; if they had no home there,
they would be sent to a detention center for three months.16
The first form of Vagrancy Act was passed in 1901,17 and the
one which is still in force was passed in 1968.
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(ii) Persuasion
This was done mainly by national politicians immediately after
national independence. The squatters are reminded that they
have a role to play in national development and they could best
play this role in the countryside. The appeal to the unemployed
groups in the city to "go back to the land", however, was given
up in the late 3960s (and replaced by the Vagrancy Act in 1968),
when it became clear that most of the unemployed did not have
land to go back to either.
(iii) Violence
Demolition is the third device and the most cormonly used. In
this section, we shall therefore deal mainly with demolition.
Demolition of squatter settlements and their business is as old as
Nairobi City. In 1923, three of the eight African villages in Nairobi
were destroyed and their inhabitants were moved to Pumwani, Nairobi's
first site-and-service scheme. In 1954, it was reported that "the police
and City inspectorate are holding the position with great difficulty...
demolishing 30-40 structures a week."18 The latest demolition was in
November, 1977, when about 10,000 people were rendered homeless. 1 9
There are various rationales for demolition. The colonial govern-
ment justified demolition primarily as a tool to maintain public health
standards. This excuse is given to this day. In addition-to maintaining
public health, there is the City Council's and the government's concern
to maintain governmental control over development. As the Town Clerk
once remarked, "You allow these shanties to go up and you will one morning
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wake up to find several of them right in the center of the city."20
Thirdly, there is the desire to maintain the image of the "modern city".
It is commonplace to read in newspaper reports about clearing the undesir-
ables from the city. Those with liberal attitudes and sympathy to the
"undesirables" feel strongly "that it is up the government to save the
public from the embarrassment of the public display of deformity [beggars]
or desitution."21 That kind of an attitude complies with the general view
of the image of the modern city. As Lisa Peattie and Alejandro Portes
have pointed out, the city has traditionally been viewed as "always a for-
tress of high culture, the citadel of the elites and highly homogenous in
class composition." The reason given for demolitions of October and
November, 1977, is because the City Council wants to turn the area into
flower gardens and recreational parks. 2 3
The manner with which the demolitions are carried on reveals the
authorities' attitude towards the squatters. The following newspaper
statements show that there is no respect whatsoever of the squatters and
their possessions by the authorities:
Headline:
Headline:
Shanties Flattened in Bulldozer Swoop
"Police reinforced by administration police and city
askaris surrounded the Nairobi River slums shortly
after midnight. They ordered a curfew and no one
was allowed in or out until dawn....The massive mili-
tary-style clean-up operation left thousands home-
less." 24
Out Go the Squatters
Axe Squads Flatten Huruma Shanties in Dawn Swoop
"Demolition squads swooped without warning on Nairobi's
Huruma settlement at dawn yesterday to kick out thou-
sands of illegal squatters." 25
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"fighting broke out yesterday in a Nairobi produce
market when a group of City Council askaris tried to
confiscate vegetables from a number of women...onions,
tomatoes, bananas, peas, peppers, cabbages, carrots
and other foodstuffs were thrown into a heap by the
askaris." 26
Such inhumane acts occur because of the general image people have
of the squatters. In summary, the squatters are characterized as:
- idle and shiftless members of the population
- loafers and ne'er-do-wells in town
- robbers and thieves
- temporary or transitory immigrants from rural areas
- parasites in the city
- vagrants and lawless people
- those who feign poverty and prefer life in slums to going back
to the land
In general, squatters are seen as those poor people who get every-
thing from the city and contribute nothing. The above list is made up of
quotations from Nairobi newspapers reporting official statements as well
as from Andrew Hake's and Frederick Temple's studies of Nairobi.
The image of the squatters in Nairobi fits well into the general
concept of marginality which has been applied to squatters almost every-
where else in the developing countries. We shall use the information
provided by a survey of temporary structures, conducted by the National
Christian Council of Kenya, to assess the validity of this image of squat-
ters.
First, the squatters are not temporary or transitory immigrants.
The average length of residence of the squatter was found to be nine
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years, while that of the city in general is 13.6 years. Only roughly a
quarter of adult respondents had come to Nairobi within the past five
years. Three-quarters had been squatting for an average of seventeen
years. For those who lived in Mathare Valley, where the survey was done,
42 percent had come from another Nairobi squatter area, mostly due to
demolition.2 7 That shows there is long residency in other squatter areas,
too.
More than anything else, the squatters' contribution to the general
economy of the city is grossly understated. The NCCK survey showed that
45 percent of the squatters in Mathare Valley had wage-employment, with
an average monthly income of Shs. 225. Another 36 percent were self-
employed, with a monthly cash income of Shs. 95. The overall average
monthly income, including the 19 percent who said they had no cash income
at all, is Shs. 142. This amounts to a monthly cash income of Shs.
16,908,750. Since most of such income is for subsistence, we assume that
the bulk of it is consumed in Nairobi. The self-employed, or those in
the "informal sector", probably created, by 1971, over 50,000 jobs which
did not appear anywhere in any other statistics.28 The ILO estimated
that about 30 percent of Nairobi's population live out of the incomes
generated in the informal sector. Studies of squatter economics in other
developing countries show that this "secondary economy" is definitely a
subsidiary of the general monetized economy. "Although good studies
of barrio economics are lacking -- and much needed," argues Professor
Lisa Peattie, "the evidence in the literature and my own experience in
Venezuela would suggest that even the limited part of barrio economic
life which lies outside the regular market economy is quite dependent on
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the inflow of money represented by the wages of those employed' in the
'modern sector'. It is those wages which are redistributed through the
kinship networks, which become the payments for purchases at the neigh-
borhood stores, and which form the capital on which local businesses are
founded .29
In 1970, the cost of squatter houses in Nairobi was estimated at
Shs. 5,000,000. In 1970/71, 8,943 dwelling units were demolished by the
City Council, equal to four times the number built by the public sector
in the same period. The shelters which housed 48,000 people caused a
capital loss of approximately Shs. 2,800,000 to Nairobi housing stock.
It is, therefore, a myth that the proponents of marginality theory
uphold when they contend that squatters are a drain on the urban economy.
Squatters in Nairobi contribute to the urban economy both in terms of
labor and consumption. In general, most of the employed persons in squat-
ter areas are employed outside the squatter area. Therefore, it would
be found that the squatter area is part of a city- or national-scale
economy.30 Bamberger argues that "shanty-town also provides the major
source of labor for much of the city's industry and through not having
to pay rent, the cost of labor is kept down."3 1 Janice Perlman is of the
same opinion: "Because there are so many tavelados [squatter settlements],
there is an ever-willing labor pool which enables wages to remain at low
levels and employers to avoid workers' benefits requirements."3 2
The NCCK survey results invalidate the myth that squatters are lazy
people who run away from the rural areas. The study reveals that 73 per-
cent of household heads do not own rural lands anywhere. Only 27 percent
of the respondents indicated that they own land outside Nairobi. These
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were asked how many people were currently living on their land. The tab-
ulation showed that there was already an average of only 0.5 acres per
person. If these people went back to the land, there would be an average
of only 0.33 acre per person. They would therefore worsen the agrarian
conditions that forced them to migrate in the first place. It is not
surprising, therefore, that when asked where they would go if their
houses were demolished, only 3 percent replied that they would return
upcountry. 97 percent said they would either rebuild on the site, move
in with friends (temporarily) or build new shanties elsewhere in Nairobi.
There is also ample evidence to show that squatters are not politi-
cally marginal people. As a matter of fact, the struggle for liberation
that is believed to have won the Kenyan independence was organized from
the slums of Mathare Valley until the infamous Operation Anvil of 1954.
As one scholar has shown, "The 40 Group and other movements associated
with it, represent the most successful populist political initiative in
Kenya's history to this day."33 Today in the squatter settlements, par-
ticularly types 3, 4, and 5, there is a branch of the ruling -- and the
only political party in Kenya -- KANU. In his study, Marc Ross shows
that the squatters of Mathare Valley are politically integrated into the
national politics. They attend political meetings and they participate
in voting. 34
Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter has revealed several things concern-
ing the squatters in Nairobi. First, the capitalist system does not pro-
vide the squatters with even the most basic needs, much less the social
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amenities enjoyed by the richer members of the society. Secondly, the
system has very negative attitudes towards the squatters, and through
demolitions and general harrassment, has treated them in a most inhumane
manner. Thirdly, the squatters are not marginal members of the urban
society. They contribute both economically and politically to the growth
of the city.
As it has been contended, "it turns out that development of squatter
settlements is one of those regular irregularities through which socie-
ties are able to do things which they find necessary, while at the same
time denying the existence of, or at least any support to, the phenome-
non. "
3 5
Whereas the authorities, some analysts and even public opinion from
some circles may fail to recognize it, both the so-called "modern", or
"formal", sector and the "informal" sector are integrated into the soci-
ety; only that they are on very different terms. Squatters are not mar-
ginal to the Nairobi society, but integrated into it in a manner detri-
mental to their interests. They are not socially marginal but rejected;
not economically marginal but exploited; and not politically marginal but
repressed. In a word, squatters are a very oppressed class of people.
Finally, we have shown that the various methods (regulatory, per-
suasion and violence) of dealing with the squatter problem have failed
not only to eradicate but even to effect minimal control over squatting.
The erroneous image of the squatters as marginal seems to be the basis
for employing such methods. But the basis of squatting, as it has been
established in the previous two chapters, is the capitalist mode of pro-
duction that has been prevailing in Kenya in the last seventy years. Our
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contention is that, insofar as urban form flows from, and is an integral
part of, the general economy of the society, none of the seemingly urban
problems can be eradicated within the structures that generate those
problems in the first place, and nourish them in the next place, also.
Nor can the squatting, or indeed any other socio-economic problem affec-
ting the lot of the urban poor, be abolished in isolation.
It is because of that proposition that I decided to look at a
slightly different approach to the squatting problem. It is called
"slightly different" because even the types of Community Organization
practiced in Nairobi squatter areas today have very little effect on the
root causes of squatting, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Community Organization in the
Squatter Settlements of Nairobi:
A Case Study
Introduction
Our study so far has dealt with origins, nature and extent of squatting
in Kenya in general and Nairobi in particular. It has been shown that
squatting is basically a structural problem. The problem developed out
of capitalist socio-economic structures which evolved from colonialism
and continues to thrive under neocolonialism. In this chapter the primary
concern is that of the solutions to the problem. In post-independent
Kenya, demolition of squatter settlements and, of late, rural incentive
schemes and concentrated decentralization - through central place
strategy - are official means of resolving the poverty and inequalities,
urban squatting problems included. In our view, demolitions and similar
public policies will neither stop the proliferation of squatter settlements
nor better the socio-economic conditions of the squatters. This case
study is an analysis and a discussion of a different approach used in
improving the living conditions of the squatters. This approach is
community organization.
The purpose of this chapter is basically to analyze a case of commu-
nity organization in Mathare Valley. In our view, community organization
is simply local-based efforts of addressing the problem facing the local
people. The nature this local way of addressing the problem will take
depends solely on how those engaged in it perceive the problem they are
trying to solve. The analysis in this chapter will show that none of
those involved in community organization in Mathare Valley are seriously
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tackling the sources or roots of the squatting problem
In this analysis it will be shown that community organization in
Mathare Valley has been a result of the following: In the case of
base-group initiatives, community organization comes out of desperation
and is basically a means for survival. (In this study, base-groups
refers to the squatters' organizations.) Secondly, community organizations
and community development have emerged from opportunism by profit-oriented
groups, mainly referred to as private companies in Mathare Valley. A
third type is that initiated by voluntary organizations like NCCK which
sees the squatting problem as an inevitable consequence of urbanization
and modernization. NCCK gets involved to demonstrate to the authorities
that more positive strategies than demolition or redevelopment are
viable. It also sees its involvement as a vocation and "Christian
commitment to the poor."
First I shall discuss briefly the typologies of community organiza-
tion in the squatter settlements of Nairobi and especially in Mathare
Valley. The three types we shall deal with are categorized according to
the group or agency which initiates the mode of community organizing.
The three initiators which were mentioned above are the squatters, the
private companies in the squatter settlements and voluntary associations.
Then, in further detail, I shall analyze the type of community organiza-
tion sponsored by a voluntary association, in this case NCCK.
A major concern in analyzing community organization as a solution is
to look at it against the problem as analyzed in the preceding chapters.
It will become evidently clear that considered against the problem, the
solution offered by community organization is piecemeal. But so far it
is the community organization that has had tangible positive impact on
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the lives of a good many squatters.
Definitions
Before going into the case study, let us deal with definitions and con-
cepts of the main terminologies that shall be used in this analysis. These
terminologies are community organization, community development, and
participation.
1. Community Organization
Most of the definitions of community organization are not concise. It
is therefore not easy to quote a single definition that can embrace the
concept of community organization. The following definition includes
most, but not all, of the elements of community organization:
"Community organization refers to various methods of intervention
whereby a professional change agent helps a community action
system composed of individuals, groups or organizations to engage
in planned collective action in order to deal with social problems
within a democratic system of values. It is concerned with programs
aimed at social change with primary reference to environmental
conditions and social institutions. It involves two major inter-
related concerns: (a) the interactional processes of working with
an action system, which include identifying, recruiting and working
with the members, and developing organizational and interpersonal
relationships among them which facilitate their efforts; and (b)
the technical tasks involved in identifying problem areas, analyzing
causes, formulating plans, developing strategies, and mobilizing
the resources necessary to effect action.1
For our purpose, this definition is adequate only for the type of
community organization practiced by the NCCK. The definition includes,
on the one hand, working with an action system and mobilizing the resources
needed to produce change and, on the other hand, diagnostic and planning
tasks. It focuses more sharply on the professional "change agent" who
interacts with an "action system". That is why it refers to "methods of
intervention". Intervention presupposes an outsider; so for the type of
community organization practiced by the victimized people in the community,
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in our case the squatters themselves, the idea of intervention does not
arise.
In their definition, Kramer and Specht include not only organizing
but also planning. That means community organizing includes both the
intellectual process and defining problems and proposed solutions, and
the activities that stem from those plans, involving mobilization of neces-
sary resources to achieve a result.
For the purpose of our analysis, I shall accept the above definition
but add to it one important dimension. My concept of community organiza-
tion will include the efforts made by the people at grassroots level to
deal with their day-to-day mundane problems. This includes the spontan-
eous response, on the part of the squatters, to interventions like
demolition. It also includes other activities such as organizing the
security of the community, building a nursery school or raising funds to
pay fines for their members who have been arrested by the police.
2. Community Development
Community development is seen as one type of community organization,2 the
other being social planning. There are several definitions of community
development that are worth noting:
(a)"Community development is a process of social action in which people
of a community organize themselves for planning and action; define
their common and individual needs and problems;....[and] excecute
these plans with a maximum of reliance upon community resources."3
(b)"Community development is a social process by which human beings
can become more competent to live with and gain some control over
local aspects of a frustrating and changing world... .Personality
growth through group responsibility for the local common good is
the focus."4
(c)"Community development can be tentatively defined as a process designed
to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole
community with its active participation and the fullest possible
reliance on the community initiative."5
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The first and third definitions stress local initiative and use of
local resources. This presupposes that community change may be pursued
optimally through broad participation of a wide spectrum of people at
the local community level in goal determination and action.
Taking all the three definitions we have emphases on the following:
loaclly defined needs; local action; reliance on local resources;
personality growth via group interaction; and harnessing underutilized
human resources. All those are important elements in community develop-
ment. Among the three definitions we have all that it takes to have
community development.
3. "Citizen" Participation
Community participation* has been inadequately developed as a specific
conceptual area of social science.- Its definition is therefore more
problematic than definitions of the other two. In a given context,
participation is normative and not merely descriptive. As Roweis points
out,
"citizen participation, viewed as a mode of societal and political
existence, can only be normatively considered in the context of
societal guidance or social change." 6
Often "citizens" are invited to participate in something introduced into
their community from outside. That means somebody other than the
"citizens" will determine the nature of and the extent to which they will
participate. This raises the question as to what degree do "elites" or
"texperts" and to what degree do "citizens" set societal courses of action.
The capacity to determine another party's participation insmething
connotes the capacity to limit or control his degree of participation.
*In this analysis, community participation will be used instead of
citizen participation.
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In spite of the concerted efforts at advocacy for people's participa-
tion in the matters that vitally affect their lives, it is important to
note that as long as the status quo is maintained - in other words, as
long as the dichotomy between the elite and the "citizens" prevails -
there will always be a "class" of people - the elite - with a higher
perception of what is desirable than the less educated, the citizens.
In such a situation, argues Roweis,
"the elites are relatively free to set societal courses of action
as long as such actions entail only minor changes in citizens'
societal knowledge. When, however, elites initiate changes that
fall outside the perceived boundaries of existing contexts, they
first have to inform and win the consent of citizens. Hence, the
raison d'etre of citizen participation." 7
There are different ways of "informing and winning the consent of
citizens", depending on situations. In squatter settlements it almost
invariably begins with dispensing of benevolent goods through welfare
service.
In the area of community organization, participation has been viewed
in various and not always compatible ways. Sometimes, participation is
spoken of as a goal in its own right. This view sees psychological
satisfaction in participation. This concept is cherished mainly in
industrialized countries. In the United States, for instance, citizen
participation is considered crucial since
"..... in an impersonal urban environment, where associational ties
have supposedly been weakened, the core objective of practice has
been viewed by some to be the restoration of potential ties for
meaningful human interaction through participation." 8
Among the proponents of this view are William and Loureide Biddle.9 In
such a formulation substantive results, such as specific health and
educational programs, are not so important as is the more fundamental
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objective of providing channels for meaningful interaction. Whereas such
participation might be desirable in industrialized countries of the West,
where citizens feel lost and impersonal in the "urban jungle", it is not
the kind of participation that is necessary in squatter settlements in
developing countries where, if anything, human interaction among the
squatters is the order of the day.
Sometimes participation is viewed as "a means for achieving more
concrete programatic ends - but as a constant, unvarying means."1 0
Murray G. Ross is a leading advocate of this view. Ile contends that
community organization requires the participation of the people of a
community because what is to be united in common action is people. And
what is to be changed is to be changed by people.1 1
A third view of participation is more relativistic and analytical.
It looks at participation also as a means, butas a conditional means to
be employed selectively for certain goals and under given circumstances.
In my view, community participation has two dimensions. The first
is expressive-oriented. This is where members of a community, in our
case the squatters, act in concert to express their feelings about an
issue. While in the process they achieve substantive results they also,
more importantly, express their inner feelings. In such a case they
conceive, plan and execute their plans. The second is task-oriented.
In this we concur with Murray Ross' view. The squatters participate in
programs designed to achieve a task - sometimes all by themselves, at
other times and more often in collaboration with an external agency.
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Typology of Community Organizations in Nairobi
Community organizations come into existence to meet the needs and
serve the purposes of a group or groups of people. Since needs and pur-
poses of different groups of people vary, there will tend to emerge
different types of community organiztions. An organization which serves
the purposes of only one group of people, especially if it is a group
without sanctioned power like the squatters, will hardly last a long
time. On the other hand, a community organization which serves several
purposes and/or purposes of several groups will tend to last for a long
while.
As indicated above, there are three types of community organization
in Nairobi. These are base-group organizations, private company organi-
zations, and organizations of voluntary associations.
1. Base-group Organizations
This is a community organization that comes into existence as a result
of squatters' initiative. It happens when people get so desperate they
make things happen in their own interests. It is in this kind of a
community organization that the people could be said to be genuinely
participating in shaping the events which vitally affect their lives.
In base-group organizations, plans are made and executed by the victims
themselves. Such organizations are characterized by the boldness with
which squatters act. They defy the authorities and the law. When they
are task-oriented, as they often are, base-group organizations aim at
short-range social change.
In Nairobi the activities of base-group organizations are not
physically violent but they tend to produce immediate and positive
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results, There are many examples of such activities but I shall mention
only two. The first one is about an incident which happened in 1970 after
a squatter settlement was burnt down at Kaburini. The victims organized
themselves to confront the authorities. Andrew Hake gives an account of
the incident:
"Three days later....there was an obviously well-organized demonstr-
tion of Kaburini residents, 'mostly women with babies on their backs
and clad in tattered clothes to which banana leaves had been tied.
With their faces painted with black ashes and carrying charred
remains of their burnt-down houses', they marched singing past
City Hall, the Parliament Building and the office of the President
in Harambee House, and 'sat outside the main entrance of the new
Hilton Hotel, in the mistaken belief that they would see [the]....
President....there and could tell him of their suffering'." 1 2
As it happened, they never saw the President, but it was not long before
they were settled in another location.
The second incident happened in September 1977, after the city
council police confiscated the merchandise of market women in Nairobi:
"Following the incident, a large group of women marched on City
Hall to demand an explanation from the Mayor for the constant
'terrorism." 13
It was only after the march that the women recovered their foodstuffs.
Base-group organizations are found in the squatter settlements that
fall under types* (2) semi-permanent rural, (3) semi-permanent urban and,
to a lesser degree, (5) temporary and semi-permanent infill.
Base-group organizations basically serve the interests of the squat-
ters only. Once base-group organizations have made "some victories",
there will be a tendency on the part of the authorities to co-opt the
leaders. The authorities will respond promptly to the demands of a
base-group organization but after that it will take time to work out
*
See page 112 above.
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longer-term strategies for dealing with the organization. That is why
it happens that base-group organizations will either be co-opted or
liquidated. The more permanent a squatter settlement becomes, the higher
are the chances of its base-group organization being co-opted or integra-
ted into the system. A case in point is Mathare Valley.
In Mathare Valley there are nine villages. Except for the two more
recently settled villages, all others have each an elected chairman and
village committee. In villages I, II and III the organizational set-up
is closely connected with the KANU* (Kenya African National Union)
political organization.14 Villages IV, V, Ngei I and Ngei II also have
similar organizational set-ups, although officially not along the KANU
lines. The village committees are responsible for settling disputes
and for community (village) development. The only primary school in
the Valley is situated in Village I. Each village has contributed to
the building and maintenance of the primary school either in cash, in
kind or by supplying labor. Seven villages have each built a nursery
school and, with the exception of three villages, all others have each
built a community hall. The community hall is the center of the village
social life; dances, committee meetings and village meetings are held
there. Open-air markets and kiosks (for selling foodstuffs and other
basic goods) are organized by the village committees.
Community development is done mainly through self-help projects
organized by the committees. Through such self-help activities Village
II has managed to install pipe-borne water, although not to individual
houses. The activities are organized to raise funds or to provide
* Kenya is de facto one-party system and KANU is the only ruling party.
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labor or to contribute goods which could be sold for cash.
For many years the squatters in Mathare Valley organized their own
police to provide security as well as to regulate drunkenness in the
villages. With Mathare Velley being politically integrated into the
mainstream political system, the ruling party has taken over in overseeing
the security of the villages. Today, "The villages all have KANU youth-
wingers to act as police, who seem to have been effective in dealing with
less serious offenses...."15 But as the political integration of squatters
in Mathare Valley becomes more successful, the role of the youth-wingers
is also diminishing. This is best explained by the situation in the
"best organized village."16 As Etherton observes, 'they were most effec-
tive in Village II, but now that the police are able to patrol the area
without fear of being beaten-up themselves, the youth-wingers are less
effective."1 7
An important point to note here is that it is not just the role of
one aspect of Mathare Velley life - like youth-wingers - that is dimin-
ishing, but as the squatters are being more politically integrated the
vitality and dynamism of base-group organizations are being seriously
threatened. To illustrate this point, let us look briefly at the
leadership in the village which is supposed to be the best organized.
Community organizations in Mathare Valley began as base-group
organizations. As indicated above, they still retain some but by no
means all the basic characteristics of base-group organizations. When he
was doing his studies in the area in 1971, Marc Ross shows that among all
the Mathare Valley leaders the one of Village II was the most integrated
into the metropolitan politics. In the village committee the leader/
chairman is the dominant figure.
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"While other people participate in the village committee meetings
as well as in general public meetings, it is the leader-chairman
who decides when they will talk, how long they will speak and
whether they will be praised or rebuked for their remarks."18
Ross continues to show that the leader uses the public meetings to
communicate threates to village groups which he feels are opposed to his
leadership. In what is considered to be a typical general village
meeting, there are twenty-four recorded items in the minutes, of which
twenty-two are records of what was spoken by the leader/chairman. The
remaining two were an announcement by the leader of youth-wing and a
point of information by the vice-chairman. More than half of the twenty-
two items accorded to the leader/chairman are to do with law and order
and the ruling party. That is no wonder bacause, as Ross notes, "it is
difficult to separate [the leader's] party role from his role as village
chairman or head of the co-operative society. He is able to provide the
party with supporters for political rallies and with voters on election
days." 1 9
2. Private Company Organizations
In the late 1960s, groups of squatters in Mathare Valley organized them-
selves into co-operatives with an aim of purchasing the land they were
squatting, thereby securing their houses from the constant annoying
demolition raids conducted by the authorities.20 That move was considered
necessary because
"although politically well-organized and supported by their Member of
of Parliament, the squatters....had failed in their attempts to win
recognition from the Nairobi City Council and from the central
government." 21
The late 1960s were very bad years for the squatters because they were
the peak of the records of squatter settlements demolitions in Nairobi.
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Originally, there were twenty-five land-buying co-operatives, but
today only one of them is co-operative. All the others changed status
and became land-buying and house-building companies organized on limited-
liability and share-holding bases.
The co-operatives became companies because it soon became clear that
land-buying and house-building was lucrative buisness. Then more people
sought to buy it, the land acquired more value, and as more groups entered
the market, prices rose. As Temple learned,
"in 1967 one company acquired a 12 acre plot for 3,000 shillings; in
1969 another company bought a plot nearby of the same acreage for
25,000 shillings; the next-door plot, again of 12 acres, is now
selling for 60,000 shillings. The most expensive plot, 15 acres
close to the town center and with a few stone houses, has just been
sold for 800.000 shillings. 2 2
The sale prices were between two and ten times greater than the Nariobi
City Council's valuations for the plots. Land in Mathare Valley began to
cost slightly less per acre than in Muthaiga, an upper-class area which
contains Nairobi's "embassy row".
What is even more pathetic is the fact that soon after their
formation, companies began to take in outside members from other parts
of Nairobi and even from outside Nairobi. Etherton shows that by
mid-1969 all but six companies had outside members. By the end of 1969,
new companies organized completely outside the squatter villages began to
buy land in Mathare Valley.
Today, the land-buying and house-building companies are capitalist
enterprises. There are bitter conflicts between them and the squatters.
Most companies are known to have written to officials demanding the
squatters be removed by the government and settled elsewhere.23 In some
cases, companies have harassed squatters by tearing down latrines and
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building houses among the old villages.
We have included private company organizations as a type of community
organization not because of what they are now, but because of the original
impetus that led to their formation as co-operatives. They are involved
in community development in Mathare Valley, but their activities are
detrimental to the advancement of squatters as a community.
The company houses are too expensive for the squatters and this
accounts for the drastic and dramatic change of the character of Mathare
Valley between 1969 and 1971. During that time, "the population more than
doubled as 'housing companies' built 7,628 one-room units of housing with-
24
out the approval of Nairobi's governing authorities." Most of the
people who came to occupy those units were those with regular jobs, but
because of the general shortage of cheap housing and their meagre income,
could not afford better houses elsewhere. Such people do not feel the
strong sense of community that the poorer and more desperate squatters
feel. Nor do they feel obliged to participate in community development
since in case of complaints they have their landlords to bother.
With demand for cheap housing exceeding by far the supply, house-
building in Mathare Valley became one of the most lucrative businesses
"in town". As Etherton explains:
"The basic reason for this economic bonanza is the fact that a
six-room structure costs around Shs. 4,500/- to build, but each
room is rented for Shs. 70/- per month. On a yearly basis this
becomes Shs. 5,040/-. Subtracting maintenance and loss through
defaulters the revenue for about one year is about equal to the
cost of the house. From that one ought to adjust for the cost of
land, but even so. the return on investment is above 50%, which
makes it one of the most attractive investments in Nairobi."2 5
Whereas they contribute to the physical development of the squatter
settlement, the companies therefore have inverse contribution to the human
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development of the squatters. With the kind of housing improvements they
are making, and motivated by nothing other than profit maximization,
sooner or later the companies are going to drive away the squatters from
Mathare Valley. Already, the influx of outside speculators has increased
because they see that the area is an excellent site for housing develop-
ment with its many accessible undeveloped sites located only five miles
from the city center.26
In the final analysis, I predict that for the squatters the situation
in Mathare Valley will get worse before it gets better. We have pointed
out that the leadership of base-group organizations has been co-opted into
the mainstream of the socio-political system, thereby being deprived of
its power capacity to make things done in the interests of the squatters.
The leaders of the village committees are themselves leaders and share-
holders in the "Private Companies Limited". The need to revitalize
base-group organizations, therefore, is greater now than ever before.
3. Voluntary Associations
The third type of community organization work among the squatters is
that of voluntary associations.
NCCK is regarded as a voluntary association because it fits the
definition of a voluntary association. According to Rothman:
"Voluntary associations are often viewed as mechanisms of mediating
between the individual, made small by the growing size and complexity
of society, and larger community and bureaucratic structures that
affect one's life. In this sense, voluntary associations represent
collective instrumentalities through which individuals in concert,
especially those with little power or resources, may make a greater
impact on their social environmeqt than if they acted independently."
27
Whereas the formulation defines what NCCK represents, it is, however,
important to note that the squatters in Mathare Valley had organized
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themselves as communities even before NCCK began its work there. It is
best, therefore, to view NCCK as mediating between the squatter communi-
ties and the bureaucratic authorities.
In this section we shall do a more detailed case study of NCCK's
work in squatter settlements of Nairobi and especially in Mathare Valley.
I chose to do a more detailed analysis of NCCK's work because of several
reasons:
(a) In my opinion, NCCK has done more to better the conditions of
the squatter in Nairobi than any other agency, public or private.
(b) NCCK, as a voluntary association, and with great concern for
serving the poor, has great potential for doing even more valuable
work in this area than it has done hitherto.
(c) Data on NCCK's work have been available.
Method of Analysis
The method used in analyzing NCCK's Urban Squatter Improvement Program
(USIP)* and its work in Mathare Valley borrows from several scholars.
The first part, which is an analysis of NCCK as a community organization
agency, borrows from the method suggested by Mayer Zizald.28 The second
part, which is an analysis of NCCK's social problem-solving process, is
29
based on the method proposed by Robert Perlman and Arnold Gurin,
Alfred J. Kahn30 and to a lesser degree by Jack Rothman.31 The third
section of this case study will discuss the work of NCCK in Mathare
Valley and the fourth section will deal with the major accomplishments.
A final section is a critique of NCCK's approach to community organization
and community development in squatter settlements of Nairobi.
* USIP was originally known as Mathare Valley Development Project. In
1976 it was called Urban Community Improvement Program. For the purpose
of this study, we shall use USIP.
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A. Organizational Analysis
Four interrelated aspects form the core of this analysis:
(1) USIP's basic goals;
(2) The organization's constituency and resource base;
(3) The organization's target populations, whose interests and
purposes are served by its work; and
(4) External relations.
(1) Basic goals and modes of procedure
The basic goals can be divided into two categories. First are the
service-oriented and secondly the change-oriented goals.
(a) Service-oriented goal
"To help raise the standard of living of squatter communities
economically, socially and spiritually." 3 2
This goal is to be achieved by:
(i) encouraging job creation through self-help methods;
(ii) assisting small businessmen with small loans and management
skills;
(iii) providing employment to groups of people through organizing
small-scale industries which are run as far as possible by
the workers themselves;
(iv) providing nutrition guidance to mothers in the community;
(v) offering social welfare service to the destitute in the
community.
(b) Change-oriented goals
Two goals can be identified: first is "to develop leadership and
"33
awareness among the squatters;" secondly, "to influence change of
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policies and programs of the local government." 3 4
These goals are to be achieved by:
(i) encouraging formation of interested groups to deal with
common problems;
(ii) providing a forum through which individuals and groups can
meet to identify their common problems and plan solutions;
(iii) dialogue with the local government on how best the problems
of Mathare Valley could be solved.
My observation, to be elaborated in a later section of this chapter,
is that NCCK has made more progress in achieving the service-oriented
goals than it has the change-oriented goals.
(2) Constituency and resource base
Constituency in this respect does not refer to the clientele but rather
to the kind of staff and practitioners who make the program function.
The resource base refers to both personnel and funds.
The director of USIP is the staff person who supervises the entire
work in Mathare Valley. The director and his staff are responsible for
planning of activities as well as resource allocation. Their plans have
to be approved by an advisory committee, a majority of whose members are
not NCCK employees. The committee members are people working with
government, private business or in non-governmental organizations in
Nairobi. The director is answerable to the general secretary, who
is the chief executive of the NCCK. At the moment, there is a staff of
fifteen, the majority of whom are social workers.35 With the exception
of one volunteer, a carpentry instructor, all others are Kenyan nationals.
Like most other NCCK projects, the bulk of USIP's funds comes as
aid from overseas churches and church-related organizations.36 However,
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it is important to note that the small-scale industries are self-suffi-
cient in terms of paying wages to the workers.
There are three points to note with relation to constituency and
resource base. First, USIP's staff is composed of indigenous people.
This is important since a few years ago there were quite a few expatriates
in the program. Whereas we do not mean to suggest that the indigenous
staff will always have a higher perception of the problems involved in
the work than foreigners, it is nevertheless highly probable that they
will tend to understand the squatters better. If nothing else, they
speak the same national tongue - Kiswahili.
Second, the director and his staff have a high degree of freedom
from the mother organization as far as program development and implementa-
tion are concerned. This is important in that it is the staff who are
out in the 'Valley' working with squatters and so in the best position to
identify the problems. As Zald found out, "when an organization is
directly dependent on its constituency for achieving organizational goals,
greater attention will be paid to constituency wishes and participation."3 7
Third, most of the work is funded from external sources. This,
however, does not mean that the external sources have control over the
work. The funds given are earmarked but the decision on how they are
used to do the work is entirely left in the hands of the program staff. 3 8
(3) Target populations
The main target group is the squatter communities in Mathare Valley.
To a lesser degree the local government, too, is a target group insofar
as NCCK's program aimed at changing social relationships and attitudes
between Nairobi City Council and squatters. To achieve this aim it was
necessary for USIP to establish a network of trust with both target groups.
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This is because "to the extent that members of target groups are suspi-
cious of an organization, communication channels will be blocked." 3 9
And without communication no useful work could be done.
To establish such a situation with Nairobi City Council was not a
very difficult thing since, as we shall show in a later section, NCCK
and Nairobi City Council saw eye-to-eye in major issues. To establish
an NCCK-squatters linkage was more problematic because NCCK personnel
and the squatters come from different social classes. A necessary pre-
requisite, therefore, was to minimize the social distance between the
squatters and the outsiders. This was done by having the pioneer workers
from USIP serve multiple purposes. The first practitioner represented
the "ego-ideal" of the squatters. For quite some time she even lived
among the squatters. It was only after establishing a network of trust
with the target groups that USIP sent specialists like nutritionists and
technical advisors to Mathare Valley.
As a casual evaluation, I would say that NCCK did establish a good
linkage both between Nairobi City Council and the squatters. However,
as far as changing the norms, values and social relationships between the
two target groups, it has a long way to go.
(4) External relations
The NCCK program could not succeed in mobilizing the squatters or in
reaching its major objectives without dealing with other agencies. This
is because NCCK is but one among several organizations that have interests
in the squatters. The motives for the interests are not necessarily
compatible. Nairobi City Council has already been mentioned as one agency
that NCCK had to deal with. The other was the central government.
Nairobi City Council and the central government have business in control-
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ling development not only in squatter settlements but in metropolitan
Nairobi in general. The way NCCK dealt with those agencies will be
discussed in more detail in the next section.
When NCCK began its work in Mathare Valley there were no rival
organizations. But later the land-buying and house-building companies,
mentioned above, began to do rival work. However, some NCCK officials
consider the companies' activities to be complementary.40 My prediction
is that in the near future conflict will develop between NCCK work and
that of the companies, unless USIP's basic goals will change to accom-
modate the kind of exploitation inherent in the work of the private
companies.
How does the relationship between USIP and those external organizations
enhance or impede its work? To a large extent, this will depend on
whether the activities of all those organizations can be merged, coordina-
ted or have a "peaceful co-existence". As a general postulate, coordina-
tion, sharing of facilities and proper integration are likely to take
place only when all the concerned agencies are likely to gain.41
This can be the case under the following specific conditions:
(1) The greater the symbiotic relation between the agencies, the
more likely the coordination. For instance, when the work of
USIP helps to create amicable social situations in Mathare Valley,
the police can carry on their official duties without fear of
being beaten up by the squatters. On the other hand, when the
government refrains from demolition of Mfathare Valley, NCCK's
work becomes easier. In such a case, the two organizations stand
to gain by cooperating. But as far as the private companies are
concerned, especially after 1970, they will stand to gain if the
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government demolishes the squatter houses.4 2
(2) The greater the marginal profits, the more likely the coordina-
tion. Or, stated differently, the greater the marginal cost of
coordination and integration or the lower the marginal profit,
the less chance of integration and coordination of activities.43
The example in (1), above, explains this condition as well.
(3) The less constituencies overlap, the more likely it is that the
constituencies are either neutral to or distrust each other and
thus the longer it will take and the more difficult it will be
to gain cooperation. Experience elsewhere shows that overlap-
ping constituencies contribute to coordination of the work in
community organization.45 The social workers of USIP and those
of Nairobi City Council work closely together in Mathare Valley.
They share their findings and experiences. Nairobi City Council
and USIP are represented in each other's relevant committees.
What the above propositions suggest is that NCCK, Nairobi City Council
and the government do, and will continue to, cooperate in their
programs in Mathare Valley. But the NCCK and the private companies will,
if they have not yet, conflict because the work of each tends to have
negative implications for the other's interests.
B. NCCK Social Planning Process
Having made an analysis of NCCK's community organization, we shall now
analyze another vital aspect of its work. This is the NCCK's social
planning process. It is vital in the sense that it shows the steps or
stages NCCK went through in developing its work in Mathare Valley.
Explicit in this analysis is the NCCK's theoretical and conceptual
framework of what the squatting problem in Nairobi is and its under-
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standing of how it can be resolved. In this section we shall use NCCK
rather than USIP because we are dealing with the period prior to formui
tion of the squatter improvement program.
In a social planning prodess there are two important aspects:
planning and organizing. Our definition of planning borrows from A.J.
Kahn. He defines planning as "a policy choice and programming in the
light of facts, projections and application of values."46 Choice
and values in this analysis are not necessarily objective; they refer to
the choice and values of NCCK, as we shall show later in this section.
Planning can also be considered as the analytical task of the practitioner,
or a development process in which the several levels of intellectual
undertaking are in constant interaction. Organizing takes on a broader
definition. It is "both the intellectual process of defining problems
and proposed solutions, and the activities that stem from those plans,
involving mobilization of necessary resources to achieve a result." 4 7
In other words, it could be considered as the interactional tasks in the
social planning process.
The two - planning and organizing - go together and the absence of
either of them could be futile to the work of an organization. Without
mobilizing the people and resources, planning is sterile. It is through
organizing that new policies and programs are put into effect. On the
other hand, organizing people to achieve social change requires planning
to guide both ends and means of their efforts.48 A synthesis of the two
is the problem-solving process.
NCCK's social problem-solving process has the following steps:
(1) defining the problem
(2) building the structure or the communications system for addressing
it
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(3) consideration of alternative solutions and adaptation of policy
(4) implementation of the program
(5) revision of the above decisions and actions in the light of con-
tinuous monitoring, evaluation and feedback
A more complex but better articulated way of explaining the steps was
developed by Kahn (p.62).
(1) Problem definition
Defining the problem is, in my view, the key step in a problem solving
process. The way an organization defines the problem or conceives of it
presupposes the ideology of the organization. The way in which a problem
is formulated will strongly influence how it will be handled in the
succeeding phases of problem solving. "In other words," contend PeriLman
and Burin, "the formulation of the problem to a large extent sets the
direction for thinking about it and acting on it."49
When defining the problem, NCCK is confronted with the issue of
whether to accept an already existing formulation provided by other
institutions or a popular theoretical position concerning the squatting
problem, or to undertake its own research and come out with a new formu-
lation altogether. Generally the NCCK concept of the squatting problem
seems to be greatly influenced by schools of thought that view "squatters
as communities striving for elevation" and "squatting as inevitable
blight" (see the introduction to this study).
In the preamble to the problem definition step, the NCCK study seems
to accept squatting as "simply the manifestation of normal urban growth
processes under historically unprecedented conditions. The tragedy is
not that such settlements exist - which is inevitable - but that many are
so much worse than they need have been."50 The position is clearly
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John Turner's.
The NCCK study considers squatting to be a matter of course in a
developing country like Kenya because the "inevitable break-up of tradi-
tional living and land ownership patterns brought a flood of young and
old to the swollen towns seeking work, excitement or just a change of
lifestyle."51 In independent Kenya, rural-urban migration increased all
the more because "freedom of movement of all 'wananchi' [masses] was one
of the first and most cherished rights of the new citizens."
With so great an influx into the cities, and without adequate stock
of low-cost housing to cater for them, "shantytowns sprang up in the nooks
and hollows of the city, offering a realistic - if rather unsightly -
answer to the basic needs"52 of obtaining food and shelter.
To show that "this [situation], of course, is not unusual," it is
observed that "United Nations figures show that in the past decade over
200 million people have moved into cities in Asia, Africa and Latin
America alone." And, in any case, "by 2050 it is estimated that fully
91% of the world's population will be living in cities."53
However, in its process of developing the Mathare Valley (Community
Work and Development) Project, NCCK appears to believe that its own
theoretical model is the most useful in defining the tasks that needed
to be performed, since the planning process essentially rests on an
appraisal of the situation that is to be effected. This was a commendable
idea to cherish because "the exercise of appraising the problem with as
much freedom from predefinition as possible provides an opportunity to
consider a range of alternatives in addition to those that may already
exist."54 But, as will become evident later in this analysis, neither
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the analytical nor the organizational tasks of NCCK's work in Mathare
Valley were original.
In its planning process NCCK was very concerned about coming out
with realizable solutions. It is true that the research which was under-
taken could not have been very useful without clearly set criteria of
what is and what is not relevant. As Kahn observes, "planning without
adequate investigation of relevant realities, relevant social facts, is
utopian thinking or traveling blind. Planning that assembles volumes
of data without imposing criteria of relevance and priority in their
appraisal is useless ritual. Actually, one does not know what facts to
assemble and how to weight them without simultaneous attention to pre-
ference and value questions."5 5 The question that should be raised,
however, is how objective the 'social realities' are. From what perspec-
tive are the 'social realities' being viewed.
Before undertaking the project the NCCK states clearly that it will
seek solutions "that must be financially, technically, politically and
administratively viable." In which case it will play any one or
progressively all three of the following roles.
"(1) Agitator/or initial community link, because the church or other
private agency is at least closer to the squatter community than either
the academics or officials.
and/or (2) The 'priming' exercise, i.e. taking the first step in
initiating pilot work along new lines where more conventional or
conservative elements hold back.
and/or (3) Gap-filling, where the constellation of organizations
concerned with the problems of low-income families still lack any
effective official coordination."5 6
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In considering those roles which NCCK can play singly or simultane-
ously, its work in Mathare Valley could then be viewed as typical community
organization as conceived in the United States.* The Mathare Valley
(Connunity Work and Development) Project fits into Kahn's definition of
community development. Community development, according to Kahn, is a
term that describes "both field and method, refers to community organi-
zation in underdeveloped countries or deprived areas in developed coun-
tries with a goal of creating 'community competence'. It involves adap-
tation to the special circumstances of the poor, the powerless, the
unskilled and the uneducated."57 Hence, the role of a community organizer
is that of 'change agent' or 'enabler' in community work. NCCK sees
itself fulfilling, and in its work in Mathare Valley has fulfilled, that
role. Besides the social work and establishment of cottage industries
in Mathare Valley, which will be discussed below, the NCCK was instru-
mental in establishing "Mathare Valley Development Committee". The
committee is composed of village leaders, politicians, NCCK and City
Council staff. "This group offers strong potential for meaningful
community participation."58
(2) Building Structure
When NCCK began its work in Mathare Valley, there did not exist a struc-
ture under which it could operate. It was therefore necessary to set
one up. In a situation where social change of any magnitude is involved,
various parties who have a stake in the system to be effected by the
change will be interested not only in the end result but even in the means
used to bring about that change. In the case of Mathare Valley, other
* See the definition of Community Organization above.
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interested parties were the City Council and the government. The people
who were being propelled toward change by the new venture were also
interested but, as we shall see later, from a different perspective. All
those parties had to be included in the structure.
With all those parties involved, a structure could not be designed
without some issues evolving. In a typical communicy organization situ-
ation, two types of issues are likely to emerge. First, if there is a
broad consensus on the purposes that different parties would like to
see pursued but there are differences as to what measures will be most
effective, the structure can be weighted toward maximizing expertise in
problem solving. If, on the other hand, there are wide differences con-
cerning values, purposes and goals, there is a prior task of finding a
mechanism that can achieve an agreed-on direction with sufficient legi-
timation to exercise influence on the problem being attacked.59 It
seems that in Mathare Valley case the latter problem did not arise. The
three dominant parties in NCCK, Nairobi City Council (NCC) and the Govern-
ment did not have any fundamental differences with respect to values,
purposes and goals. As to the fourth party, the people, they seem to
have been included in the organizational framework to legitimize the
purpose defined below.
The main purpose as outlined in the NCCK report was to work out
"a basic approach toward regaining development control where it was
lost, and channeling the potential private investment which squatter
settlements represent." 60
That purpose was set by NCCK, NCC and Government in their joint Pilot
Improvement Scheme in Mathare Valley.
Notwithstanding the homogeneity of the above parties, an accepted
structure did not come forth easily. Delays were caused by trivial
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differences emanating, to a large extent, from lack of sufficient factual
groundwork to facilitate productive discussions. As a result, "valuable
meeting time was wasted in mismatched and confusing conversation. '6
In the long run, the following structure was chosen: A '3-point
system' including the City Council, NCCK and Community Spokesmen with
the Central Government at the center. "The central government may not
be directly involved, but should be kept clearly in the picture with
periodic progress reports and copies of all significant correspondence."6 2
Voluntary Community
Agencies - Spokesmen
(NCCK)
Central
Government
City Council as
Coordination Unit
The role of the parties involved will be:
(a) City Council - gather and circulate official information on
forward planning and specific programs for low-income families. Keep
up-to-date information on low-cost housing from other countries. Parti-
cipate in all meetings.
(b) NCCK (and/or other voluntary agencies) - help fill the gaps where
the city cannot function, e.g. the setting up of small inudstrial estates
or similar schemes designed to stimulate employment and increase incomes
in designated target areas. This is the one to be involved in the grass-
roots work in the squatter settlement.
(c) Community Spokesmen - middlemen between the people and the City
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Council, but more of ten than not going through NCCK.
(d) Central Government.- periodic review of squatter policy. This
should include (1) regular evaluation of progress made by the agencies;
(2) discussion of the implications of new research findings (both local
and world-wide); and (3) proposals for adjusting agency roles or creating
new tools altogether to fill developing gaps or deal with new problems.
(3) Alternative Solutions
Consideration of alternative solutions to a problem is the stage at which
an organization makes a choice concerning the means to be used in
achieving the ultimate goal. It could therefore be viewed as policy
formation stage. Policy formation takes the point of departure from
general statements of goals and values and leads into more specific
program measures. Perlman and Gurin call it "an operational statement of
goal or goals."63 The most essential function of a policy is to provide
an explicit guide for future actions. In the case of NCCK, making a
choice concerning the nature community organization work had to take
was very crucial. This is because it involved laying a foundation upon
which to build the future work towards solution of such a serious problem
as squatting. It was therefore necessary for NCCK to consider a whole
range of alternative solutions before choosing the one it regarded as
most appropriate.
The alternative solutions are divided into two categories: deterrent
policies and positive policies.
Deterrent Policies
The most obvious example of deterrent policies is demolition. We dis-
cussed demolition of squatter settlements in Chapter 5. Others are influx
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control, where "pass-laws and other methods of restricting population
movements have been similarly unsuccessful in solving the squatter
problem"64 and rural incentive schemes and decentralization. Rural incen-
tive schemes and decentralization "is actually a positive form of a
negative approach and is listed under 'deterrents' only in that it is
usually intended to keep people on the land (or in decentralized towns) and
thereby hold down migration to major urban areas." 6 5
Positive Policies
There are two types of positive policies: first, recognition and pro-
gressive improvement of major squatter areas representing substantial
investment, especially in terms of dwelling units and businesses; and
secondly, vigorous expansion of the low-cost housing stock. In the case
of recognition and "progressive improvement" it was necessary for the
following two conditions and one promise to be met before any "progressive
improvement'".was undertaken.
(i) official recognition of the area by the urban authority
(ii) acquisition of land if it is not already in public hands
(iii) (promise of) provision of essential services (water, roads,
sanitation, electricity, health and educational facilities)
in the area
After a consideration of advantages and disadvantages of "site and service"
approach, otherwise referred to as "progressive improvement", it was
reckoned that
"The key to successful progressive improvement lies in limiting
public expenditure to a minimum and maximizing the private role,
so that improvement is paced to the homeowner's own ability and
interest."66
Of all the alternatives, NCCK chose the one of improvement of existing
settlements with provision of basic services. This was conceived of as
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"varied site and service approach". It was noted that the approach is
not new. Experiences would be drawn from other countries, especially
Latin America where
"lnew ways are being found of speeding up the provision of these ser-
viced plots for self-help, cooperation or even private commercial
building of low-cost homes."67
The organization was satisfied with its choice of alternative
because of the enormous advantages offered by (varied) site and service
schemes. Some of the advantages of these schemes are that:
1. investment in infrastructure is flexible and can serve changing
land uses;
2. site and service schemes elicit considerable private investment
for low-cost housing which would otherwise not be available for
this use;
3. responsiblity for management and rent collection can be trans'
ferred to the private sector;
4. the greater efficiency of the private investor can be put to work
for public purposes;
5. site and service transfers the onus of initially low-standard
development from public to private shoulders;
6. both home upkeep and improvement costs are borne by the indivi-
dual; and
7. most important is the fact that The Price is Right.
Those advantages imply that at a conceptual level the burden of housing
the poor is not the responsibility of the public sector but that of the
private individual. The policy implication seems to be that the authority
should relax the housing standards so that the poor can live peacefully
(without the authority's undue interference), with his own 'poverty-
level' standards.
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(4) Program Development
Planning that limits itself only to policy analysis is incomplete from
the point of view of practice. It is here that one of the distinctions
can be made between academic and practice orientations. An academic
orientation may stop with analysis, identifying values, choices and
consequences, and developing theoretical frameworks for evaluation. A
practice oriented analysis, on the other hand, needs to incorporate all
that into an action situation; this is done through building a program
to make operational the choices made.
Program involves the mobilization of resources and their delivery
to where they are needed. The major elements included in a program, as
far as community organization is concerned, are (1) content of the jobs,
where it is necessary to spell out what kinds of activities and services
are needed in the community, how much of that is needed and through what
physical arrangements they can be delivered; (2) a clear consideration of
the resources available to do the work. This includes both material and
human resources. It is important to know how these resources can be
mobilized; (3) what is feasible under the prevailing circumstances. It
will be necessary to consider what changes, if any, are needed in order
to achieve the objectives in policies and distribution of resources.
It is at this point that strategies for achieving the necessary changes
are mapped.
In describing its program development, the Mathare Valley Project is
described as having "happened in the spontaneous and rather haphazard
fits of growth characteristic of locally-initiated work which usually
begins on nothing."68 In the report it is suggested that "we wandered
into Mathare Valley one day and simply never wandered out again." But
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having taken us through the preliminary steps in social planning, the
suggestion that the Project "happened spontaneously" is not very con-
vincing. The Project, as far as our analysis goes, was a result of a
very well planned social intervention. Either the report is being
humble in explaining a benevolent church organization's concern in
helping the poor, or it is simply glossing over the issue. If the for-
mer is the case, then the most important point to note here, which the
report tries to dramatize, is the mode of and the point at which the
Project intervenes in Mathare Valley. As it is clearly stated, "the
void left by a consistent cold shoulder from city and government is
often filled with a strong spirit of self-help"6 9 characteristic of
poverty-stricken communities like squatter settlements. So when NCCK
came into Mathare Valley, initiative had already been taken by the
people; they were constructing a nursery school in Village 1.
The NCCK's first involvement in community work at the Valley seems
to be that of assisting in the construction of the nursery school.
"This was achieved with the assistance of students and lecturers from
a theological college."70 It was after that involvement that the Mathare
Valley Project (MVP) began to take shape.
The first activities undertaken by the MVP were those whose aim was
to alleviate the most basic needs of the squatters. That is why it
began by turning to "the unavoidable and urgent needs of providing
,7'
limited relief to destitute families and periodic fire victims."
This was done mainly with resources available within the NCCK social
work program.
The next activities were concerned with educational needs. It
started with a school fee assistance program, since most of the
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squatters could not afford school fees. This assistance "soon necessi-
tated a voluntary tutorial project to upgrade the work of students fre-
quently placed above their ability levels due to their old ages." The
last activity related to educational needs was that of conducting
training workshops for the nursery school teachers. However, this had
counterproductive results because the trained nursery school teachers
considered themselves highly qualified and therefore demanded better
pay, which the community could not afford. They ended up resigning.
As it is reported, "this soon demoralized the training schemes, which
were eventually left to the periodic efforts of a few resolute volun-
teers."72 During this period the Project began to get some aid from
overseas and international agencies.
The third category of activities involved establishment of employ-
ment generating cottage industries in the Valley. This was necessary
since through its involvement NCCK came to learn that "unemployment was
obviously a major problem."7 3 The employment schemes gave the project
more satisfaction because they were by far preferable to relief pay-
ments, which simply developed increasing dependence. All it took was
a total capital outlay of 40 ($110) to provide full employment to one
of the destitute cases. The cottage industries became part of an
ongoing program in the Valley.
The fourth and, according to the documented report, most important
category of activities was the squatter housing improvement program. It
is considered to be the most important because it provided the legal
tenure and urban security the squatters most desired.74 The NCCK and
the NCC formed a joint working party whose task was to prepare details
of a pilot project to experiment with the idea of "improvability". The
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Pilot Scheme involved (1) the improvement of 2 small Mathare villages,
Ngei I and Ngei II; and (2) the resettlement of one unimprovable village
outside the Valley, called Kaburini (or Mji wa Huruma) which was burned
down in early 1970 by the city, but still remained essentially intact.7 5
By 1970 NCCK had a staff of 10 people involved in community devel-
opment and community organization in Mathare Valley,
In the above brief analysis, we can identify the MVP's priority in
program development. The order of priority is
(i) food
(ii) education
(iii) employment
(iv) shelter
However, in terms of longer term commitment, housing is given primacy
over the rest. It is also important to mention that it is not just
housing, b.ut housing through the site and service scheme. It is to
this program that most of the resources were directed later on. What
seems to have happened is that food, education and employment were
given priority in terms of chronological sequence in program development
to build the people's confidence in the Project.
(5) Evaluation and Feedback
Evaluating information and feeding it'back to guide action applies to
the problem solving process in two ways. First, in describing a con-
tinuous activity that permeates the problem solving process we have
described in the above four steps. Second, evaluation applies to the
action outcome or end product of the total process. In this section
we are concerned mainly with the former.
In a program, monitoring of information is important in that it
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helps to correct or modify earlier decisions about structure or even
policy. It is highly probable, especially in an experimental program
like that of NCCK, that the perception of the problem might change as
the process goes on, and/or that the views of people and organizations
adapt themselves to one another as they interact. In such cases, solu-
tions to problems tend to be a choice among alternatives, each of which
represents some gains and some losses. During the initial stages of
program development, the NCCK workers admit that "We tried our hand at
many types of work, weeding out the less successful and concentrating
our limited resources on those roles which we could perform best, and
which would complement and not replace the community's own self-help
organizations."76 When it became apparent that nursery school teacher
training schemes had inverse impact on community development, the idea
was shelved. There is not much documentation of what effect monitoring
and feedback had on the MVP's activities, but it seems there was enough
flexibility to allow room for modifications, at least.
In concluding the analysis on NCCK's social planning process, there
are at least two things worth noting:
(1) The document we have used as data source states that the MVP
was meant to supplement the official work in Mathare Valley. If official
work here means the work of NCC and government, as we think it does, one
wonders what that means since there was, at least until NCCK came into
Mathare Valley, no official work of any importance. We will tend to con-
clude, therefore, that by "to supplement the official work" NCCK is making
a policy statement. As the work progressed, it becomes very clear that
NCCK, NCC and the government worked in close collaboration.
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(2) Whereas one of its major objectives was to involve the people in
community development, it is difficult to find evidence of people's
participation in the rest of the report. Where it is mentioned, it is
only in a very vague manner like "community spokesmen will be included
in the committees", or there was "involvement of the resident's develop-
ment committee in the decision-making process." But it is not spelled
out who the spokesmen were or what their role was, although the role of
other parties concerned is clearly stated. The only vivid description
of people's participation is where they planned and executed their
plans - sometimes in unorthodox* ways - during the construction of the
nursery school in Village 1. But at the time of that event, NCCK was an
invited participant and not an initiator.
NCCK Work in Mathare Valley
Before embarking on concrete projects in Mathare Valley, NCCK set for
itself what Icall here "operating policies". There were two of them:
(1) As far as possible NCCK would utilize its resources to complement but
not replace the community's own self-help organization and initiatives;
and (2) NCCK work will.be directed to the "neediest of the needy".78
It was found necessary to set such "operating policies" because when
NCCK's staff went into Mathare Valley for the first time, they found
the squatters organized and working with amazing apirit. So it was
* A roadblock was established at the Pangani entrance to the village.
Everyone who passed into the village was expected to pay one shilling.
One man refused, so his cycle was impounded. The angry man complained
to the Kenya Police, who sent five constables to enforce the constitu-
tional liberties of the individual. After discussion, not only did the
man pay one shilling and get his bicycle back, but the five askaries
added five shillings to the school fund.
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determined that such spirit should be encouraged and helped to thrive.
Co-operation between NCCK and the people was therefore the highest
criterion. The co-operation took various forms depending on the nature
of the issue. For instance, in determining the neediest families, village
committees gave a list to NCCK socialworkers who verified it by paying
home visits to those recommended. This kind of co-operation minimized
considerably any unprecedented friction between the social workers and
the people.
The NCCK work in Mathare Valley can be divided into five areas:
(a) education promotion; (b) health services; (c) nutrition and family
education program; (d) employment generating projects; and (e) shelter
improvement. We shall discuss each one of these in turn.
(a) Education promotion
In 1968 NCCK staff in Mathare Valley organized a joint meeting between
them and the community leaders of Village I. The aim of the meeting was
to "list the needs in order of priority and also to suggest ways of
"79
meeting those needs." On top of the list was education for children
followed by health facilities, which includes a need for clean water and
access to a clinic.
It is no accident, therefore, that the first NCCK staff experience
in Mathare Valley was in a work camp, during which time a nursery school
in Village I was constructed. When the building was constructed NCCK
served clean water for the nursery school. That was the first time
that clean water had ever been installed in Mathare Valley. The
water was also used by the people, especially those close to Village I.
Shortly after the nursery school was opened an event, which was to
be a turning point as far as education facilities in Mathare Valley is
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concerned, took place. NCCK invited the City Education Officer to visit
the Valley. He did not know that NCCK and the community had already
organized a multitude of school age children - who never had the oppor-
tunity of attending school - to come and "greet the special guest". As
Wanjiku Chiuri recalls the incident, "hundreds of children turned up and
the City Education Officer was dumbfounded." What ensued during the
visit implies that it was the first time a City Education Officer had
ever visited Mathare Valley. The results of the encounter were very
pleasant. The City Council official
"responded by requesting the City Council schools around the valley
to create an extra stream to accommodate Mathare children. This
necessitated the establishment of a school fees assistance program,
a voluntary tutorial project to upgrade the work of students fre-
quently placed above their ability levels due to their older ages."8 0
The tutorial program which was organized by NCCK staff involved
students from Nairobi University, Highridge Teachers College and Kenyatta
Teachers College. The children benefited from four hours per week of
intensive coaching by the same teacher. The tutoring was spread over two
hours a day for two days a week. This program proved to be successful
until it was discontinued two years later in favor of training nursery
school teachers from the Valley.8 1
Those initial steps towards expanding the opportunities for childrens'
education in Mathare Valley led to some improvements in this area. In
Mathare Valley today there is one primary school and six nursery schools.8 2
The role of NCCK did not continue to be as active except in assisting
the most destitute families with school fees. However, it runs "functional
literacy classes" for the workers of the cottage industries in Mathare
Valley. The purpose of these classes is "to improve English skills, while
using stories which are related to their own life situations in Mathare
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Valley. In this way they become more aware of their surroundings and
try to discover ways in which to improve the situation. Other classes
have been held on African literature and on business management."8 3
Without elaborating a little more on how the "functional literacy classes"
are conducted, it is difficult for the author quoted to convince us that
mere improvement of "English skills" can help to raise the level of
consciousness of the workers. While we do not underplay the importance
of "functional literacy classes", we tend to believe that all that it
amounts to is basically simple adult literacy and not consciousness
raising, as the author would have us believe. But our criticism is rather
inconclusive because it is made while relying on scanty information
concering functional literacy classes. However, I tend to foster a
conviction that an issue as important as consciousness raising of the
workers could have been given more attention in a document dealing with
"An Experiment in Human Development".
In spite of our criticism, however, we recognize that by and large
NCCK played a big role in improving the facilities and conditions for
formal education in Mathare Valley.
(b) Health services
One of the problems considered by the Mathare Valley squatters to be most
acute and serious is lack of clean water. Efforts at securing clean
water were taken by the people before NCCK started work among them. On
one occasion the community leaders decided to investigate the possibil-
ities of obtaining water from a city council pipeline passing close by
Mathare Valley. To obtain such water an initial capital of Shs 4000
(approximately US$500) was needed. It did not take long before the
people raised the required money through self-help activities. But as it
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turned out they never obtained the water. Installation of the prospec-
tive supply was delayed for some time and finally "the City Council Water
Department decided that 'illegal squatters' should not be permitted to
use clean water." 8 4
Whereas NCCK has not done much by way of alleviating the acute shor-
tage of clean water, it has installed water in institutions such as the
nursery school and in its various cottage industries in the area. The
people have access to such water but the meagre supply is far from
meeting the great demand.
Lack of medical services is another serious health problem in
Mathare Valley. Prior to 1971 the people spent a good deal of their
incomes in having transportation to take patients to clinics in other
parts of the city. NCCK has helped to combat this problem with consider-
able success.
"With permission from the administration, the NCCK helped to construct
the first temporary clinic in 1971. The services of a volunteer
part-time medical doctor and nurses were secured from one of the
churches. Later on the community gave the NCCK part of the class-
rooms in the community's self-help permanent school. The two rooms
are used as a Maternal and Child Health Clinic, which forms part
of the Nutrition and Family Life Education Center." 85
Compared to the colossal health problems of the area, the services pro-
vided at the clinic are grossly inadequate. However, the approach to health
service delivery in the squatter settlement is very commendable. The
clinic has become a center for providing comprehensive family-centered
health care services. This approach, to be elaborated in the section on
nutrition below, is very useful for the inhabitants, whose meagre incomes
cannot afford conventional medical services in Nairobi.
(c) Nutrition and family education program
For NCCK nutrition and family education program is perhaps the most
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active and valuable involvement in community organization and community
development in Mathare Valley today. Since NCCK started community work in
Mathare Valley in 1968, the organization has been deeply concerned with
the widespread malnutrition, and its derivatives, among the children, As
early as 1969, after NCCK helped in building a nursery school, it was
recognized that one of the problems that constrained the learning capacity
of the children was undernourishment caused by lack of sufficient and
nutritious foods. NCCK organized soup kitchens and distributed powdered
milk in an effort to combat malnutrition. This had limited success, as
far as records go.
It was not until 1974 that there was a breakthrough in the area of
nutrition. That year a study was made by a trained nutritionist working
with NCCK in co-operation with the Medical Doctor who visits the clinic
three times a week. They observed mainly the school children who are
assisted financially by NCCK. The childrens' health and academic perfor-
mances at school were the two major variables observed. The observation
revealed that generally the children from Mathare Valley did more poorly
in school than those from more well-off neighborhoods. Among the Mathare
Valley children those with poorer health had poorer performance in school
than those whose health was better. So it was concluded that there is a
close correlation between poor health and poor performance in schools.
On that basis, the NCCK project "became increasingly concerned about
mental retardation in children due to poor diet." 8 6
Whether or not mental retardation due to poor diet is widespread
among the children in Mathare Valley is a matter we shall not pursue
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in this discussion.* However, our major concern is not so much the relia-
bility of the research findings as the spirit behind the project known
as "Nutrition and Family Education Project". The crucial element in the
NFEP philosophy of health is that an entire family becomes the "patient".
When a child is found to be a victim of malnutrition a complete diagnosis
(medical, social, economic, etc.) is done of the child's entire family
situation. The family with all of its problems now becomes the concern
of the project.
When the project was launched in late 1974, mothers came forward
and "gave long stories of extreme poverty". It was found out that the
basis for malnutrition was multi-faceted: besides the abject poverty,
women had too many children who were too close to one another. Because
of too frequent births "the children are weaned to improper foods" too
early. Hence there is a high probability for the weanlings to be under-
nourished. 87
After the thorough diagnosis of the problem, it was found necessary
to prescribe a multi-faceted solution as well. It was found necessary
to begin a public health program for the mothers. Under that general
title were specific activities, namely education and nutrition, family
planning and general hygiene. There was another very central aspect of
the problem which, if not addressed, could make the abovementioned acti-
vities appear too disembodied from reality. This aspect is the resources
required to purchase the necessary goods. The project therefore had to
* At any rate I seriously question the basis on which the children are
judged to be mentally retarded. The comparatively poorer academic per-
formance on the part of the Mathare Valley children should be attributed
to a multi-variate causation. The physical, social and psychological
environment of a place like Mathare Valley is hardly conducive to high
permormance in formal education.
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create occupations for the mothers to increase their earnings and also
to devise ways of ensuring that the added income be used for the intended
purposes.
The project began by establishing a Nutrition and Family Education
Center. Besides the education part of the program, a patchwork project
was started. 100 mothers are involved in sewing patches on pieces of
cloth. They are taught various designs and today the women, a majority
of whom had never been to school, make their own designs. The women
attend the center and after a brief period of instructions on nutrition,
family planning or hygiene, they pick up their pieces of cloth and take
them home for sewing. "The mothers appreciate this arrangement very much
because they can look after their children while they are sewing. The
arrangement is ideal because the mothers cannot afford to hire house-
helpers." 8 8
Through the project the mothers can earn Shs 50 ($6) per week, "which
is quite considerable, taking into account their financial plight before
joining the group." 8 9 The low cost but nutritious food produced at the
center seem to have encouraging results. The food is a mixture of ground
soy beans, maize flour and powdered milk. Mothers buy the mixture at the
center aid take it home where they prepare it for their children.
Since the project began, a very interesting development - from the
viewpoint of community organization - has taken place. Through their own
initiative the women decided to form a credit union. They appointed
their own committee. The organization required every woman to contribute
Shs 4 (US$.50) every week. "Four different women are selected each week
to receive Shs 92 (about $12) so that they can do much more for the family
that week. Through mutual encouragement women buy necessary items like
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blankets and clothes for children. After they have spent the money each
woman is asked to invite the committee members and show them what she
has bought for the family." 9 0
The project is very encouraged with the impact it has made on the
lives of many mothers and their families. It hopes to begin a research
on technology of drying and storing foodstuffs. This is because after the
nutritionist's observation it is evident that "during the dry months when
food is scarce and prices of food go up, poor families cannot cope with
the stiuation."91 This observation is of course a fact; it is usually a
matter of common sense and it should not take a specialist, conversant
with situations like squatter settlements, that long to realize it.
However, the intentions are good and, as the nutritionist contends, if
food is bought during the time of plenty and properly preserved, it could
go a long way in helping the poor families to contain situation during the
time of scarcity when food prices "skyrocket".
The NFEP is a young and very promising program. It is promising
because it addresses a very basic problem and involves mothers whose stake
in the success or failure of the program is very high.
(d) Employment-generating projects
With involvement, NCCK came to -a better understanding of the nature of
the Mathare Valley community and its problems. Unemployment was obviously
a major problem. In an attempt to address this problem,
"The NCCK initiated, at the request of the community, a chain of
temporary workshop clusters which offered employment to the very
needy families. No doubt, the job opportunities created were very
few, but the items produced, such as copper jewelry, leather shoes,
school uniforms, and high-quality educational toys, had a great
impact in changing the general public's attitudes towards Mathare
people. Many people visited Mathare Valley for the first time
while they went to buy from the workshops." 9 2
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Four small scale industries are now in operation. These are Furaha
Toys, Malaika Crafts, Leo Mpya and Ufumaji (Weaving Project). In all, there
there are about 100 people employed on a full time basis. Below is a
brief discussion on the activities of each of the industries.
Furaha Toys
Started in 1970, this is the biggest of the NCCK workshops in Mathare
Valley. It specializes in wooden educational toys. It has the highest
output but it is also the most capital intensive as compared with the
other workshops. Its output runs to several hundred thousands of toys
per year. Some of its products are exported to West Germany and Great
Britain and others are marketed locally. The local market is composed
mainly of the richer people, tourists and high class schools, since the
toys are of high quality and therefore too expensive for an average Kenyan
and ever moreso for squatters in Mathare Valley. With a work force of
77 in 1975, "Furaha Toys is now self-supporting and able to pay all the
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workers more than the minimum wage recommended by the Government."
Malaika Crafts
Malaika Crafts was begun in 1971 with four disabled young men who had
been trained in jewelry making at a Government Rehabilitation Center.
The workshop employed a total of 18 persons in 1974. All the employees
are referred by an NCCK social worker, who tries to determine those most
in need.
The workshop is able to pay wages for all employees, with the exception
of the manager, whose salary is partially subsidized by the NCCK.
"The workshop produces items in copper and brass, which incorporates
the use of local pods, crocodile teeth, fishbone vertabrae, and ostrich
egg beads, as well as some clay beads which are made locally. All
designs are based on some African motif, and most are now being
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created by the workers themselves. The jewelry wholesales for
Shs 20 ($2.90) up to Shs 75 ($10.70), depending on the design and
materials used."g9
In 1975 a leather section was opened. The leather goods made include
shoes, bags, belts, watch straps and key rings.
Unlike Furaha Toys, Malaika Crafts is entirely labor-intensive. But
like it, its finished products too are expensive and are consumed mainly
by people of high income classes. The manager of the workship recognizes
this fact:
"Most of our products are marketed overseas through Cottage Industries
(Germany, England, Holland), or sold through the NCCK Cottage Crafts
shop in Nairobi. Another shop in Nairobi, 'African Heritage', has
been instrumental in gaining markets for our jewelry in the U.S.A.
In March 1974 the Field Museum of Chicago presented an exhibit of
Contemporary African Art which included some of our work."9 5
Leo Mpya
Leo Mpya is basically a training workshop for sewing. The trainees
are mostly girls who fail to go to high school. Together with training,
Leo Mpya specilizes in tailoring. Clothes are made to measure and the
making of school uniforms is a large part of their activities.
Since its inception in 1971, Leo Mpya has made a lot of progress.
For instance, in September 1975, seven girls who were taking a one year
course in dressmaking and design graduated. A few of these girls had
indicated their interest in working together as a co-operative, after
finishing their course. The project started them off with a loan and
also assisted in finding suitable market and adequate premises for their
business. The workshop will continue to train more girls who fail to
96
qualify for secondary school education.
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Ufumaji* (Weaving Project)
This is the youngest of the workshops. Like Leo Mpya, Ufamaji is basi-
cally a training workshop. It weaves mainly woolen material. Unlike other
projects, Ufumaji takes in people from outside Mathare Valley. But they
are almost invariably needy cases. The trainees are expected to do weaving
in other parts of Kenya where wool is plentiful. One remarkable aspect
of this project is its ingenuity in utilizing local and most common
plants in making dye. The project seems to be making good progress.
Its finished products are so popular in Nairobi that production cannot
keep up with demand.
Like the products of other workshops, those of Ufumaji are also too
expensive for the average Kenyan.
Connected with the small scale industries is the small business
scheme. The aim of the project is to assist a few individuals by
advancing small loans. It is also the project's aim to
"help the people to run their small businesses more efficiently.
Group oriented co-operatives have been found more successful. So far
4 groups are in operation trading in charcoal, used clothes and
meat. Group members are taught practical bookkeeping, banking and
business administration. In this way loss of funds through misman-
agement is minimized."9 7
Other businesses that have been set up through loans from NCCK are
tea kiosks, fruit and vegetable vendors, and small businesses.
In concluding the section on employment-generating projects we would
agree that they have contributed a great deal to the economic progress of
a good many households in Mathare Valley. It is important to recognize
that helping 100 families in a squatter settlement to have a regular
income is a great contribution to the economic advancement of the community
*
Swahili word for weaving.
176
as a whole. This is because there is a network of kinship relationships
among the squatters which makes it possible for an added income to meet
the needs of other people besides the individual recipient.
(e) Shelter improvement
The findings of the research on squatter settlements of Nairobi, done by
NCCK in 1971, convinced the organization that the most effective way of
housing the poor was by improving the shelters on the current locations.
Prior to the concept of improvability, the city authorities advocated
redevelopment of the squatter settlements. It has been pointed out above
(see section on alternative solutions) that, of all the alternatives,
NCCK chose the one of improvement of existing settlements with provision
of basic services: in other words, varied site and service approach.
Ever since, NCCK lobbied the City Council Planning Department and other
relevant authorities until the concept of improvability was accepted as
the desired strategy for resolving the problem of squatter housing.
NCCK seems to have put a lot of hope in the improvability approach.
When the City Council finally accepted the idea, NCCK received the accep-
tance with a sense of optimism.
"The opportunity finally presented itself when, just before the
November 1971 elections, City Council did an about-face in policy and
agreed to a joint pilot scheme with the churches to test this idea
of 'improvability' to replace the former demolition policy. This would
allow the residents to then progressively develop the Valley over
time to a better standard housing, but most important, it would provide
the legal tenure and urban security they most desired, as well as
basic services." 9 8
Since then NCCK, as the chief protagonist of the idea of improvability,
has done a lot to prove that it is the most viable option. It established
its first site and service scheme in 1971. The arrangement is that NCCK
gives loans, either in cash or kind (building material) and the people
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organize their labor, preferably on a self-help basis. The NCC is sup-
posed to provide the plots and services.
As of 1976 168 houses out of a total of 310 plots allocated had been
completed. Another type of arrangement within the same program is
that of building tenant purchase houses. The houses are built by the
City Council and the prospective owners are supposed to pay deposits
before they are allocated houses. When the first lot of such houses
were completed in 1974, "The NCCK assisted 130 families with a loan to
pay for the deposit."9 9
In all it seems that NCCK has helped about 133 households through
varied site and service schemes. Assuming an average of 5 people per
family, about 1,500 people are supposedly living in better shelters as
a direct benefit from the site and service scheme.
However, the improvability strategy has not worked as well as NCCK
hoped it would. That is because of several reasons. First, the private
housing companies in Mathare Valley have become the dominant agency in
"improving" housing in Mathare Valley. But as we pointed out earlier,
the company houses do not benefit the neediest of the needy in Mathare
Valley. Second, the NCC has on many occasions not lived up to its pro-'
mises of providing plots and services. In one case, that of rehousing
people of Mji wa Huruma, it took the City Council five years to allow
the people to move into the site which did not have any services.
The third reason is even more problematic because it questions the intrin-
sic viability of improved site and service schemes as a solution to
squatter housing problems. Of the 130 families that NCCK helped to
acquire improved houses, Chiuri has this to say:
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"When the same families were visited after one year, nearly half of
them had rented out the whole house and had gone back to rent
cheaper accommodation in the squatter settlement. About a quarter
of the families occupied the kitchen space only and rented the
other three rooms. The other quarter had changed the internal
structure construction by putting an extra wall or blocking the
existing door and building a door where there was not one."100
In light of the above it seems the NCCK will have to devise another
more viable approach to the solution of squatter settlement housing.
D. Summary of NCCK sccomplishments in Mathare Valley
To accurately evaluate the achievements of NCCK in Mathare Valley it is
important to review its goals. Under the service-oriented goals NCCK
aimed at helping to raise the standard of living of squatter communities
economically, socially and spiritually. The change-oriented goals are
first, to develop leadership and awareness among the s uatters and
secondly, to influence change of policies and programs of the local
government.
In this assessment the accomplishments of NCCK are divided into
three areas: fisrt is the general recognition of NCCK's work by other
organizations; second is the achievement of service-oriented goals; and
third are the achievements towards the change-oriented goals.
1. General recognition
In Nairobi NCCK's work in squatter settlements is known in all circes
In recognition of its work among squatters, the government has granted
NCCK's representation in the committees that have anything to do with
poverty and welfare. NCCK is represented in committees of international
organizations like UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program) and UN
Human Settlements Program, both of which are headquartered in Nairobi.
Having represented NCCK in the Non-Governmental Organizations under UNEP,
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I understand the basis of NCCK's representations to be its contribution
towards improvement of squatter settlements in Nairobi.
Perhaps more than any other agency the City Council of Nairobi in
collaboration with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (World Bank) seem to be most impressed and appreciative of the NCCK
work in Mathare Valley. As a result, NCCK has been invited to partici-
pate in development of the biggest site and service scheme in Kenya,
known as Dandora Sites and Services Project. According to the terms of
reference with regard to the Project:
"In order to benefit from the National Christian Council of Kenya's
(NCCK) experience in organizing and supporting low income communities
and because of time pressures for the Dandora Sites and Services
Project, the Town Clerk and the Task Force preparing the Dandora
Project have requested NCCK to prepare proposals for community
organizations and management of the Project."101
More specifically, NCCK was requested to:
"(a) make recommendations on how recipients of serviced lots might
be organized, prepared or trained for their introduction into
the Project;
(b) decide what role voluntary welfare groups and other organizations,
e.g. church groups, should play in support of the project;
(c) decide what productive or commercial enterprises, e.g. small
industries and. handicrafts, should be promoted within the
community - how and at what stage; and
(d) decide what training arrangements should be made to promote
self-help housing, productive enterprises, and social services
within the community.1 0 2
(2) Service-oriented
Using the data available it is difficult to measure how the peoples' living
standard has been raised spiritually. But socially and economically it
is probable that the standard of living of quite a good number of people
in Mathare Valley has risen as a result of NCCK's contribution. Services.
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in Mathare Valley range from social welfare to financial sponsorship of
children in schools to installation of water at the nursery school to
provision of clinic services. It was pointed out that the NCCK small
scale industries employ no less than 100 workers on wages above those
recommended by the government. The numerous small shops and other busi-
nesses in Mathare Valley could be attributed, to a large extent, to the
NCCK's Small Business Loan Scheme.
The Nutrition and Family Education project has brought under one group
100 women who, besides earning some income through Patchwork, are begin-
ning to be more responsible in caring for their children. In evaluating
its one year experience the project has the following to say:
"From observation the women who come to the Center have improved a
great deal. They clean a little, wear better clothing and, above
all, they are looking after their children better than before."103
Whereas the shelter improvement program is beset with enormous
problems, it is fair to attribute part of site improvements in Mathare
Valley to the project. As NCCK admits, with respect to shelter improve-
ment, the project has a long way to go. However, at the very least no
less than 100 families have benefited fron NCCK as far as improved
housing is concerned.
(3) Change-oriented achievements
Perhaps the most important achievement as far as NCCK is concerned is
the legal recognition of Mathare Valley as a necessary blight in the
normal development of Nairobi. NCCK views the accomplishment with a
sense of satisfaction.
"Thus during 1971, despite the delays, frustrations and general
scrabble of any work without precedent we feel that the basic aim
of the pilot scheme has been achieved: Mathare Valley has been
legally recognized."?1 0 4
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The implication of this is that the authorities refrained from demolishing
shelters in Mathare Valley. This creates a good atmosphere under which
the squatters can do their work and make some progress, while NCCK too
needed the same atmosphere to carry on its projects successfully.
Secondly, the NCCK considers having won the government and City
Council into accepting the concept of improvability as a big accomplish-
ment.
A third accomplishment under change-oriented goals is the fact that
the City Council changed its attitude towards primary school education
for Mathare Valley children. Many children from the Valley are able
today to attend schools in some communities within proximity of Mathare
Valley.
The area NCCK has had very little or no accomplishments in at all is
helping to raise the awareness of the people of Mathare Valley. Perhaps
this is because it has not made any effort to do so. The organization
seems to have contented itself with social welfare services and mild
City Council policy adjustments. In almost all the data available there
is no mention of how NCCK has made efforts at achieving its goal of aware-
ness building among the people. However, there is a mention of the need
to seriously reconsider the pursuit of this goal in the future.
"Finally NCCK should get away from traditional methods of social
work, namely casework and groupwork, and work much more with communi-
ties. NCCK should not be tied down with development projects but
should be much more a change agent which tries to tackle attitudes
and institutions which stifle human development for change. In
short, NCCK in problem areas should engage in conscientisation
programs where people analyze their own situations and determine
their own response to such situations. 1 0 5
How scrupulously this goal will be pursued is a matter whose evalua-
tion will not be made in this study.
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Finally, we view NCCK's most important achievement to be that of
legitimizing the need for improvements of squatter settlements of Nairobi.
Superficial as the current changes might be, Mathare Valley will hardly
be the same again. It is pertinent to predict that in all probability
Mathare Valley will not be demolished without strong resistance from the
communities dwelling there. Through their involvement in self-help
projects, in interacting with authorities (with NCCK as mediator), it
is highly likely that the people have come to realize their potential
as a community. It is just as well that we conclude the summary of
NCCK achievements by quoting the view of Mathare Valley people themselves:
"even if NCCK could not do much, at least they cared." 106
E. Conclusions
In concluding the case study let us review the major points we have
-raised. We identified three types of community organization in Mathare
Valley. Whereas all three of them seem to have contributed to physical
and economic development of Mathare Valley, none of them has made signi-
ficant contribution to educational consciousness raising, least of all
the private companies whose advancement is detrimental to that of the
squatters.
The companies began as. self-help organizations whose ultimate objec-
tive was to obtain security of land tenure for the whole community. But
when the opportunity arose, the leaders seized it and in the long run they
are now party to exploitative merchandising in Mathare Valley. This
behavior on the part of the squatter leaders is not peculiar to the
Mathare Valley people. Generally unconscientized oppressed people tend
to yield to opportunism. Observation of squatters elsewhere reveal that
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"The oppressed tend to look at immediate, short-range benefits because
their situation does not encourage long-term plans and hopes. Even
when they have started to struggle for liberation, individual-
leaders and members of factions can give in to the temptation of
immediate gain at the expense of their companions." 1 0 7
In spite of all the important work done in Mathare Valley hitherto,
the people - the squatting masses - remain demobilized and only organized
in a manner that makes them prone to politics of manipulation. A good
case in point is the situation in Village II which, incidentally, Marc
Ross, Donna Holden, David Ethertonand Andrew Hake all consider to be the
best organized and advanced. The criticism I put forth here is not
against the point that it is organized and advanced but the important
point is, in whose interest is it organized and advdnced. Marc Ross
throws some light on this. In his thoroughly researched study of poli-
tical integration of squatter settlements in Nairobi, he best articulates
the degree of political manipulation of the people in Village II by the
"best" leader in the Valley. Peoples' inertia and lack of conscientized
organization manifest themselves again in the current crisis between
the squatters and the exploitative capitalist companies.
NCCK's great achievements in raising the standard of living of the
squatters lacks a corresponding development in awareness building. That
kind of development is likely to lead to a situation similar to that of
the companies vis-a-vis the people, if only at micro level. Such a situ-
ation is likely to emerge because whereas it is true that the people
possess the basic capacity to advocate for things in their interests as
a community, it is equally true that when they have been forced to live
so long under inhuman conditions, they tend to develop exploiter attitudes
and behavior. This proposition has been well promulgated by an authority
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on pedagogy of the oppressed. 1 0 8
NCCK seems to have been obsessed by the notion of "improvability"
of squatter housing through varied site-and-service schemes (SSS). But
from the experiences with "improvability", it seems to be getting disil-
lusioned about both the efficacy and viability of the strategy. It is
beyond the scope of this study to go into the merits and demerits of SSS.
But it is in order to note that the SSS now being advocated and
heavily financed by the World Bank (among other agencies) as the "new"
and most effective strategy for solving the problem of low-cost housing
in underdeveloped capitalist countries, was tried for the first time in
the wake of the Industrial Revolution in Europe.109 Since then, it has
been tried in most of the developed capitalist world. It has never suc-
*
ceeded in solving the problem. We doubt if it will succeed in Kenya.
In the final analysis, therefore, we conclude that in Mathare
Valley, and even more so in other squatter settlements of Nairobi, the
solution to the roots of squatters' problems, as analyzed in this thesis,
has a long way to go. That is why the next, and last, chapter of this
study is devoted to suggestions on how to improve the current NCCK
work in Mathare Valley.
*
For an informed view on bureaucratic problems, as well as an in-
depth analysis of the biggest site-and-service scheme in Kenya, see
Richard Beardmore: "Site and Services: A Strategy for Kenyan Urban
Development," Unpublished MCP Thesis, MIT (1978).
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Chapter 7
Recommendations
Our study has spelled out the root causes of the squatting prob-
lem in Kenya in general and Nairobi in particular. We also made an
analysis of various types of solutions to the squatting problem. Two
types of solutions were discussed: first, is the official approach by
the authorities; and the second one is community organization. The
first approach was shown to be ineffective in dealing with the problem.
Whereas the second one has had more positive impact upon the lives of
squatters, it also is beset with very serious problems which were point-
ed out in the previous chapter. One of the organizations involved in
community organization among the squatter settlements of Nairobi is the
National Christian Council of Kenya. Its work was shown to have con-
tributed toward improving the living conditions of squatters in Mathare
Valley especially. NCCK has also expressed concern over wanting to
improve its traditional social welfare approach to community organiza-
tion. It proposes to transcend its present case work and group work
approach and "engage in conscientization programmes where people analyze
their own situations and determine their own response to such situa-
tions.I
It is on that basis, therefore, that the recommendations in this
chapter are made to NCCK. It is also understood that an organization
like NCCK can only achieve incremental changes, and then only to a limi-
ted degree. NCCK is clearly not a political movement nor a revolution-
ary organization. That is why our recommendations will be based pri-
marily on what the organization has set as its goals.
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The recommendations are made on two interrelated levels. First,
is a theoretical or conceptual level. That means the recommendations
will be directed towards the theoretical position of NCCK with regard
to the squatting problem. The second level is on more pragmatic issues
and the recommendations will be addressed to specific work of NCCK.
In making the recommendations, we are fully aware of the socio-
economic circumstances now prevailing in Kenya. A consideration is
also taken of the limitations to what NCCK as a voluntary church organ-
ization is able and capable of doing.
1. Theoretical Position
The analysis of NCCK's "definition of the squatting problem" in
Chapter 6 above, revealed that NCCK sees the problem as basically an
inevitable consequence of urbanization and modernization. That position
seriously understates what this study has shown to be a very complex
problem. We contend that such a position was reached at because of
lack of clear analysis of the historical process that laid down the
basis for squatting in Kenya. Our first recommendation, therefore, is
for NCCK to seriously review its theoretical position concerning the
squatting problem in Kenya. This study, I believe, has shown clearly
the root causes of the problem. It can, therefore, form a sound basis
for a theoretical framework from which to conceptualize the problem.
We do not pretend to say that the study has exhausted the means by which
the problem can be understood. However, insofar as the analysis is
based on the historical context within which the present Kenyan socio-
economic "development" has taken place, it is pertinent to argue that
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an accurate definition of the problem has been made.
Strong emphasis is laid on theoretical framework, because any ac-
tion which is not based on profound knowledge of the fundamental reality
of the problem it seeks to resolve is unlikely to succeed in solving
that problem.
2. Recommendations on the Work of NCCK
(a) Pedagogical Role
In the field of community organization, it is common to hear ex-
pressions such as "lifting the level of awareness of the people" or
"building the people's consciousness". Before making a recommendation
on the pedagogical role of NCCK, it is necessary to point out what I
understand by those nebulous expressions.
The terms "lifting the level of awareness" and "consciousness-
building" can be very misleading. They presuppose two opposing parties;
one possessing the tools and technology required to "lift" or "build"
the awareness or consciousness of the second party, whose awareness and
consciousness are apparently dormant. By implication, the concept con-
siders awareness and consciousness to be static categories that can be
"lifted" or "built" at will. In my view, that concept of education is
wrong because it treats knowledge as a gift bestowed by those who consi-
der themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know lit-
tle or nothing. It also treats empirical reality as static. But the
real world is very different from what the above concept presupposes.
No one individual, group, or, for that matter, class of people can pre-
tend to have a monopoly of knowledge. Nor is reality static; rather,
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it is a process undergoing constant transformation, in which case then,
it is too presumptuous on the part of some people to see themselves in
the business of lifting and building other people's awareness and con-
sciousness.
That, however, does not mean that I do not see some basis on which
a certain class of people can be in a more advantageous position than
another class of people, in terms of having access to facts concerning
systems, institutions or some other dimensions in life. In this re-
spect, there is one basis on which an organization like NCCK is said to
be in a position to contribute towards the squatters' understanding of
the structures that repress them.
That basis can be seen from the viewpoint of historical reality
of the Kenyan situation. Kenya has only just come out of colonial
domination. By nature, a colonial situation does not permit the develop-
ment of sophisticated education for the natives and, therefore, the
grassroots do not generally reach a high level of political conscious-
ness before the advent of the phenomenon of national independence.
What the colonial system did was to offer the petty bourgeoisie the
historical opportunity of taking leadership in formal education and its
derivatives. The NCCK staff, composed, by and large, of petty
bourgeoisie, could be said to play a role of information-gathering and
sharing of it with the squatters.
A good example of how NCCK is in an advantaged position to under-
stand some things that are beyond the social terrain of the squatters,
is its role in development of Dandora Site-and-Services Project. NCCK
is kept fully informed of the Terms of Reference of the Project. In
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the Project Agreement the World Bank, the Kenya Government and the Nai-
robi City Council agreed on the following terms of reference concerning
squatter settlement demolitions. No demolitions will be done except
under the following conditions:
(i) there will be thirty-days' notice to the squatters affected
prior to demolition;
(ii) the shelter owner asks for demolition;
(iii) there is provision of alternative housing prior to demolition;
(iv) the squatter settlement is seriously needed for public use;
(v) the squatter settlement is clearly a health/safety hazard. 2
But as far as we know, the above conditions were not met before
the most recent demolitions in Nairobi. According to the newspapers,
the demolitions left over 10,000 people homeless.
In that kind of situation, NCCK can help the squatters in resist-
ing demolition without being accused by anybody of sedition. And be-
sides, I believe that every human being has a right to be told before-
hand why his house is being demolished. Sharing of the information of
that kind can correctly be said to increase the awareness of the squat-
ters and being involved in resistance, which in any case will be within
the conditions laid by the authorities, contributes to critical con-
sciousness of the squatters.
(b) Community Organization Training
In the analysis on Chapter 6, it was shown that the leadership of
base-group organization in Mathare Valley has been co-opted by the urban
political system. It hardly serves the interests of the squatters any-
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more. At the same time, the situation of the squatters is now seriously
threatened by the proliferation of land-buying and house-building pri-
vate companies in Mathare Valley. In light of the above, it is correct
to argue that the squatter community in Mathare Valley is seriously in
need of more enlightened base-group leadership.
As we pointed out above, NCCK has expressed concern for seeking,
together with people, viable means of raising the people's level of
awareness concerning the structures that oppress them. But as far as
we know, nothing has been done in practical terms to implement that con-
cern. We therefore propose that NCCK undertakes training of community
organizers from among the squatters themselves. The pertinent question
to raise is how feasible would such an undertaking by NCCK be.
It is most unlikely that within the current NCCK staff in Mathare
Valley there are people fully equipped to do community organization
training. But there are potential people who would need only several
months' orientation to acquire the necessary skills. A joint recommen-
dation, therefore, which may be a prerequisite to the above one, is for
NCCK to use its connections with other church-based organizations and
sponsor some of its staff, or indeed reliable squatters themselves, to
train with organizations that have experiences in the area. An organiza-
tion from which NCCK can benefit in this respect is the Christian Coun-
cil of Asia (CCA), which runs several community organization training
courses every year. To facilitate an arrangement towards this end, the
NCCK can collaborate with the Urban Industrial and Rural Mission of the
World Council of Churches, whose duty it is to render that kind of ser-
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vice to church-related organizations.
Conclusion
This study has showed that the squatters are part of the exploited
and oppressed class of people in Kenya. It is our contention that the
ultimate solution to their problem lies entirely in their hands. But
it is also true that any organization that shows concern over the plight
of squatters and has gone to some length to demonstrate that concern,
both in words and by action, needs to be encouraged to do even more.
It is in that understanding that the above recommendations were made.
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